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Dissertation Abstract 
This dissertation revolves around the complex political circumstances in apartheid South Africa 
that produced Nelson Mandela the rhetorician, human rights activist, and the longest political 
prisoner in human history. The manner in which Nelson Mandela deploys a braided rhetoric that 
is a combination of the African and Western rhetorical traditions for spearheading the anti-
apartheid struggle in South Africa is investigated. Mandela draws upon the African rhetorical 
tradition through which his identity, selfhood, and ethos were forged, while appropriating the 
Western rhetorical tradition through which he attained his education and training as a lawyer. Also 
examined is the complexity of inter-ethnic strife among Black South Africans; a situation that was 
exploited by the apartheid regime and which made the western rhetorical tradition inadequate for 
addressing apartheid domination. The dissertation also studies Mandela’s dynamism as he 
navigates the murky waters of apartheid policies, which were not only smoke screens for veiling 
their racist intent but were enactments that kept morphing for the purpose of crushing any form of 
dissent. The complex situation produced an audience that was very diverse; and to appeal to these 
local and international audiences, Mandela required a rhetoric that was nuanced and effective 
enough to dismantle the apartheid racist order. Mandela employs narratives, which are performed 
in keeping with the African oral tradition - to unify, organize, and inspire his people; to call on the 
world beyond the borders of South Africa to account for their support of Apartheid; and to call out 
whites South Africans for their implicit and explicit consent to the evils of a racist social, political, 
and economic order. Mandela’s rhetoric is strengthened particularly because, even as he speaks 
and writes in service of a struggle against systemic racism, he rises above the reification of 
essentialism and thus resists complicity.   
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            Chapter One 
 Introduction 
My dissertation examines the manner in which Nelson Mandela employs a braided rhetoric 
within a complex socio-political context, as a strategy for dismantling apartheid. I describe braided 
rhetoric as the weaving together of both the Western and African rhetorical traditions. African 
rhetorical tradition refers to the entire system of artistic forms – visual, oral, and written, which 
are employed to celebrate and inculcate the African culture. These forms are employed within 
Africa and in the diaspora in ways that are highly persuasive. The Western rhetorical tradition is 
employed to describe the Greco-Roman canon with its tropes, figures, and symbols that form a 
system for persuasively inculcating, celebrating, and disseminating Western culture. This Western 
system of communication, with its derogative depiction of other races, formed the foundation for 
justifying imperialism, which in turn helped to produce racist apartheid. Apartheid was predicated 
on systemic and institutional racism, which was deployed to fragment Blacks in South Africa. 
Therefore, as a resistance leader, Mandela required a unique and complex rhetorical system in 
order to bring unity to these Blacks. Mandela’s braided rhetoric provided him with the rhetorical 
tools needed to appeal to the cultural commonality of these Blacks, whose ethnic differences had 
been effectively exploited by the ruling racial order to divide and weaken them.   
Not only were South Africans divided culturally and linguistically, competing anti-
imperialist and anti-racist ideologies that shaped their strategies for resistance movements also 
separated them. Further, other South African people of colour, whose vested interests differed from 
those of Blacks, were alienated from those resistance movements even as they, too, were exploited 
by the ruling racial order. Finally, any resistance by whites, who may have opposed the worst 
excesses of the Apartheid regime, was kept in check both by the political hegemony of Apartheid 
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and by the privileges bestowed on them by that regime. Thus, Mandela took on the onerous task 
of uniting Blacks, in order to produce a cohesive resistance to apartheid. He also attempted to 
bridge the gap between Blacks, other people of colour, and sympathetic whites within and beyond 
South Africa. To achieve all of these, he required a unique political rhetoric that could be strategic, 
adaptive, fierce, and reflexive. 
Mandela’s braided rhetoric is peculiar because he cultivates a style that has been criticized 
as not being as captivating as that of other human rights rhetors like Martin Luther King, Jr. 
However, the subtlety of Mandela’s rhetoric enables his words to cut deep particularly because he 
employs a variety of rhetorical devices and by his recognition of the complex audience he needed 
to persuade. Previous scholars have examined Nelson Mandela’s political rhetoric in the context 
of his human right activism and revolutionary leadership as evidence of his standing as a legal 
luminary. Jacques Derrida, for example, examines the manner by which Mandela deconstructs the 
apartheid legal framework to reveal how the Whites of South Africa violate their own legal 
heritage.  Peace and conflict studies scholar, Tom Lodge, argues that Mandela’s success as a leader 
was determined by the principles he absorbed from his cultural settings. These principles were 
strengthened by a literary culture that combined African oral traditions with Victorian concepts of 
honor, propriety, and virtue. Elleke Boehmer, a scholar of postcolonial literature, describes 
Mandela as a moral giant and an exemplar of a stand for social justice, non-racialism, and 
democracy. 
Building upon and extending this prior scholarship, my dissertation examines the depth 
and nuance of Nelson Mandela’s political rhetoric as he sought to articulate both dissent and social 
vision within a fractured and conflict-ridden rhetorical context. Through a close reading of 
Mandela’s autobiography Long Walk to Freedom and his speeches, I undertake to examine the 
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deep historical knowledge Mandela had of the political, cultural, and social dynamics of apartheid 
in South Africa and how he used that knowledge in the resistance movement. In addition, 
Mandela’s rhetoric is examined to show what role his African roots played for laying bare the 
imperialist underpinnings from the vantage point of apartheid’s subjugated and resisting subjects.  
Mandela deploys his braided rhetoric to craft a counter-history of colonialism and apartheid 
in South Africa. Mandela’s account of the effects of colonialism and apartheid connects strongly 
to Frantz Fanon’s psychological examination of colonization. Mandela crafts this counter-history 
by recovering the traditional ethos of the Xhosa tribe in the Transkei region of South African as a 
way of making an effective rhetorical appeal. The manner in which Mandela attempts to help 
Blacks in South African redefine their history exemplifies Homi Bhabha’s concept of “scraps and 
rags of tradition” as a potent means of reclaiming the past of a dominated group. According to 
Bhabha, the signs and traditions of a nation are used by resisting subjects to tell a people’s history 
(as opposed to an imperial history), with the intention of creating unity among a divided people. 
Mandela’s braided rhetoric attempts to unify his fellow Black Africans and to also show that Black 
Africa has a rich rhetorical heritage. His deployment of African tropes and symbols as well as his 
intricate style enabled him to identify with his fellow Black South Africans in order to assuage and 
reclaim their bruised collective identity. The way Mandela crafts a counter-history, by combining 
Western and African tropes and symbols, reveals a revolutionary rhetorical strategy that is highly 
effective. The effectiveness derives from how he utilizes a surface lexical structure that is laden 
with deep meaning, which his people can easily recognize and identify with. By so doing, he 
attempts to heal the wounded cognitive fabric of the oppressed people of South Africa. 
The historicizing of apartheid as a modern system of colonization is necessary for 
analyzing the rhetoric of Nelson Mandela. Colonization is largely responsible for the 
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psychodynamics that helped to shape apartheid policies. Apartheid was a racist order that was 
influenced by political, economic, and social events at the local and political levels that was played 
out on a global scale. Global events like WWII and emerging African nations (who were gaining 
independence from their former colonial masters) caused the apartheid government to be a 
constantly morphing phenomenon. These global events created awareness among Blacks and this 
awareness sparked debates surrounding freedom. These debates implied that leaders like Mandela 
needed to develop creative ways with which to engage with the people so as to find effective means 
for dismantling the hydra-headed apartheid system. Consequently, Mandela crafts a unique 
rhetoric that was braided from the Western and African rhetorical traditions, which served him 
quite well in the anti-apartheid struggle.  
 
Historicizing of Apartheid 
Understanding the history of South Africa is significant for bringing into perspective 
Mandela’s complex context and his peculiar rhetoric. The current population of the Republic of 
South Africa stands at about 58, 065, 097, but for the sake of this project, I am using the 1980 
census that has the population at about 28.6 million. The 1980 figure can be described as the first 
most credible census because most Blacks were not properly accounted for in previous ones, and 
it serves to show the South African population during the anti-apartheid struggle.  South Africa 
has a racial classification that can be roughly divided into four groups that are as diverse and 
fragmented as can be imagined. According to Vincent Crapanzano, Anthropologist/Comparative 
literature expert, these groups have the Africans or Blacks making up the majority of about 20.7 
million, Whites were about 4.5 million, the Coloureds or the people of mixed descent (also referred 
to as Browns) were about 2.6 million, and Asians were about 800.000 in number.  
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These different races were hardly homogenous in terms of language, religion, philosophies, 
or aspirations. The Asians were largely descendants of indentured labourers, and they were entirely 
Indians whose ancestors arrived in South Africa in the last decades of the nineteenth century and 
the first decade of the twentieth century. These Asians were made up of 70% Hindu, 20% Muslim, 
and 8% Christian (Crapanzano, xiv – xv). Their main languages are Urdu and Gujarati, and they 
live mostly in the province of Natal. The Coloured are descendants of whites and of slaves that 
were imported from Madagascar, tropical Africa, Southeast Asia, the local Khoikhoi-Hottentots, 
and San-Bushmen. These Coloureds mostly lived in the Cape Province. The whites, who are made 
up of Afrikaners (descendants of seventeenth-century Dutch, German, and Huguenot settlers), 
predominantly spoke Afrikaans, and as members of the Dutch Reformed church, they had no 
affiliations to traditional African cultures, while the rest of the whites are English-speaking. There 
were about 130,000 Jews in South Africa, who largely control the private economic sector. By the 
middle of the 19th century, the Afrikaners were in control of the bureaucracy and government.  
The Black population can be described as mostly rural, and they can be safely divided into 
nine ethno linguistic groups. Among the Blacks groups, the Nguni is the largest tribe, and they 
consist of the Xhosa, the Zulu, the Ndebele, and the Swazi tribes. The Basotho (South Sotho, 
Bapedi – North Sotho) is the second largest group and, in addition to these other two groups are 
the Tsonga, the Venda, and the Tswana, with a sizable population.  Blacks were definitely the 
poorest people in the country. This poverty was all encompassing basically because apartheid 
policies were designed to keep Blacks impoverished and powerless. For example, the 
“discriminatory laws, regulations, and agencies that serve to maintain baaskap (“bossdom”), or 
white supremacy” (Crapanzano, xix) are a manifestation of the very term apartheid. This term 
means “separateness” in Afrikaans. Its operating laws enabled its romantic-nationalistic 
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philosophy of separate development. The laws, whereby a person’s rights and privileges were 
determined based on their racial classification (Crapanzano, xix), ensured that Blacks were 
subjugated socially, politically, and economically.  
Apartheid South African was greatly impacted politically, socially, and economically by 
diverse events locally and globally. The events that changed the South African political and 
cultural situations were very complex to say the least. For example, the Dutch were among the 
first group of white immigrants to arrive in South Africa with “a small party of Dutch tradesmen 
in 1652” (Stephen M. Davis, 1). Though their religion and culture were foreign to the indigenous 
Blacks, they had a relatively peaceful co-existence until the influx of Huguenot refugees swelled 
the numbers of foreigners; and that influx fuelled the conflict over farmland. This large number of 
white refugees also heightened inter-racial tension.  
At about this same time, a new wave of British immigrants exacerbated the already fragile 
socio-economic milieu. That is because the British immigrants became as much a threat to the 
Dutch speaking Afrikaners as to the indigenous inhabitants of the land. The situation reached an 
alarming stage by the arrival of about five thousand imperial English speakers, who came to 
colonize Cape Town in 1820. Interestingly, these English-speakers “had followed in the wake of 
British rule, which had supplanted Dutch governance over the Cape colony. London’s power 
provoked a major split in the young Afrikaner nation between those who wished to live and let 
live with the British and those who yearned for the freedom to farm their land out of the reach of 
“foreign” interference” (Davis, Apartheid, 2). These frictions caused strong internal disputes 
among Blacks that led to the famous war, which produced the victorious Zulu monarch, Shaka 
who crushed Black opposition in the local space. Shaka was in turn defeated by the combined 
power of the Europeans in the bloody battle of Ulundi. The suppression of Black independence 
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created a new form of power dynamics that pitted the British and Afrikaners against each other in 
a cycle of “fighting and negotiating with each other over the form of white governance in the 
region” (Davis, 3) within a period of about thirty years. The British victory in the Boer war altered 
the political landscape of South Africa in a way that excluded Blacks from enjoying any political 
franchise, despite being in the majority. 
The Afrikaners regarded English settlers as representing British imperialism, and after 
failing to achieve secession, the Afrikaners settled for a coalition. Howard Brotz describes this 
coalition as having resulted “in a massive center party that seemed to put to rest in a decisive 
manner the bitter memories of the South African War” (9). This coalition also sealed the fate of 
the indigenous people and consigned them to the position of second-class citizens for over a 
century. WWII was one of the global events, which served to accentuate the divisions among the 
English and the Afrikaners. WWII was evidence that despite achieving a coalition, it did not totally 
erase ethnic cleavages at both local and global levels among whites. In South Africa, the war was 
regarded as a British or European affair, and some leaders of the Afrikaner sought to be neutral as 
a test of independence from the British Empire. The vote for neutrality was lost, and this loss 
reduced the power of the Afrikaners. This reduced power produced a new, more racist power order 
that would eventually change the social, economic, and political landscape to the detriment of the 
scapegoated Blacks.  
 
The Cultural Logics of Imperialism 
Blacks were deeply fractured culturally and linguistically because of the heterogeneous 
nature of their ethnic differences. Black South Africans were further fragmented because they had 
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differing ideological understanding as to what form their resistance to apartheid should take. These 
differences created conflicts among them, which were made more complicated by the divide and 
rule strategy of the Afrikaner government. The conflicts among Blacks provided justification for 
white hegemony, whose apartheid policies of segregation were crafted to maintain the economic 
and power dynamics in favour of whites. 
It is important to understand the role that the historical construction of racial ideology 
played in imperialism and by extension, apartheid. The idea of viewing people of colour and their 
cultures as inferior prepared the grounds for imperialism. These ideas existed long before the 
economic conditions that expedited the exploitation of the lands and people of colour. Martin 
Bulmer and John Solomos describe racism as an ideology that produced discrimination on the 
basis of racial difference. And this ideology emanated from the belief that a designated racial group 
was biologically and culturally inferior. Such beliefs were used to rationalize and prescribe the 
treatment received by such racial groups in the society. These beliefs were also employed for 
explaining and justifying the groups’ social position and accomplishments or lack of it.  
Bulmer and Solomos argue that racism and racist ideologies existed long before the 
enlightenment period. The enlightenment period was the point when racism served as justification 
for pushing western culture upon the ‘other’ in order to exploit them. Thereafter, racism became 
further complicated and systematized by “the processes of economic expansion and capitalist 
development” (Bulmer and Solomos, “General Introduction,” 10). Despite the fact that the 
construction of Blacks as uncivilized dates back to the 1st century BC, some scholars such as Philip 
Curtin, Michael Banton, and George Mosse, among others have argued that the description of 
Blacks has been in a flux over the centuries. The description of Blacks has been changing 
according to which historian or explorer was deploying the narrative and for what purpose. Some 
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descriptions have placed Blacks in sublime positions, while others have produced images that were 
bizarre and grotesque. In a bid to create sensational myths, reality became blurred between 
extremes that contributed toward shaping the ideology of race. This racial ideology became 
embedded within the cultures of Europe in a way that was made manifest socially, politically, and 
economically. As a result of this historical foundation of racial ideology, anything that did not 
emanate from Europe was regarded as inferior, dark, or evil. Therefore, imperialism was 
influenced by the racist ideology that aimed to devalue people of colour. This devaluation 
engendered the fear and loathing whites have toward people of color.  
People of color were loathed because of the way they have been constructed over time. 
Apart from the zoological terms like dog and monkey that have been used to construct people of 
colour, the essentialist traits that have been imputed onto them have stuck. Victor Villanueva 
describes the traits, whereby people of colour were depicted as having minds that ran not higher 
than that of animal functions of eating, sleeping, and sexual debauchery (24). Villanueva argues 
that having such depictions appear on documents that determined immigration policies show how 
persuasive the rhetoric of racism can be. These racist ideas found a counterpart in European 
cultures, with their roots in a history that compartmentalized races within an ideological 
framework of hierarchy. Consequently, when it became important to explore other lands for 
economical advancement, the racial ideology that constructed people of colour as hierarchically 
inferior was used as justification for their colonization. Capitalism found a ready base in this racial 
ideology for the satisfaction of a market force that was driven by greed. Capitalism helped to 
reinforce the hierarchy, which reproduced the struggle for dominance politically, economically, 
and ideologically. Therefore, imperialism cannot be separated from racism, which in turn was 
fuelled by a Eurocentric view of culture.  
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Eurocentrism had a very powerful effect on the culture of Europe. That is because “there 
was an almost universal acceptance of the idea that Western, industrialized society had produced 
(or been produced by) men of higher intellectual power than their ‘primitive’ brethren” (Colby and 
Cole, 64). This idea of superiority, long held by the Western world, reached conclusions of cultural 
differences arising from “anecdotes supported by missionaries and travelers and, later, the 
observations of field anthropologists” (Colby and Cole, 64). Therefore, imperialism proceeded 
“from a single ideological climate” (Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, 3) that 
resulted in an imposition of the colonizing culture and language on the colonized. This imposition 
operates at a dual level of “simple utility (as propaganda for instance) and at the unconscious level, 
where it leads to the naturalizing of constructed values (e.g. civilization, humanity etc.), which 
conversely established ‘savagery’, ‘native’ as their antithesis and as the object of a reforming zeal” 
(Ashcroft et al, 3). Imperialism was established on “a privileging norm” and as a template for the 
denial of the ‘peripheral’, the ‘marginal’, and the so-called ‘uncanonized’ (Ashcroft et al, 3). 
Consequently, the Western literary canon and its rhetorical tradition were as central to the cultural 
enterprise of imperialism as the racial ideology that formed them.   
It is important to discuss the connection between culture and ideology in order to grasp the 
role played by this connection in propelling imperialism. Culture and ideology cannot be divorced 
in the sense that ideology as a set of ideas exists in culture. While ideology is homogenous, culture 
is not, but the ideologies produced in various cultures help to promote cohesion within those 
cultures. By homogenous, I connect with Josue Antonio Nescolarde-Selva, Jose-Luis Uso-
Domenech, and Hugo Gash who argue that ideologies derive their power from the logical 
coherence that forces totalitarian groups to reject alternative visions of reality (2). In terms of 
culture, Edward Said and Bhabha share the idea that “all cultures are involved in one another; none 
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is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic” 
(Said, xxv). Therefore, what holds cultures together are those ideologies that produce a belief that 
what is practiced is the morally right thing to do.  
Said deploys culture to explain how Western ideologies that are depicted in rhetoric, 
poetics, and philosophy are used to push certain agendas. These means of expression have 
connections to the economic, social, and political realms that often exist in aesthetic forms from 
which a group of people derive pleasure. Culture is fashioned among a group of people and in turn 
gives rise to a “popular stock of lore about distant parts of the world and specialized knowledge 
available in such learned discipline as ethnography, historiography, philology, sociology, and 
literary history” (Said, xii). The ideas constructed about the people of distant lands were firmly 
entrenched within the Western cultures, and these ideologies formed the moral grounds for 
imperialism.  
In addition, the Eurocentric ideology whereby late nineteenth century Europeans saw 
Europe as the focus and standard by which other cultures must be judged has been strongly 
interrogated. That is because every culture is emblematic of a symbol system that is inseparable 
from the people of that culture. Therefore, individuals and groups imbibe values and employ 
symbol systems that are informed by what they have internalized culturally and epistemologically. 
To avoid the fallacy of essentialism, these values and symbol systems must be separated from the 
human essence. Bhabha also argues that Western literary canon and rhetorical tradition have been 
influenced by the cultures that produced them. Therefore, Western literary canon and rhetorical 
tradition have contributed toward how people from other cultures are perceived. The influence of 
the Western rhetorical tradition in producing racism and, consequently, imperialism can be seen 
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in the way Western cultures were celebrated and promoted as superior legacies. The superior status 
attributed to these cultures demanded that they be protected and propagated.  
Since Europe was populated by whites only, anyone outside the shores of Europe was not 
only inferior but was commodified as something to be used and exploited. For example, Abdul R. 
Mohammed argues that imperialist and colonialist discourses commodified the people of other 
lands into stereotypical objects, which were used as resources for colonialist fiction. Consequently, 
characterization of Africans as the epitome of evil and barbarity provided justification for their 
economic exploitation. The literary canon gained currency and was employed to promote the so-
called superiority of the Western culture.  Thus, the rhetorical tradition provided the tools, in terms 
of tropes and figures, for promoting the superiority of Western cultures and the inferiorization of 
people of colour.  
Said argues that the main concern in imperialism was the battle over land and when it came 
to “who owned the land, who had the right to settle and work on it, who kept it going, who won it 
back, and who now plans its future – these issues were reflected, contested, and even for a time 
decided in narrative” (xii-xiii). According to Said, imperialist ideas are embedded in history and 
art, and these disciplines helped to form the attitudes that gave impetus to imperialist practices. 
Therefore, the foundation of imperialism is art and science. Remove them or degrade them and the 
empire is no more because “empire follows art and not vice versa as English supposes” (Said 13). 
The cognitive activities ignited by imperial indoctrination can be highly compelling. According to 
Said, “defensive, reactive, and even paranoid nationalism is, alas, frequently woven into the very 
fabric of education, where children as well as older students are taught to venerate and celebrate 
the uniqueness of the tradition (usually and invidiously at the expense of others)” (xxvi). The result 
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is that the passion produced in turn feeds other passions, with the singular purpose of spreading 
the gospel of this superior culture. 
 
The Consequence of an Internalized Racial Ideology 
The racial ideologies of a superior culture were internalized by whites, and such ideologies 
were seized upon to help entrench their rule over Black South Africans. The idea of white 
supremacy was an attractive concept for the Afrikaners, and that concept gained popularity for 
them among their fellow whites who sought to suppress Blacks. Howard Brotz examines the 
dynamics of apartheid from a broad perspective through which he describes the factors that gave 
birth to the Afrikaner Nationalist Party as an ethnic fusion through the process of realignment (The 
Politics of South Africa, 3). The ‘segregation’ policy, which was a forerunner of the ‘apartheid’ 
policy, was fed by the fear harboured by whites that dreaded the superior numerical strength of the 
Black population. This fear gave rise to laws that disenfranchised Blacks from voting.  
The laws removed them from the voting rolls in the Cape, the only place where they had 
previously enjoyed voting rights. This move was masked by the addition of more land to the Native 
reserves in order to give the impression that the locus of Black economic and political development 
was tied to the reserves. According to Brotz, the origin of the Bantustan idea was conceived at this 
point. The creation of the Bantustan, also known as Bantu homeland or Black homeland, meant 
that Blacks were restricted to existing within certain geographical regions. Sadly, the lands that 
were being added to the Native reserves were the least arable.  Brotz observed that Blacks did not 
quite understand the loss of their franchise or the addition of land to their reserves. Their lack of 
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understanding stemmed from the fact that they still had confidence in the good faith of the 
government.  
This confidence in General Jan Smuts’s government quickly evaporated when the 
anticipated move of abolishing the pass laws as a first step towards equal rights (Davis, 5) was 
sacrificed on the altar of white supremacy. Smuts caved under the pressure from the pro-Nazi 
National Party because of the desire to retain power in the 1943 general elections. It was easy for 
Smuts to betray Blacks because they had no voting power anyway, and the whites-only electorate 
was a significant motivating factor in spurning the aspirations of the Black populace. To combat 
the evil that the loss of franchise represented, the ANC leadership was forced to “recognize the 
apparent futility of passive negotiation. Peaceful but forceful confrontation seemed the only path 
available” (Davis, 5). However, the membership of the ANC was rather insignificant and there 
was a need to re-organize and re-strategize.   
To address the situation, consultations by the ANC would ultimately necessitate a “focus 
upon the delusions and also the iniquities of the segregation policy, the hardships of which fell 
entirely upon the shoulders of the Blacks” (Brotz, 12). These consultations helped to organize the 
divided Black groups, in a bid to free them from the yoke of oppression. The apartheid struggle 
would prove to be an uphill task because racial integration was such a formidable obstacle that any 
attempt to give any form of franchise to Blacks raised the level of fear among whites. This fear 
created a paranoia that caused whites to believe, particularly amongst the Purified Nationalists, 
that they were endangered. This paranoia contributed towards the evolution of apartheid policies, 
their interpretation, and implementation. Consequently, the whole world watched as “Afrikaner 
nationalism broke loose to become something like a wild politically irresponsible force” (Brotz, 
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13). A major global event that changed the socio-political landscape of South Africa was the 
industrial revolution as well as the discovery of natural resources in South Africa. As Brotz argues,  
Industrialization sounded the death-knell of an easy-going rural economy among 
Whites and Blacks, in which domestic herds were valued for status rather than for 
a market. Such an economy depended for its perpetuation upon inexhaustible 
supplies of free land; and then this condition no longer obtained, the economy 
became decrepit and could no longer carry all its population. Industrialization was 
to draw both the poor whites and the tribal Blacks who were displaced from the 
land, between whom there were the rawest racial prejudices, into competition in the 
urban labour (4-5).  
The demand for land and the resources from it created competition that worsened the racial 
tension. This competition, as with conflicts and issues pertaining to self-preservation, implied that 
alignments were produced using ‘identification.’ Such ‘identification’ exposed the power relations 
that saw the emergence of the white minority government, which was an “alliance between 
Afrikaner nationalism and the English-speaking Labour Party” (Brotz, 7). This coalition rode on 
the back of Black subordination in what was described as “The thesis of Creswell, the leader of 
the Labour Party” (Brotz, 7), which was founded on “the employment of cheap Black labour 
working on indentures or contracts to organized white labour” (Brotz, 7). Brotz, who is writing 
from a political perspective; and Vincent Crapanzo, who examines apartheid from the angle of 
anthropology, both recognize the impact of the industrial revolution in economically empowering 
whites over the other races, particularly Blacks. In essence, the industrial revolution, as an 
economic force, served very well the purpose of manoeuvring the state machinery to further 
deepen unequal race relations in South African. The cheap labour provided by Blacks constituted 
the entrenchment of their lower-class status.   
  The subordination of Black labourers was not only proof of the social-economic order; it 
exposed and heightened the fear that plagued organized white labour of “unrestricted competition 
for employment with racial groups who would work for lower wages” (Brotz, 7). This competition 
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resulted in the racist hubris that was informed by social Darwinism among whites, who viewed 
work in the mines as beneath them. Therefore, they would not perform jobs regarded as ‘Kaffir 
work’, which were earmarked for Blacks. Consequently, Blacks were restricted to specific low-
level jobs that created employment ceilings and limited prospects for them. To reinforce the 
subordination of Black labourers, the same Creswell thesis was used to discourage Blacks from 
migrating to the towns. The implication of this spatial segregation was that what had been achieved 
economically was translated into a geographical curtailment. Blacks became confined to “Native 
reserves” thereby bringing together ‘imperialism’ and Afrikaner nationalism in a concept of new 
colonialism. This new colonialism goes as far back as 1922 when the Transvaal Local Government 
Commission came up with an act that argued that:  
If the Native is to be regarded as a permanent element in municipal areas, and if he 
is to have equal opportunity of establishing himself there permanently, there can be 
no justification for basing his exclusion from the franchise on the simple ground of 
color. Some Coloured persons and Natives are possessed of property and brains, and 
have educational qualifications not inferior to some enfranchised Europeans; many 
carry on trades and are their own employers, and it cannot be denied that they have 
special and peculiar needs not at present being met. We consider that the history of 
the races, especially having regards to South African history, show that that the 
comingling of Black and White is undesirable. The Native should only be allowed 
to enter urban areas, which are essentially the White man’s creation, when he is 
willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the White man, and should depart 
therefrom when he ceases to minister (Brotz, 25-26).  
This reasoning that forbids the comingling of races - using Fagan’s phrase – was the 
foundation for racist laws like the Pass Law. The Pass Law required Blacks to always carry on 
them a piece of identification. The identification specified their race on their person, and this 
practice solidified apartheid segregation. At this point, it might appear that the moral vacuum that 
Crapanzano described as the basis for apartheid had begun to deepen. Interestingly, the concluding 
part of the commission that refers to the ‘history of races’ and the desires of whites to avoid 
comingling of races is evidence of a repudiation of forensic logic. The point here is that the same 
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report that had provided glaring evidence of racial equality was making excuses for racial 
segregation. This report served to enable whites to persuade themselves on why they should hold 
on to an idea that was obviously morally wrong. By making excuses for racial segregation, the 
Afrikaners were resisting persuasion. The fact that racial segregation was being hinged on the so-
called history of races reveals the psychology of racism. Despite the observation that any 
disenfranchisement on the basis of race was an aberration, a rejection of this truth is what 
Crapanzano regards as deep moral depravity.  
This moral depravity is also evident in The Fagan Report or the Report of the Native Laws 
Commission of 1948. This commission was constituted to investigate the idea of segregation, and 
the report recognized that failure to address racial inequality would ultimately create problems in 
South Africa. Paradoxically, although Fagan admitted that “normal democratic franchise of one-
man, one-vote, or as he termed it, majority rule by the counting of heads” (Brotz, 27) was the 
morally right thing to do, he rejected the integration of races that such a franchise would produce. 
The rejection of racial integration (which is a consequence of racism) contradicts the democratic 
franchise of one-man, one-vote. This rejection was concretized in apartheid policies as a measure 
to keep Black South Africans subjugated. Fagan’s report pandered to the fear that white South 
Africans had of Blacks.   
The contradiction in Fagan’s report between an endorsement of democracy and segregation 
was informed more by fear than malice. Though not justifiable, this fear was understandable. The 
Afrikaners, who were occupiers and who were empowered by imperialism and colonialism, 
enjoyed political and economical power and privilege.  The fear of losing such power and privilege 
owing to the fact that they were in the minority was real. The fear that whites had of Blacks was 
responsible for the resistance to persuasion that is portrayed by the contradiction in Fagan’s report. 
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Although Fagan acknowledged the intelligence and industry of Blacks, (which was no less than 
that of their white counterparts), his inconsistency through the endorsement of segregation was 
informed by racism. This endorsement helped to reproduce systemic racism in apartheid South 
Africa.  
Blacks were regarded as uncivilized despite the evidence to the contrary in Fagan’s report. 
The labelling of Blacks, as sub human and uncivilized, bought into the rhetoric of racism that the 
Afrikaners had internalized. This labelling produced the justification for the violence that the so-
called uncivilized Blacks were subjected to. The rhetoric of racism produced a cycle of fear, 
whereby the risk of losing political and economic power to those who had been rhetorically 
constructed as inferior played a significant role in the Afrikaner’s rejection of forensic logic.  And 
the consequence was a resistance to persuasion.  
Despite Fagan’s acknowledgement of the cognitive equality of Blacks, both Fagan and the 
Afrikaners refused to be persuaded to share power. In refusing to share power, Afrikaners proved 
themselves impervious to the evidence provided by Fagan that (1) Some Coloured persons and 
Natives are possessed of property and brains and have educational qualifications not inferior to 
some enfranchised Europeans, (2) they have special and peculiar needs not at present being met, 
and (3) If the Native is to be regarded as a permanent element in municipal areas and if he is to 
have equal opportunity of establishing himself there permanently, there can be no justification for 
basing his exclusion from the franchise on the simple ground of colour. However, Fagan himself 
endorsed the systemic racism that segregated and denied Blacks their rights. The systemic racism 
that caused Afrikaners to resist such logical reasoning created the circumstances into which 
Mandela needed to speak.  
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The Complicity of Western Rhetorical Tradition in the Cultural Logic 
Entrenched within the consciousness of Europe is the concept of a superior culture, which 
was instrumental in constructing racism and which, in turn, helped to justify imperialism. Within 
this culture are the literary canon and the rhetorical tradition, which constructed Blacks as animals. 
The construction of the Black race as subhuman was done with an ulterior motive as JanMohamed 
argues, and that motive was the exploitation of land. However, this construction was not achieved 
in abstraction. Said argues that the dehumanization of the Black race is deeply steeped in the 
Western canon. The imperial activities that are influenced by the Western canon and rhetorical 
traditions have severe ramifications. Jean-Paul Sartre describes the implication of the subhuman 
construction of the Blacks in his preface to Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth in the following words: 
Our soldiers overseas, rejecting the universalism of the mother country, apply the 
“numerous clauses” to the human race: since none may enslave, rob or kill his 
fellow man without committing a crime, they lay down the principle that the native 
is not one of our fellow men. Our striking power has been given the mission of 
changing this abstract certainty into reality: the order is given to reduce the 
inhabitants of the annexed country to the level of superior monkeys in order to 
justify the settler’s treatment of them as beast of burden (13).   
The implementation of the “numerous clauses” was made possible because Africans had 
already been constructed as sub-human. That construction enabled their enslavement and the 
annexation of their lands. The enslavement of Blacks was a deliberate act that occurred at the 
conscious and sub-conscious levels. The ideas about other people and their lands were planted in 
the minds of imperialist soldiers through their various symbol systems. The Western canon is 
replete with literatures that project this idea of the sub humanity of Africans. Henry Louis Gates 
argues that western literatures and philosophers like Hegel and Kant produced texts that drew 
conclusions that projected Blacks as ‘stupid’. Gates captures the fact that Kant first claims that “so 
fundamental is the difference between [the black and white] races of man…it appears to be as great 
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in regards to mental capacities as in color” (Quoting Kant, 10). The very idea that the Blacks are 
mystified as being physically and mentally black, in order to portray them as evil, is a rhetorical 
trope that was internalized by the imperialists.  
JanMohamed describes the imaginary starting point, where the depiction of the “other” was 
exploited, as a form of a Manichean allegory. The imaginary operates at the level of fictional text 
where the “European writer commodifies the native by negating his individuality, his subjectivity, 
so that he is now perceived as a generic being that can be exchanged for any other native (they all 
look alike, act alike, and so on)” (JanMohamed, 83). While the surface structure of the texts claims 
to present particular encounter with “specific varieties of the racial other, the subtext valorizes the 
superiority of European culture” (JanMohamed, 84). Colonial rhetoric commodifies the Black race 
into a stereotype in order to use them as a resource for colonialist fiction. In these texts, Blacks are 
fetishized as the epitome of evil and barbarity and badly in need of civilization. The seizing of land 
occurs as an execution on the spatial and physical level of what has been conceived at the level of 
textual fiction. JanMohamed argues that the overt aim of civilizing the savage has a covert aim 
that can be described as having been influenced by a psychology of superiority. That psychology 
has its  
assumption in all colonialist literature [that] is accompanied in colonial texts by a more 
vociferous insistence, indeed by a fixation upon the savagery and evilness of the native 
[that] should alert us to the real function of these texts to justify imperial occupation 
and exploitation. If such literature can demonstrate that the barbarism of the native is 
irrevocable, or at least very deeply ingrained, then the European’s attempt to civilize 
him can continue indefinitely, the exploitation of resources can proceed without 
hindrance, and the European can persist in enjoying a position of moral superiority 
(JanMohamed, 81).  
The negative depiction of the Black race is ubiquitous in the Western world as shown 
by Fanon, Crapanzano, Said, Bhahba, and a host of other scholars. The information 
concerning Blacks makes for interesting reading because their fetishization was constructed 
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in mythical tropes. Therefore, narrative fiction specifically plays an important role in “the 
history and world of empire” (Said, xii). Furthermore, it is the stories that explorers and 
novelists craft about strange regions of the world that imperialists employ for constructing 
the “other.”  
Whether people choose to identify with Dante or Shakespeare, the ideas in their narratives 
serve to define the identity of a group of people, who vigorously strive to preserve particular codes 
of behaviour that set them apart from those considered as the “other.” The ideas in the texts of 
writers like Carlyle, Ruskin, Dickens, and Thackeray about colonial expansion, inferior races, or 
“nigger” cannot be ascribed to a different area from that of culture. Said argues that culture is “the 
elevated area of activity in which they “truly” belong and in which they did their “really” important 
work” (xiv). Furthermore, long before the imperialist encountered the people of the distant lands 
described in their narrative fictions, an image has already been formed in their minds of a beautiful 
and fertile land populated by an evil and barbaric people.  
 
The Psychology of Imperialism 
         Western culture and western rhetorical tradition were responsible for producing a 
mindset, which in turn formed the ideas behind imperialism. The cultural enterprise of imperialism 
had a grand plan, which according to Fanon was hatched by systematically destroying the 
indigenous cultures without giving the colonized access to the culture of the colonizer. Any attempt 
to resuscitate the indigenous cultures was condemned as exaggerated passion, while disregarding 
the fact that the psyche of the colonizer, as well as their sense of self, was “conveniently sheltered 
behind a French or German [or English] culture, which has been given full proof of its [their] 
22 
 
existence and which is uncontested” (Fanon, Wretched, 169). Thus, the culture and language of 
the colonized people was subjugated, and the effect was psychologically damaging.  
Said argues that the idea advanced for the justification of imperialism lies in the rhetorical 
construction of the “other,” which has psychological implications for the colonizer and the 
colonized. Therefore, “[t]he notions about bringing civilization to primitive or barbaric people, the 
disturbingly familiar ideas about flogging or death or extended punishment being required when 
“they” misbehave or become rebellious because “they” mainly understood force or violence, 
“they” were not like “us” and for that reason deserved to be ruled” (Said, xii) were irrevocably 
bound up in the psychology of imperialism. Consequently, imperialist culture thrived on a 
rhetorical pattern of us versus them.  
Such internalized ideologies formed the principle behind white domination, white 
supremacy, and what Fanon describes as arrogant racism. This arrogance is firmly entrenched in 
the psyche of the imperialist. Fanon argues that racism was formed from a Manichaeism that “goes 
to its logical conclusion and dehumanizes the native, or to speak plainly, it turns him into an 
animal. In fact, the terms the settler uses when he mentions the native are zoological terms” 
(Wretched, 34). Bhabha describes this stereotyping of the Black race as “a tie-up between the 
metaphoric or masking function of the fetish and the narcissistic object-choice” (77) that is also 
“an opposing alliance between the metonymic figuring of lack and the aggressive phase of the 
imaginary” (77). Fanon argues that “The colonialist bourgeoisie, in its narcissistic dialogue 
expounded by the members of its universities, had in fact deeply implanted in the minds of the 
colonized intellectual that the essential qualities remain eternal in spite of all the blunders men 
may make” (Wretched, 37). Such Manichean depiction of the Black race starts in the imaginary 
and culminates in their physical and spatial domination. 
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The imperialist discourse was crafted as an overt desire to ‘civilize’ the ‘savage’ in order 
to introduce him to the benefits of Western cultures. But the covert purpose of such discourse was 
the exploitation of the colony’s natural resources. The portrayal of Africa as barbaric, which was 
pervasive in the Western world, was largely responsible for the stereotyping Africans have been 
subjected to. Sander Gilman describes the role of portrayals that take on the conventional 
significance of essential difference as a defining factor in imperialism. Gilman says that the 
twelfth-century Jewish traveler Benjamin of Tudela wrote that: “at Seba on the river Pishon is a 
people who live like animals and eat of the herbs that grow on the banks of the Nile and in the 
fields. They go about naked and have not the intelligence of ordinary men. They cohabit with their 
sisters and anyone they can find. And these are the Black slaves, the sons of Ham” (228). The 
information that is fed into the minds of the imperialists via the racist tropes embedded in texts 
gains currency and becomes elevated to the level of a religion when repeated over and over again.  
Crapanzano reiterates the idea that whites have firmly entrenched in their beliefs that the 
essential qualities of the Black race are a part of their DNA. And these essential qualities reside in 
both their blood and psyche. For example, one of the white people Crapanzano interviewed in 
South Africa said “the Blacks are barbarians, uncivilized, raw…They can become professors and 
doctors, but there is always something lacking…It is in the blood…You can take a Black man 
from the bush, but you can’t take the bush from the Black man” (Crapanzano, 10). This idea that 
the Black man’s blackness is in his blood gives the impression that should a white man be infused 
with a Black man’s blood, the white man would become partly black. In fact, the idea is that any 
percentage of black blood when mixed with white blood makes the white person black.  
Essentialism is often used to construct human flaws as the problems of particular races, 
and thus, it makes people of such races appear irredeemable. Essentialist constructs that strip 
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Blacks of their humanity set the tone and stage for their domination. Blacks are depicted as being 
either inhuman or infantile, who lack the ability to govern themselves. Crapanzano points out that 
“Apartheid is the product of an essentialist racism in which people of color are considered to be 
quintessentially different from whites and cannot, as such, enter in any meaningful way into the 
formation of white identity. They- the “Blacks,” “Coloureds,” “Asians,” “kaffirs,” “Brown,” – are 
a “lower race,” “Childlike,” “prolific,” “raw,” “primitive,” “savage,” “uncivilized,” “of the bush.” 
This difference is preserved through distance” (Crapanzano, 39). Such colonial discourse creates 
a psychological distance that aims not only at spatial separation, but aims at the exclusion of people 
of colour from enjoying human dignity at all levels of life. The colonized are forced to exist on a 
sub-human level socially, economically, and politically. Any leverage that they are given is 
perceived as a privilege no matter how inferior such leverages like lower standard of education or 
deplorable accommodations are. Such deliberate dehumanization represents a psychological 
dislocation on the part of the oppressors, who are emotionally distanced from the realities around 
them. 
The psychological distance embodied in imperialism is problematized by the ambivalence 
that Bhabha refers to as “sly civility” (95). The point being made here is that imperialist discourse 
eulogizes the Eurocentric culture by normalizing its historical expansion and exploitation. 
Imperialism is, thus, depicted as a fixed hierarchy of civil progress (Bhabha 95). In essence, what 
is articulated in imperialist discourse is the doubleness that is enacted in the violence of one 
powerful nation deliberately effacing the history of another under the guise of benevolence. And 
this doubleness is enunciated as “the father and the oppressor…just and unjust” (Bhabha, 95) in 
apparent contradiction. The ambivalence referred to here “reveals an agonistic uncertainty 
contained in the incompatibility of empire and nation; it puts on trial the very discourse of civility 
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within which representative government claims its liberty and empire its ethics” (Bhabha, 95-96). 
The ambivalence strips the colonialist of the moral inclination to subscribe to any form of equality 
for the colonized. 
 
Psychology of the Colonized 
The psychology of imperialism produced a superiority complex that is reified by the 
colonizer to create a polarity. The polarity of superior versus inferior is systematically constructed, 
and the inferiority complex is projected onto the colonized. The actions emanating from the 
superiority complex are designed to crush the will of the colonized. Everything about the colonized 
is inferiorized – their skin colour, hair texture, physical features, culture, and language. According 
to Ngugi Wa Thiongo, the worst deathblow to the Africans was the ‘cultural bomb,’ and the 
colonialist’s goal was to annihilate the people’s belief in themselves.  
Ngugi’s point connects to Fanon’s argument that the idea of imposing a language on the 
colonized represents a disempowerment. The disempowerment operates at a level deeper than the 
spatial colonization that appropriates the land of the natives. According to Fanon, language holds 
the power that controls the intellectual and cultural world expressed through that language. The 
power of language is captured by Paul Valery as “the god gone astray in the flesh” (Fanon, Black 
Skin, 18). What is emphasized here is that language has the power to build or destroy and to unite 
or divide. This idea corroborates Fanon’s argument that language is not just a means of 
communication, it holds the power for creation and is also a means of production. Therefore, 
human communication, which is the basis and process for evolving culture, is intricately tied to 
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human identity. In stripping the colonized of their language, they are equally stripped of their sense 
of identity. 
From Fanon’s arguments in White Skin Black Mask, racism and racial oppression have 
deep cognitive effects. The psychosis that he describes is produced over time and to combat such 
a problem, it would be necessary to employ strategies that are similar to those employed for 
creating the psychosis in the first place. In essence, the erosion of the historical past and by 
extension, the cultural identity of the colonized were achieved in rhetorical construction and 
violence. Therefore, the instruments for dehumanizing and inferiorizing the colonized cannot be 
eschewed when seeking redress. Fanon captures the psychological warfare waged against natives 
in the following words: “The colonial world is a Manichean world” (The Wretched, 33), where 
“the confrontation of ‘civilized’ and ‘primitive’ men created a special situation – the colonial – 
and brings about the emergence of a mass of illusions and misunderstandings that only a 
psychological analysis can place and define” (Black Skin, 85). The indigenous people who had 
became slaves in their own land were fed a version of history that claims that the Black man is 
“insensible to ethics; he represents not only the absence of values, but also the negation of values. 
He is, let us dare to admit, the enemy of value, and in this sense, he is absolutely evil” (Fanon, 
Wretched, 34). The construction of the Black race in such negative and degrading rhetoric has the 
potential of creating an identity crisis in the colonized.  
Bhabha argues that the scraps and rags of tradition are employed for constructing anti-
colonialist discourse, which serve to undo the damage of racist indoctrination in the colonized. 
This idea connects to Fanon’s argument that stories from the past are given a new role in order to 
galvanize the oppressed into decisive acts meant to unseat the colonial powers. The colonialist 
discourse has the effect of making the African people see their past as “one wasteland of non-
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achievement and it makes them want to distance themselves from that wasteland” (Ngugi, 3). 
According to Ngugi, to counter this effect, the colonized have to fight imperialism with a more 
creative culture of resolute struggle. Such tenacity enables them wield even more firmly the 
weapons contained in their cultures. 
Fanon describes the imposition of a foreign language on the colonized people as creating 
in their soul an inferiority complex resulting from the “death and burial of its local cultural 
originality” (White Skin, 18) when face to face with the language of the civilizing nation. To 
buttress this point, Ngugi argues that language is culture itself because culture is “the collective 
memory bank of a people’s experience in history. Consequently, culture is almost 
indistinguishable from the language that makes possible its genesis, growth, banking, articulation 
and indeed its transmission from one generation to the next” (Ngugi, 15). The suppression of the 
indigenous languages was violently enforced in the colonized world without any consideration 
being given to the many effects on the colonized.  
To combat the psychological effect of the distortion of the history and culture of the 
colonized, it is important to reclaim those histories and cultures in dynamic ways. However, it may 
be impossible to reclaim such histories without identifying the nature of that historical and cultural 
past in order to determine how these past histories, cultures, and languages have been distorted. 
Fanon, Ngugi, and Aime Cesaire argue that it is necessary to use the language of the oppressed for 
communication and artistic purposes in order to help them reclaim their identity. It is interesting 
to note that these scholars wrote in the language of the colonizer and have been criticized for not 
practicing what they preached. To truly practice what he preached, Ngugi switched to writing in 
Gikuyu. On the other hand, scholars like Edward Braithwaite and Chinua Achebe believe that the 
language of the colonizer can be used in a different way and can be bent to capture the culture, 
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flora, and fauna of the colonized. Mandela’s peculiar rhetoric goes beyond the recommendations 
of Braithwaite and Achebe. Mandela employs the tropes and symbols of the western rhetorical 
tradition (the language of the colonizer) and the African rhetorical tradition (the language of the 
colonized) to attempt a reclamation of the African past. To appreciate the ways in which rhetors 
like Mandela attempted to reclaim the African past, it is necessary to undertake an objective 
examination of the African rhetorical tradition. 
 
African Rhetorical Tradition  
Comparative study of African rhetoric has shifted from the colonial/imperial binaries of 
superior versus inferior, with the Western rhetorical tradition placed at the apex of this hierarchy. 
Instead, emphasis is being placed on the form, function, and value of African indigenous rhetoric 
and cultures. Kermit Campbell states that “comprehensive studies of rhetoric in Africa or 
comparative rhetorical studies that take African cultures into account should be based on African 
historical records (early and modern) if the integrity of such studies is to be maintained” (257). 
Campbell makes an illuminating assertion that argues that the roots of Africa’s rhetorical tradition 
are not only variegated and deep, but that they defy simple categorization and judgment.  
The variegated nature of African rhetorical tradition is exemplified in the role of the West 
African griot or the South African imbongi, whose duty as a narrator has a rhetorical appeal. The 
griot is a repository of oral tradition and history. The griot or imbongi performs the important task 
of acquainting the people with their culture through storytelling, praise singing, poetry, or music 
by employing a rhetorical dexterity and wit that is compelling and persuasive. Campbell’s example 
of the Guinean Mamadou Kouyate, “the griot narrator of a long-canonized version of Sundiata, 
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first published by the French in 1960” (269) depicts the wealthy legacy of the African rhetorical 
tradition. For example, “[t]he empires of Mali and Songhay each have an epic poem that 
memorializes, as epics customarily do, the nation’s history and its legendary heroes. Sundiata 
(Mali) and The Epic of Askia Mohammed (Songhay) are long narrative poems typically recited by 
oral poets called jeli…or griot” (Campbell, 268).  Mandela drew heavily upon this griot/imbongi 
style narration in most of his speeches and courtroom appearances as a way of reaffirming the 
pride of his African heritage.  
The griot, however, plays a dual role of calling the populace to action as well as exhorting 
the leaders to exemplary leadership.  According to Campbell, “griot oratory clearly possesses what 
I would call a sermonic quality, one intended to stir the heart, to provoke and persuade an audience 
to take action on the battlefield as well as on the throne” (272). In essence, the oratory of the griot 
is significant in ensuring that both the leader and the led are made to remember their glorious past 
in order to secure a better future. The West African griot or the South African imbongi is defined 
as the traditional figure who “…was, and still is, observer, commentator or councillor on the past 
and passing scenes. He happily still survives in some part of Africa, not only rehandling traditional 
material…keeping the heroic feats of historical figures alive, but also commenting in historical 
style on contemporary matters” (Kaschula and Diop, quoting Jones, Palmer, and Jones, 13). 
Campbell argues that the griot functions as an orator as well as being a poet or storyteller.  
The griot’s role of reminding the people of the kingdom’s glorious past in order to motivate 
them into a particular action makes them important orators within the African context. For the 
griot “appeals to his countrymen’s pride, their thirst of glory today and for posterity. His words 
are perhaps particularly persuasive given his calculated use of rhetorical questions and extended 
metaphor” (Campbell, 270). There is the need to examine the nature of the African rhetorical 
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tradition in order to answer the questions such as: what are the hallmarks of the African rhetorical 
tradition? In what ways does the western rhetorical tradition differ from its African counterpart?  
Ruth Finnegan, Campbell, Roger Abrahams, and Bekunuru Kubayanda among others 
describe African rhetorical tradition as comprising of a system of expression and communication. 
The system is derived from the culture and values of the African people in forms of songs, dances, 
rituals, proverbs, riddles, folktales, and griots, which are artistic, performative, and persuasive in 
nature. These forms and functions exist in both the oral and written art forms that make up the 
African rhetorical tradition. But the oral form is often used as an excuse to subordinate African 
literary art. An examination of the verbal aspects of African rhetorical tradition will portray the 
complexity and creativity that make them effective as rhetorical tools.  
The oral forms of African creativity exist as rhetorical modes that play significant roles in 
helping to form the values of the people. In addition, African rhetorical tradition harnesses the 
aesthetic value of verbal art as a tool of strengthening the cognitive retention of the lyrics and 
rhythm of songs that accompany performances in the mental modes that are easily retrievable for 
re-enactment. The cognitive activity activated by African verbal art is what Finnegan’s perspective 
of a schema between language, mind, and memory (Oral Tradition, 169) depicts. This cognitive 
aspect of African rhetorical tradition makes manifest the notion that rhetoric owes it validity to a 
deeply cognitive engagement, which is evident in tropes and figuration as processes of the mind.  
African rhetorical tradition should not be examined only from the perspective of African 
oral literature; rather, it should be viewed holistically as encompassing oral and written forms, 
which act as embodiments of the cultural, linguistic, and psychological expression of the African 
people. African oral literature possesses similar rhetorical depth and complexity as the written 
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forms. The emphasis on the oral does not indicate a preclusion of a body of written literatures; 
rather, the influence of the oral on the written is made more obvious.   
Although oral literature in Africa has been viewed as similar to the “picture of the 
rhapsodist of the Homeric age” (Finnegan, Oral, 81), the different genres of African literature are 
dynamic and contextually realized. African oral literature is rich with narratives, which contain a 
wide variety of stories about animals and humans, “historical texts, proverbs, riddles, vernacular 
texts describing local customs, sometimes additional vernacular compositions by the collector, 
and, very occasionally, songs or poems” (Finnegan, Oral, 28). It is pertinent to point out that the 
oral aspects of African art depend greatly on the creative genius of the performer, whose 
effectiveness is stylistically realized. The ability of performers to capture the passions and 
persuasively communicate the essence of the art being performed is a question of style. The 
individual styles of different performers can make the difference between a persuasive or not so 
persuasive performance.   
The performer and the audience enact roles that make the African verbal arts particularly 
engaging. For example, I enjoyed tales by moonlight as a growing child in my village in Nigeria. 
The performer of the folktales with which we were enamoured as growing children was dynamic 
in crafting various tales. Though very old, these tales were made to come alive and made to appear 
new by the style of the performer. The performer has various resources at his disposal, which are 
drawn upon for playing out a particular art form. The artist is typically face to face with his 
audience and can take advantage of this medium to enhance the impact of the tales. In many stories, 
for example, the characterization of both leading and secondary figures may appear slight; but 
these figures can be orally delivered in forms, which are conveyed by more visible means – through 
the performer’s gestures, expressions, and mimicry. The creative genius of the performer often 
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makes the characters larger than life; and consequently, the tales become more memorable and 
persuasive. This oral creativity is captured in the following words:  
Much more could be said about the many other means which the oral performer can 
employ to project his literary product – his use, for instance, of vivid ideophones 
or dramatized dialogue, or his manipulation of the audience’s sense of humour or 
susceptibility (when played on by skilful performer) to be amazed, or shocked, or 
moves, or enthralled or appropriate moments. But it should be clear that oral 
literature has somewhat different potentialities from written literature, and the 
additional resources which the oral artist can develop for his own purposes; and 
that this aspect is of primary significance for its appreciation as a mode of aesthetic 
expression (Finnegan, Oral, 5). 
The aesthetic value of these performances is tied to their orality. Therefore, rather than 
view the oral aspects of the African rhetorical tradition as a reason to subordinate it, their 
examination should be based on the creativity and artistry that make them persuasive expressions 
of the African culture. The performances of African verbal art are highly effective in the formation 
of selfhood. For example, I recall wanting to be like some of the characters – in virtues, wisdom, 
and beauty - in the tales I consumed and enjoyed as a young child.  
             Abrahams argues in his article “A Rhetorical Theory of Folklore” that “each item 
of lore can be discussed meaningfully in terms of linguistic and dramatic organization and 
relationship of performer to the rest of the group. In fact, understanding of an item (and by 
extension, the tradition in which it exists) begins with an interrelating of all of these stylistic 
matters” (146).  To appreciate culture dependent artistry, it is pertinent to know that the items for 
expressing culture are instruments of argument as well as tools of persuasion. Therefore, the 
manner in which all the parts or style, performance, content, and usage are cohesive must first be 
understood within specific cultures.  
The works of scholars involved with comparative studies and the parallelism between 
African and European folktales show that the content of folklore contains some level of 
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universality. Poetry is a genre that is very useful for describing the varied nature of African 
literature. Poetry is either composed or performed. In addition to being realized privately or 
publicly in the royal courts of traditional kingdoms in Africa, African poetry can be appreciated as 
being employed for multiple purposes that can be ceremonial, ritualistic, as well as entertaining. 
The panegyric is a poetic composition, and its performance is the most specialized genre, which 
traditionally occurs within the royal courts.  
The panegyric is mostly enacted in the “elaborate praise poems of the Zulu or Sotho in 
Southern Africa, the poems of the official singers of the ruler of Bornu, the royal praises of the 
Hausa emirs, the eulogies addressed to rulers in the various kingdoms of the Congo, and many 
others” (Finnegan, Oral, 83). The poet has the role of remembering as well as expressing the 
eulogies being performed in a way that is similar to, yet significantly different from the role of the 
West African griot or the South African imbongi. What is unique about African poetry is the 
specialized skills of speaking drums as employed in the Yoruba, Hausa, and Ashanti tribes and the 
highly specialized bards of Rwanda.  
Such bards are highly sophisticated and elaborate in their composition in addition to having 
specialized modes of expression. These types of poetic composition and performance are hardly 
restricted to the courts anymore, but they have spilled into other public spaces where these 
panegyric forms are used to sing the praises of political leaders and politicians. The panegyric was 
equally employed for religious and ritualistic purposes, which is particularly evident in Islamic 
and traditional rituals. The specialized cults dedicated to certain deities in West Africa, like the 
Fon of Dahomey and the Ifa priests of the Yoruba tribe in Nigeria, go through the kind of training 
that are highly professional. The use of panegyric in the public spaces often has materialistic 
motivations similar to the sophists of classical rhetoric. Despite the negative connotations that 
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accompany such rhetorical applications, the perversion of a particular art does not strip the art of 
its intrinsic beauty and power. 
To support this argument, Benjamin Colby and Michael Cole argue against the long-held 
belief in the superiority of Western modes of thinking over those of other cultures. These scholars 
also claim that “the reasoning and thinking of different people in different cultures don’t differ 
…just their values, beliefs, and ways of classifying things differ” (quoting J. Gay and M. Cole’s 
The New Mathematics and an old Culture, 63). The “ways of classifying things” referred to here 
echo what Burke refers to as ‘symbol systems’ of the ‘symbol using animal’. Nietzsche also 
describes such symbols as “a movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthromorphisms: in 
short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, 
transferred, and embellished, and which, after a long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, 
and binding” (“On Truth and Lies,” 891). In essence, differences in symbol systems can only be 
accounted for within the cultures from which they are derived. 
The basis for making the dichotomy between western and non-western modes of thought 
(under a hierarchy of superiority and inferiority) is predicated on the contrast between “rationality 
(sometimes equated with scientific method) as opposed to non-rationality” (Finnegan & Horton, 
Introd, 17) and ‘civilization’ as opposed to ‘primitiveness.’ The notion of civilization and 
primitiveness used for making this distinction is highly subjective. Observations of these groups 
of people center around their belief system such as “beliefs in spirits, totemic ancestors” (Colby 
and Cole, 64), or beliefs in witchcraft, oracles, and magic. Consequently, the idea of “primitive 
thought” focus on the belief system of a group as a yardstick for judging their cognitive capacity, 
and this view tends to blur the line between “process” and “content.” 
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Like other literary genres of African rhetorical tradition, folklore is traditional and argues 
traditionally. As rhetorical tools, these literary genres use “arguments as persuasive techniques 
developed in the past to cope with recurrences of social problem situations” (Abrahams, 146). The 
performance sometimes employs songs and dance in combination with word narration that involve 
the individual performer, who is often joined by members of the audience (or chorus) for 
communal enjoyment. One of the most important aspects of the African rhetorical tradition is the 
communal role, which makes most oral arts communal properties.  
Despite the communal nature of African art, the creative genius of the performer is 
indispensable because it is employed to enhance the aesthetic quality of the literary product being 
performed. The communal nature of African art implies that the audience plays a significant role 
in the form of “additions,” “queries,” or “even criticisms” in the performance, and this is what 
makes the distinction between oral and written literary art particularly noteworthy. The oral aspect 
of African rhetorical tradition, despite its obvious disadvantage of temporality, has several 
advantages, which are associated with their performances. What is lost in the orality of African 
oral tradition is gained in other potentialities such as immediate response and feedback from the 
audience. Such potentialities were quite evident in Mandela’s speeches, which were performances 
in themselves. 
 Oral performances have the persuasive power to produce psychological effects such as 
catharsis, which in turn create emotional wellbeing for the audience. The manner in which the 
performances are reproduced vary according to artists, genres, and cultures. And the role of 
promoting social cohesion is tied closely with the particular situations in which art and performer 
interact as evidence of social engagement. The occasions may be funerals, weddings, celebrations 
of victory, soothing a baby, and more, which when combined with the adequate literary genre can 
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be highly rhetorical. Beyond these occasions are other rituals, which perform the significant role 
of grounding people in their cultures and producing long lasting unity.  
The dynamism of the African rhetorical tradition is best captured in the role of children’s 
lullabies, rhymes, verses, and games that act as cognitive tools for enhancing the memory of the 
child and for forming strong social bonds. Rhymes, verses, and games are quite significant as they 
play out the communal nature of the African traditional society. Children’s play as a broad 
spectrum of activities, which engage children physically, mentally, and emotionally help in the 
formation of societal value system. For example, riddles are deployed mainly for entertainment, 
but the process involved in riddling does not just require answers to the questions; they invite the 
participant to identify an allusive sentence with its analogous referent. And the point of reference 
“normally lies in some play of images – visual, acoustic or situational – rather than, as in many 
English riddles, in puns, or play on words” (Finnegan, Child Play, 297). Besides entertainment, 
riddles play a pedagogic role in training children for quick thinking, intellectual skills, and other 
taxonomies. Children’s plays are characterized by games, usually accompanied by words and 
music, which sometimes connect to the traditional folklore. 
African value formation relies heavily on literature, especially poetry, which is 
significantly influential. The influence of African poetry, particularly its ability to instil pride and 
a strong sense of identity in the minds of Africans, can be best glimpsed from the panegyric 
especially those composed in the praise of kings and warriors. In this regard, poetry can be 
ambitious and elaborate, for example:  
The following extract from one of the many praises of the famous Zulu King, Shaka, 
illustrates the use of the allusion, metaphor, and praise name which are combined with 
some narrative to convey the bravery and fearsomeness of the king as he defeated his 
enemy Zwide:  
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His spear is terrible. 
The Ever-ready-to-meet-any-challenge! 
The first-born sons of their mothers who were called for many years! 
He is like the cluster of stones of Nkandhla, 
Which sheltered the elephants when it rained. 
The hawk which I saw sweeping down from Mangcengeza; 
When he came to Pungashe he disappeared…. (Finnegan, Oral, 124-125) 
The above poem alludes to Shaka as both the defender of the people and one who fights on 
their behalf through the power of his spear. It is implied that the Zulu king did not possess the 
sophisticated weapons of the colonialist, yet he was able to fight bravely and hold back the 
colonialist. Mandela alluded to Shaka as a rhetorical strategy for encouraging Black South 
Africans to remain resolute in the struggle against apartheid. African Studies scholar, Bekunuru 
Kubayanda, describes African rhetoric as “inextricably bound up with the culture, history, and 
thought of the African peoples: it is impelled by a network of repossession and reidentification 
with self and source” (114). The rhetorical tradition of a particular group of people can be 
described as the body of epistemological texts, both written and oral, that are contributory factors 
towards the formation of their value system. Interestingly, African rhetorical tradition exhibits 
traits of hybridity as a result of the cultural contact with other traditions and civilizations such as 
the Christian, Islamic, and Roman influences, which left their marks on African rhetoric. 
Consequently, “one cannot presume to identify a single epigraphic style or ethos for all” 
(Kubayanda, 267) thus debunking the myth of homogeneity among Africans.  
Heterogeneity among Africans implies that they often adhered to different ideologies 
despite having been formed within the same culture. The implication of this heterogeneity in South 
Africa is that Blacks were often divided along ideological lines as a result of class, gender, and 
ethnic differences. This division complicated an already complex context, which made Mandela’s 
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task of forging unity among Black South Africans very difficult. It is significant to examine the 
manner in which Mandela was formed and influenced by African and Western rhetorical modes 
in order to adequately capture his braided rhetoric.  
 
Mandela: His Background and African Rhetorical Formation 
Mandela’s African rhetorical influences emanated from Xhosa traditional folktales, poetry, 
wisdom-lore, communal activities like his initiation ceremony, and childhood plays. These 
rhetorical influences are evident in his autobiographies and speeches. From his personal and 
African historical pasts, he crafts narratives that exemplify Bhabha’s concept of rags and scraps of 
tradition. The narratives were deployed as rhetorical techniques for painting pictures of life in 
South Africa before colonial incursion. From these narratives, Mandela attempts to reclaim his 
African historical past in order to depict the rich rhetorical heritage that helped to form his value 
system and to portray the evil of racist apartheid. For example, he narrates the way his childhood 
activities played a significant role in his personal formation and to show how these activities fall 
within the scope of rhetorical persuasion. In essence, these activities acted persuasively upon him, 
and he deployed their narration in a rhetorical manner. Mandela shows how the activities of his 
childhood were directly responsible for his ideas concerning honour, fair play, and magnanimity 
– also regarded as the South African philosophy of “Ubuntu.” Ubuntu means humanity or “I am 
because we are.”  It is a philosophy that guided Mandela even in the darkest period of the struggle.  
Mandela’s values were formed mainly through African oral traditional narratives that were 
rhetorical in nature. He often deployed such narratives as persuasive strategies for pushing his anti-
apartheid cause. Mandela’s employment of narratives can be compared to the role of a West 
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African griot or South African imbongi, who tells and retells the history of the people for rhetorical 
effect.  He often used these narratives of the South African glorious past in the courtroom where 
logic appeared to have failed. Mandela wove narratives in a way that captures Fanon’s description 
of how tales of African past are reinvented to act as tools of anti-colonial struggle. The way 
Mandela creatively spiced his speeches with African historical narratives, some performative 
styles employed in African folktale narration, and particular African community salutations is 
examined. Their examination is based on the fact that these African rhetorical devices enabled him 
perform the role of persuasive identification. This identification served the purpose of calling his 
fellow Africans to certain actions like the stoppage of intra-tribal violence so that the common 
enemy does not succeed in using Africans to distract and destroy each other. He also deployed 
some other tropes like repetition and metaphors culled from the flora and fauna that are distinctly 
African for the purpose of reinforcing the cohesion he aimed for among all South Africans.   
According to Mandela, “To be an African in South Africa means that one…is born in an 
Africans Only hospital, taken home in an Africans Only bus, lives in an African Only area, and 
attends Africans Only schools, if he attends school at all” (Long Walk, 96). Based on these 
sentiments voiced by Mandela, the discrimination and violence suffered by Blacks indicates that 
the concept of community that he grew up with had become distorted by apartheid. Mandela 
captures the significance of the African community in the following words: “in the veld playing 
and fighting with the other boys of the village…I learned to stick-fight – essential knowledge to 
any rural African boy – and became adept at its various techniques, parrying blows, feinting in one 
direction and striking in another” (Long Walk, 9). The nature of the play Mandela describes 
portrays the freedom that formed his “love of the veld, of open spaces, the simple beauties of 
nature, the clean line of the horizon” (Long Walk, 9) that inscribed in his mind strong ideas of how 
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life should be. The cultural activities that made deep impressions on Mandela were expressions 
and embodiments of African rhetorical modes. Some of the effects help to form his African identity 
through activities such as self-praise.  
The self-praises in African rhetorical modes, particularly during ceremonies, connect 
strongly with Mandela’s account of his circumcision. Mandela’s description of his circumcision, 
and the cry of “‘Ndiyindoda!” (I am a man!)” (Long Walk, 27), immediately after the foreskin is 
cut off, may be likened to the self-praise that gives the individual pride and confidence in their 
achievement and culture. This ritual of passage from boyhood to manhood exists in many cultures, 
but the effect on Mandela’s passage can be described as fundamental in helping to shape his 
African identity. This conclusion can be drawn from Mandela’s own words thus: “…a great 
ceremony was held to welcome us as to society. Our families, friends, and local chiefs gathered 
for speeches, songs, and gift-giving…I remember walking differently on that day, straighter, taller, 
firmer. I was hopeful, and thinking that I might someday have wealth, property, and status” (Long 
Walk, 29). The rite of passage experienced and described by Mandela was unique, socially 
integrative, pedagogical, as well as persuasive.  
Mandela’s narratives of African political history, as told in his youth, formed his 
knowledge base as a young African boy. The way Mandela used these narratives rhetorically to 
attempt to persuade in the face of resistance to logos will be examined in other chapters. In 
addition, these narratives served to show that the joy and freedom he experienced as a young boy 
in the Transvaal, when compared to his suffering under apartheid, turns the Western concept of 
civilization on its head. In essence, the juxtaposition Mandela constructs with his narratives sets a 
new parameter for judging the Western precepts of civilization as a requisite harbinger of justice, 
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freedom, and equity. In essence, the absence of these elements that confers humanity on any group 
of people is a hallmark of the uncivilized. 
Mandela’s encounter with racism did not occur until he had imbibed the customs and 
traditions of his people, which are gleaned from the childhood stories in his autobiography. The 
significance of this age of encounter with racism rests on the fact he had grounding in cultural 
knowledge and pride before he encountered the racist ideology that would paint the apartheid 
heritage as uncivilized. Mandela’s narratives give us an insight into the traits he inherited from his 
father such as gait, personality, and his father’s leadership role in the society. For example, 
Mandela says: “My father was a tall, dark- skinned man with a straight and stately posture, which 
I like to think I inherited…He could be exceedingly stubborn, another trait that may unfortunately 
have been passed down from father to son” (Long Walk, 5). Without acknowledging what his 
father symbolized, Mandela carried on his father’s role as a South African imbongi within their 
traditional community. Mandela tells of his father’s duties in the following words:  
My father has sometimes been referred to as the prime minister of Thembuland 
during the reign of Dalindyebo, the father of Sabata, who rule in the early 1900s, 
and that of his son, Jongintaba, who succeeded him. That is a misnomer in that no 
such title existed, but the role he played was not so different from what the 
designation implies. As a respected and valued counsellor to both kings, he 
accompanied them on their travels and was usually to be found by their sides during 
important meetings with government officials. He was an acknowledged custodian 
of Xhosa history, and it was partially for that reason that he was valued as an 
adviser. My own interest in history had early roots and was encouraged by my 
father. Although my father could neither read nor write, he was reputed to be an 
excellent orator who captivated his audiences by entertaining them as well as 
teaching them (Long Walk, 5).  
Although it is not obvious if Mandela performs these exact roles, the manner in which he 
kept the anti-apartheid struggle alive, particularly through the power of his narratives, implied that 
he actively played the role of a griot or imbongi as a commentator, an observer, a legal interpreter, 
a mediator, and a leader. Kaschula sees the imbongi in terms of the role played as a “mediator and 
42 
 
as a political and social commentator in relation to the power base of the community within which 
he operates” (Imbongi, 66). Mandela’s national role connects to Kaschula’s description of the 
imbongi, who performed at Mandela’s first visit to his hometown upon his release from prison.  
Sitole is the imbongi described by Kaschula. Sitole performed epideictic rhetoric; and on 
this occasion, Mandela was the object of praise. On this Mandela’s homecoming, the imbongi 
acted as a mediator among the citizens as well. In essence, in criticizing those whose actions called 
for it and praising those perceived as the enemy of the people, the imbongi was performing a 
rhetorical function similar to that of Mandela and Mandela’s father. Sitole deployed the call and 
response strategy of “Amandla-ngawethu” that Mandela used in his public speeches. Mandela can 
be described as playing the role of the South African imbongi by the way he deployed his narratives 
to sensitize the people about their past and the need to unite against apartheid. The role of 
mediating goes hand in hand with the historical narrative of the people.  
The experiential and contextual impact of the African rhetorical tradition is deeply 
interconnected in the way they help to form the cultures of the African people. The significance of 
this impact is embodied in Mandela’s rhetoric, and he demonstrates that impact through the various 
rhetorical devices employed to make his appeal. Mandela describes the councils, where important 
political and cultural matters were resolved democratically, to demonstrate how the African 
rhetorical tradition was closely connected to his African sense of community. At the end of such 
councils, “a praise-singer or poet would deliver a panegyric to the ancient kings, and a mixture of 
compliments to and satire on the present chiefs” (Mandela, Long Walk, 22). The cultural 
experiences themselves were rhetorical in the sense that they helped to connect the individuals to 
their traditional identity.  
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The point being made here is that the African rhetorical tradition, which encompasses many 
facets of the African culture, was highly instrumental in shaping Mandela’s selfhood and rhetoric. 
His metamorphosis into the rhetorical figure that spearheaded the anti-apartheid movement is not 
inseparable from his African formation. The narratives Mandela employed in his various texts 
served to address the predicament of Black South Africans under the crushing apartheid 
government. In addressing the plight of Blacks, Mandela acts as the memory of the people and 
actively undertakes to reshape that memory. Thus, Mandela plays the role of the performer, and 
his narratives help to reshape the historical memory of South African Blacks for the political 
engagement of emancipation. 
The African folklore Mandela describes captures the historical past that instilled pride in 
him as a young man. The folklore encompasses “historic battles and heroic Xhosa warriors” (Long 
Walk, 11) as well as “Xhosa legends and fables that had come from numberless generations” (Long 
Walk, 11) with which his mother enchanted him. The folklore stimulated Mandela’s young 
imagination; and most importantly, they contained moral lessons that formed the baseline of 
African communal identity and unity. Such moral lessons embody Quintillian’s notions that the 
education of the perfect orator is supposed to be geared towards capturing the minds of young 
children in order to identify the distinction between ethical and unethical orators. In essence, 
Mandela’s education in African and Western rhetorical traditions accounts for his ethos and 
persuasiveness. 
Mandela draws attention to the stories he heard during the councils he had the privilege to 
witness in his youth, which helped to form his sense of African identity. According to him: “I 
discovered the great African patriots who fought against Western domination. My imagination was 
fired by the glory of these African warriors” (Mandela, Long Walk, 23). Mandela recounts the 
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ancient tales of Chief Joyi, who played the role of the South African imbongi or the West African 
griot. According to Mandela, Chief Joyi was the “great authority on the history of the Thembu in 
large part because he had lived through so much of it” (Long Walk, 23). Mandela acts as a bridge 
between the present and the past. He makes this connection by always comparing the glorious 
African past with their present deplorable conditions in apartheid South Africa. 
In addition to the poems and tales that were instrumental to Mandela’s formation, 
childhood plays were equally significant in the development of his ethos. African play is more 
than play, as with play in lot of other cultures. Mandela tells of how play formed in him the idea 
of how to uphold human dignity and honour. The concept of “face” would play a huge role in his 
rhetoric and praxis in the anti-apartheid struggle. The incident described and the lesson learned 
became some of the pillars of Mandela’s ethos. Thus, Mandela’s education through folklore and 
games started in his African rhetorical tradition long before he encountered the Western rhetorical 
tradition. Mandela’s rhetorical formation did not end with his upbringing or formal education. His 
experiences all through his career as a lawyer, his years in the struggle, as well as the physically, 
psychologically, and emotionally demanding years of incarceration were all learning experiences. 
These experiences helped to consolidate his appreciation of the Western and African rhetorical 
traditions.  
Their complex content enriches African folklore, and one of the defining features of 
African oral literature is their verbal flexibility. “The verbal elaboration, the drama of the 
performance itself, everything in fact, which makes it a truly aesthetic product comes from the 
contemporary teller and his audience and not from the remote past” (Finnegan, Oral, 318). In 
essence, the idea that the stories date back to the past does not detract from their aesthetic value. 
The aesthetic value enables Mandela to attempt reclamation of the distorted identity of his people.    
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Mandela’s appreciation and employment of the African rhetorical tradition is tied to style and 
performance, and this deployment makes it important to examine their stylistic significance. The 
impact of performance that is associated with the African oral tradition was a key factor in 
Mandela’s legal profession; and ironically, his legal profession is a legacy of the Western rhetorical 
tradition.  
 
Variety of Western Rhetorical Influences 
The influence of the Western rhetorical tradition on Mandela was quite deep as it traversed 
several areas of his life. For example, while in prison, he and other ANC leaders acquired a lot of 
knowledge and also taught other prisoners who knew little about the ANC. According to Mandela, 
“[t]eaching conditions were not ideal. Study groups would work together on the quarry and station 
themselves in a circle around the leader of the seminar. The style of teaching was Socratic in 
nature; ideas and theories were elucidated through the leaders asking and answering questions” 
(Long Walk, 467). It can be argued that the reason that Mandela used the Socratic style of teaching 
is a deliberate invocation of the Western rhetorical tradition. Mandela embraced the Western 
rhetorical tradition despite it being a channel for inferiorizing Africans and the African rhetorical 
tradition. The influence of the Western rhetorical tradition on Mandela’s rhetoric is well spread 
across his autobiography - Long Walk to Freedom. This autobiography serves the purpose of partly 
anthologizing some of Mandela’s speeches and of depicting the context of his rhetorical strategies.   
In combination with the distinct African rhetorical modes Mandela employed, he used lots 
of Western narratives, tropes, and symbols to draw attention to apartheid injustices. For example, 
he deploys symbols like Lady Justice, which is a Western symbol of equity, in a dynamic way to 
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show that the apartheid regime had betrayed their Western judicial legacy. He drew upon 
Shakespeare’s characters like Shylock to interrogate racial injustice. He also enjoyed a lot of Greek 
plays and Western writers like George Bernard Shaw. He internalized the virtues of Sophocles’ 
Antigone because according to Mandela, “it was Antigone who symbolized our struggle; she was, 
in her own way, a freedom fighter, for she defied the law on the grounds that it was unjust” (Long 
Walk, 456). Mandela, the rhetorician, refused to be limited in exercising his rhetorical agency 
either by the Western or the African rhetorical traditions in making his appeal in the anti-apartheid 
struggle. Instead, Mandela carefully draws from and combines both traditions in order to account 
for the extraordinary context and revolutionary political purposes for which he must speak and 
write. This context included the diverse and fractured audiences he had to persuade in order to 
build a movement and momentum sufficient to dismantle apartheid. 
Mandela’s appreciation of the Western rhetorical tradition is captured in the following 
words: “I only performed in a few dramas, but I had one memorable role: that of Creon, the king 
of Thebes, in Sophocles’ Antigone. I had read some of the classic Greek plays in prison, and found 
them enormously elevating, what I took out of them was that character was measured by facing up 
to difficult situations and that a hero was a man who would not break even under the most trying 
circumstances” (Mandela, Long Walk, 456). Mandela’s ability to learn from every possible source 
and situation is remarkable, and that openness may account for his rhetorical dexterity. Mandela’s 
braided rhetoric has been described as subtle because he often used stories that employed tropes 
to expose the racist nature of apartheid policies. These policies created conditions, which the 
regime would rather were kept in the dark from the gaze of the global community. The conditions 
ranged from cultural suppression, racial segregation, educational deprivation, and physical 
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violence. These conditions were responsible for the decision to move from the non-violent stand 
of the ANC to the armed struggle Mandela ultimately advocated for.  
The influence of both the African and Western rhetorical traditions had an impact on 
Mandela’s inspiring leadership and tenacity. For example, Mandela captures one of the influences 
of the Western rhetorical tradition in the following words: “Antigone rebels, on the grounds that 
there is a higher law than that of the state. Creon will not listen to Antigone, nor does he listen to 
anyone but his own inner demons. His inflexibility and blindness ill become a leader, for a leader 
must temper justice with mercy” (Long Walk, 456). Mandela was impacted by Antigone’s struggle, 
and he learned the danger of being an inflexible leader.  This impact can be seen in Mandela’s 
readiness to shift from a rigid stance on any issue to a more flexible position. For this reason, he 
was usually accused of having sold out by his fellow ANC leaders and his followers.  
However, there is a duality to Mandela’s identity and rhetorical formation that makes it 
impossible for him to deploy any single rhetorical tradition. Although the Church and the State 
both represented Western ideologies, the Church offered South Africans, according to Mandela, 
opportunities for self-realization. Mandela expressed this duality in his appreciation of the Western 
education and religion he acquired early in life. According to Mandela, “The two principles that 
governed my life at Mqhekezweni were the chieftaincy and the Church. These two doctrines 
existed in uneasy harmony, although I did not see them as antagonistic” (Long Walk, 19). Mandela 
recognized the way Africans benefited from the Western civilization that the Church provided 
access to and how those benefits were truncated by the apartheid regime. The Church and State in 
South African appeared to have been operating at cross-purposes from Mandela’s observation.  
The Church, which is supposed to be more interested in the spiritual welfare of the citizens, 
took on the role of extending the Western culture to Blacks. Thus, the Church is seen as a temporal 
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and spiritual entity, and this prompted Mandela to say that “the Church was as concerned with this 
world as the next: I saw that virtually all of the achievements of Africans seemed to have come 
about through the missionary work of the Church. The mission schools trained the clerks, the 
interpreters, and the policemen, who at the time represented the height of African aspirations” 
(Long Walk, 19).  In helping to form Africans, the Church played the role of helping Africans gain 
access to Western civilization. The Church offered vocational and spiritual training to Mandela 
and his fellow Africans to help lift their socio-economical status. This training also offered 
Mandela rhetorical tools for interrogating the Christian legacy of the apartheid regime. 
In essence, the Church in South Africa used scripture and rhetoric to put the Africans on 
the course to self-realization, while the State used the rhetoric of racism to dehumanize them. 
While acknowledging the exemplary role of the Church, Mandela got his animosity towards the 
State from the stories woven by Chief Joyi, who  
railed against the white man, who he believed had deliberately sundered the Xhosa, 
dividing brother from brother. The white man had told the Thembus that their true 
chief was the great white queen across the ocean and that they were her subjects. But 
the white queen brought nothing but misery and perfidy to the black people, and if she 
is a chief, she was an evil chief. Chief Joyi’s war stories and his indictment of the 
British made me feel angry and cheated, as though I had already been robbed of my 
own birthright (Long Walk, 25).  
Despite feeling cheated and angry about colonialism and apartheid racism, Mandela did 
not hold himself back from getting the benefits of European culture nor fail to appreciate the 
Churches that tried to mitigate the evils of apartheid. Although some church denominations played 
a good role in empowering Blacks, the fact that apartheid policies were given a religious coloring 
made the evil that the policies depict more difficult to uproot. The religious ideas were used to 
justify racism and allowed separate racial groups to develop “in its time and in accordance with its 
own predisposition” (Crapanzano, xix). This idea gave birth to the Population Registration Act of 
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1950. Afrikaners “sometimes support their argument by reference to the Tower of Babel, a sign, 
they say, of God’s desire to preserve a pluriracial, pluricultural, polyglot world” (Crapanzano, xxi). 
The Tower of Babel represents the ‘point’ or ‘place’ in “Genesis,” chapter 11, the first book of the 
Bible where human beings were linguistically separated, so that they will be unable to understand 
each other.  
This belief fortified the idea of separation within the Biblical context of the Tower of Babel.  
Such manipulative use of scripture underscores Augustine’s admonition that interpretations of 
scripture should not eschew charity in its use of rhetorical tropes. It is ironical that the apartheid 
regime would manipulate scripture as an excuse to deprive Blacks of their rights, while the Church, 
on the other hand, acted as an instrument for empowering them. Therefore, we can understand 
Mandela’s respect for and employment of the Western rhetorical tradition. The fact that Mandela 
does not reject the Western rhetorical tradition but uses it in combination with the African 
rhetorical tradition to exercise his agency, makes his braided rhetoric more appealing. 
 Mandela’s appreciation of the Western rhetorical tradition is most evident in his great 
admiration for the Western canon and legal framework. That notwithstanding, Mandela recognizes 
that the apartheid regime has been unfaithful to their own Western legal framework and the 
civilization that is enunciated in the Western rhetorical tradition. The failure to adhere to the 
concept of equal right for all makes the apartheid regime in need of civilization, as J. M. Coetzee 
portrayed in Waiting for the Barbarian. Mandela’s agitation was not against the Western rhetorical 
tradition, but against those who exploited it for an unjust end.  
Mandela’s anti-apartheid stance is best captured in the following words, “a thousand 
slights, a thousand indignities, a thousand unremembered moments, produced in me an anger, a 
rebelliousness, a desire to fight the system that imprisoned my people” (Long Walk, 95), capture 
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the build-up of emotions that accrued from the racial oppression of a group of people.  Mandela’s 
braided rhetoric is both a conscious and an unconscious enactment in the sense that he internalized 
aspects of both traditions unconsciously and drew upon them on the conscious level. For example, 
the symbols he culled and employed rhetorically come from both rhetorical traditions. The 
symbols are deliberate in their deployment and come from a deep cognitive place and are, thus, 
convincing. The complex nature of Mandela’s multiple audiences makes his braided rhetoric 
strategically productive in his anti-apartheid struggle.  
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Chapter Two 
 Mandela and Global Human Rights Ideologies 
Mandela’s rhetoric was influenced not only by Western and African rhetorical traditions 
but also by political philosophies like anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, and anti-
racism. These philosophies helped to shape his rhetorical appeal as he navigated the anti-apartheid 
struggle. Mandela’s ability to move fluidly among and between rhetorical appeals associated with 
a variety of African and Western political philosophies was particularly significant. That is because 
the apartheid government kept changing both the policies and the rhetorical strategies deployed 
against Mandela in an attempt to frustrate and contain the ANC leadership. One of these rhetorical 
strategies employed by the apartheid regime against both the ANC and Mandela was the charge of 
communism. This charge was an interesting rhetorical move because the anti-apartheid struggle 
coincided with the cold-war era. The government recognized that a charge of communism was 
bound to produce the effect of tainting the image of the anti-apartheid leaders in the Western world.  
This rhetorical move of suppressing political opposition by accusing dissenters of being or 
associated with communists was not peculiar to the apartheid government. The same scenario was 
playing out in the US where human rights activists like Martin Luther King and Malcolm X, who 
were contemporaries of Mandela, were also being accused of communism. Like Dr. King and 
Malcolm X, Mandela was undeterred by charges of communist association. The fact that human 
rights activists were being charged with communism across the globe at the time when the cold 
war was at its height indicated that human right activists were connected in some way. The charge 
of communism introduced a new phase of suppression, and this phase forced Mandela to fine-tune 
his strategy and shift from non-violence to armed struggle. This change in resistance strategy 
further exacerbated the already complicated context both within South Africa and abroad. The 
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change in strategy threatened Mandela’s efforts to persuade multiple audiences – the most 
powerful of whom shared the fear of communism. Mandela employed a rhetorical sagacity in order 
to show why: (1) the charge of communism would not stick, and (2) the non-violence philosophy 
(of Mahatma Gandhi and favoured by Martin Luther King) he had initially adopted was inadequate 
to address the anti-apartheid struggle. 
To keep the movement alive, a change of political strategies was necessary in order to keep 
up with the constantly morphing political terrain of apartheid.  The shift from nonviolence to armed 
struggle resulted in the framing of Mandela as a communist and a terrorist. In addition, he was 
projected as being inconsistent and unreliable. All efforts to discredit the ANC leadership did not 
succeed in halting the freedom struggle. It is important to examine why the charge of having 
communist association failed to negatively impact the struggle as well as investigate why 
Mandela’s rhetorical appeal for armed struggle was effective. To undertake this study, this chapter 
analyzes Mandela’s autobiography, Long Walk to Freedom and some of the speeches delivered 
before his incarceration and after his release. The texts analyzed in this chapter include “A Black 
Man in a white Court,” which was used in 1962 for defending himself against the charged of 
inciting workers’ strike and leaving the country without permission and “An Ideal for which I am 
prepared to die,” which was the three-hour appeal made from the dock at the Rivonal trial of April 
20, 1964. The Rivonia trial for treason earned him 27 years in prison.  
These texts prove quite productive for showing how Mandela’s braided rhetoric was 
deployed to interrogate apartheid. They also help in making the argument that though recognizing 
Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King’s nonviolence philosophy as a powerful political and 
rhetorical strategy, Mandela articulates the inadequacy of nonviolence as a political strategy within 
the constantly morphing apartheid governmental policies and violence ridden South African 
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context. Mandela’s argument connects to Fanon’s idea that colonialism (which apartheid 
represents) is a violent system that can only be dismantled through violence. The manner in which 
the complexity of the racist order of apartheid helped to shape Mandela’s rhetorical and political 
strategies will be analyzed under the following sub-headings: (1) Cold War as Historical Context 
for Anti-Imperialist, Anti-Colonial, and Anti-Racist Struggles, (2) What Mandela says about the 
Charge of Communism, (3) Mandela’s Ambivalence towards Communism, (4) Mandela’s 
Rhetorical Connectedness with Global Anti-Racist Activism, (5) The Convergences and 
Divergences of Anti-Racist Activists, (6) Black Art as Tools of Resistance, (7) Mandela and 
Nonviolence as a Political Strategy, (8) Apartheid Government’s Attacks on Mandela as A 
Terrorist 
 
Cold War as Historical Context for Anti-Imperialist, Anti-Colonial, and Anti-Racist 
Struggles 
Although there had been resistance to imperialist and colonialist incursions in previous 
centuries, twentieth century WWI and WWII produced an awareness of how catastrophic such 
incursions and oppressive regimes can be. This awareness, which was observed in trajectories of 
anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-racist, and national self-determination of former colonies 
was discernible across the globe. Such trajectories involved the active engagement of leaders like 
King, Malcolm X, Fidel Castro, and Mandela, who confronted the realities of human rights abuses 
all over the world. On the one hand, this engagement was instrumental in bringing about the 
liberation of former colonial nations into independent states. On the other hand, the engagement 
caused concerned individuals and groups to push for the upholding of human rights, with the hope 
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of averting a catastrophe similar to the Nazi Holocaust. This Holocaust caused leaders like by 
Martin Luther King Jr. to argue that “[n]o person of goodwill can stand by as a silent auditor while 
there is a possibility of the complete spiritual and cultural destruction of a once flourishing Jewish 
community. The denial of human rights anywhere is a threat to the affirmation of human rights 
everywhere” (Snyder, 232). The carnage of the world wars created the awareness of human right 
abuses, which in turn produced a wave of activism in the 1950s and 60s in a manner that was 
unprecedented.  
Globalization facilitated the activism, which in turn engendered relevant international 
policies. According to Jonathan Hyslop, World War II created an impact that served to shift the 
international political-legal framework of warfare in a way that had important consequences for 
Mandela and the ANC. It is interesting to note that both the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and 
Britain/the United States, on the other hand, had been strongly supportive of underground armed 
civilian resistance to Nazi occupation in Europe. This support for underground resistance acted as 
an impetus to the amendment of international laws like the 1949 revision of the Geneva 
Conventions, meant to protect civilian combatants. These amended laws were a direct consequence 
of WWII and a recognition of the need for oppressed groups to resist oppression in order to protect 
themselves. It is not surprising to see anti-colonial movements developing in Africa and Asia in 
these post-war years, and these movements indicate that the world wars acted as catalyst for more 
formidable push for self-determination compared to the failed efforts of the resistance to 
colonialism in the past centuries. That is because a new ideological space had opened up for 
national liberation organizations to demand legal protection for their fighters. But even more, by 
according to guerrillas the status of troops of national armies, the new legal regime helped the 
movements from which guerrilla fighters could claim the status of state authority for themselves 
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(Hyslop, 171). WWII exposed colonial incursion and imperialism more starkly as crimes against 
self-determination. Consequently, previous colonial subjects were more emboldened to fight for 
independence.  
This post-WWII period happened to be the cold war era, and the mutual distrust it 
engendered on the part of Western democracies and Communist nations impacted the world in a 
significant way. The impact is identifiable in the manner in which any form of opposition against 
most Western powers was coloured as having communist influences. When Marx’s Communist 
Manifesto, which states that “[t]here are, besides, eternal truths, such as Freedom, Justice, etc., that 
are common to all states of society” (Van Herpen, “Marx and Human Rights…”, 13) is examined, 
it appears to interrogate the very foundation of those Western powers. That is because the Western 
powers put freedom and justice out of the reach of certain groups of people like Blacks.  
Marx’s manifesto connects to Martin Luther King, Jr. (MLK)’s argument that “[t]here 
seems to be a throbbing desire, there seems to be an internal desire for freedom within the soul of 
every man. And it’s there: it might not break forth in the beginning, but eventually it breaks out. 
Men realize that, that freedom is something basic. To rob a man of his freedom is to take from him 
the essential basis of his manhood” (MLK, “The Birth of a Nation”, 20). Human rights activists, 
who agitated for freedom from oppressive orders, often had to endure the accusation of having 
being sponsored by Communists. Therefore, it can be argued that Communism threatens the status 
quo whereby human rights abuses are perpetrated under the guise of capitalism. Communist 
agitations were a threat to apartheid in a way that both complemented and differed from that of 
ANC.  
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According to Mandela, “[a]s far as the Communist Party is concerned, and if I understand 
its policy correctly, it stands for the establishment of a State based on the principles of Marxism. 
Although it is prepared to work for the Freedom Charter, as a short-term solution to the problems 
created by white supremacy, it regards the Freedom Charter as the beginning, and not the end, of 
its programme” (“An Ideal…). The Freedom Charter was adopted in Kliptown, on June 25,1955 
by the ANC and its allies as a proclamation of the central principles upon which the people of 
South Africa should be governed. The ANC did not have a problem with capitalism, but 
communism was totally opposed to capitalism. The Western countries abhorred Communism; 
consequently, any person or group that opposed racial and class oppression in South Africa and 
the US was accused of communism or of having communist association as a means of discrediting 
all forms of dissent.   
  
What Mandela says about the Charge of Communism  
Because Mandela was accused of being a communist, it is important to examine the basis 
for this accusation. Therefore, it is necessary to study what attracted Mandela to Marxist 
communism and the effective way he explained his pull towards and resistance to the communist 
ideology. Mandela opened his defense in his trial on April 20, 1964 by clarifying the different 
philosophies that influenced him. According to Mandela: “At the outset, I want to say that the 
suggestion made by the state in its opening that the struggle in South Africa is under the influence 
of foreigners or communists is wholly incorrect. I have done whatever I did, both as an individual 
and as a leader of my people, because of my experience in South Africa and my own proudly felt 
African background, and not because of what any outsider might have said” (An Ideal…”). 
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Mandela points out that he is first and foremost an African; and thus, his rhetoric reflects his 
African roots and identity. This assertion is valid because Mandela made this speech in his last 
trial called the Rivonia trial of 1964. Before this Rivonia trial, he was charged of inciting a 
workers’ strike and leaving the country without permission on August of 1962. In this Rivonia 
trial, he employs the rhetorical modes of the griot or imbongi to narrate the legends of his African 
heritage as a way of evoking pride in himself and his fellow Africans. Mandela captures this pride 
in the following words: 
Many years ago, when I was a boy brought up in my village in the Transkei, I listened 
to the elders of the tribe telling stories about the good old days, before the arrival of 
the white man. Then our people lived peacefully, under the democratic rule of their 
kings and their amapakati, and moved freely and confidently up and down the country 
without let or hindrance. Then the country was ours, in our own name and right. We 
occupied the land, the forests, the rivers; we extracted the mineral wealth beneath the 
soil and all the riches of this beautiful country. We set up and operated our own 
government, we controlled our own armies and we organised our own trade and 
commerce. The elders would tell tales of the wars fought by our ancestors in defence 
of the fatherland, as well as the acts of valour performed by generals and soldiers 
during those epic days. The names of Dingane and Bambata, among the Zulus, of 
Hintsa, Makana, Ndlambe of the AmaXhosa, of Sekhukhuni and others in the north, 
were mentioned as the pride and glory of the entire African nation (“A Black Man in 
a white Court”). 
It is important to indicate that Mandela was a performer, who had multiple audiences to 
persuade. The local audience was made up of his fellow South Africans: both white and Black, the 
oppressed and the oppressor. While the international community was made up of supporters of 
apartheid and white supremacy (they were also beneficiaries of the apartheid government) and 
others, who desired to see the end of colonialism and racism. It is interesting to see how Mandela 
braided his rhetoric such that it was easy to identify which rhetorical mode was being deployed 
and which audience, whether African or Western target audience, that mode was meant for. For 
example, the court scene provides Mandela, who deploys the rhetorical mode of the imbongi, the 
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opportunity to use the legends he narrates to make the point that it is the whites who should be on 
trial for depriving him and his people of their land. The imbongi rhetorical mode is employed to 
bolster the pride of his African audience, and the irony embedded within the narratives can be 
identified as targeting the Afrikaner audience. Through such narratives, Mandela exemplifies 
Finnegan’s, Kaschula’s, Abraham’s, and Campbell’s arguments that African folklore and 
historical legends are effective rhetorical tools that are often used to bring about change.  
Mandela also validates Fanon’s theory that old tales are retrieved and made new for the 
purpose of instilling pride in the people so as to resist colonization. Mandela’s braided rhetoric can 
be appreciated by the way he projects the pride in his African culture and heritage through the 
deployment of African rhetorical modes in a court scene, which is a symbol of the Western legal 
framework. As a result, it can be argued that he was firmly grounded in his African identity and 
no other social or cultural influence was powerful enough to erase that imprint. Mandela’s African 
root informed his appreciation of the African and Western cultures that helped to shape his belief 
system. Therefore, every other philosophy he imbibed was transformed by his African belief 
system that is predicated on the principle of “Ubuntu;” a principle that embraces every person’s 
humanity. It is important to examine why Mandela was accused of having been influenced by 
foreigners or by communists in the first place.  
Although Mandela was attracted to Marxist communism, he had an uncomfortable 
relationship with Marxism. The divergences between his African cultural and political 
philosophies and Marxist communism accounts for this uncomfortable relationship. The reason 
that the ANC and Communist political philosophies were at variance is laid out in a way that 
discredits the charge of communism. Unlike communism, the ANC had no problem with the class 
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structure of capitalism. The ANC was informed and guided by African traditional/political 
philosophies of freedom for all regardless of class.  The African society had layers of classes that 
Robin Cohen describes as internal social pyramids. These social pyramids were similar to that of 
the Western societies without the complications of racism. Mandela describes African pre-colonial 
class structure as one where everyone had freedom. In addition, there existed a homegrown 
democracy where everyone regardless of economic class or age, except women, had a say. 
Therefore, it can be argued that Mandela was strategically privileging race over class for the sake 
of forming a consensus that was needed to overturn apartheid racist order. In essence, class 
distinction within the traditional African society was different from the racial classification that 
existed under apartheid. The freedom enjoyed by the various classes in traditional Africa opened 
up spaces for individual development and self-actualization, and this space can only exist in 
capitalism and not in communism.  
As a result, the ANC was not as preoccupied with class as was the Communist Party whose 
main aim was to remove the capitalist system in order to replace them with a working-class 
government. The Communist Party sought to emphasize class distinctions whilst the ANC aimed 
to harmonize them (Mandela, “An Ideal…”). Mandela argues further that “It is true that there has 
often been close co-operation between the ANC and the Communist Party. But co-operation is 
merely proof of a common goal - in this case the removal of white supremacy - and is not proof of 
a complete community of interests” (“An Ideal…”). The effective way that Mandela employs 
forensic logic in his defense was a strategic rhetorical move. The move was to expose the diabolism 
behind the charge of communist association and embarrass the apartheid government before the 
international community. What Mandela achieves with this strategy is (1) to inform the Western 
audience about the differences between the ANC’s political philosophy and that of communism 
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and (2) show why the charge of communism was a deliberate ploy to destroy the reputation of the 
ANC leaders as well as discredit the freedom movement. 
Despite the divergence described by Mandela, it can be deduced that the ANC and the 
Communist Party in South Africa had one thing in common and that was the desire for “the 
removal of white supremacy” (Mandela, “An Ideal...”). Mandela strategically employs analogy to 
turn the logic of the apartheid regime, in their accusation of communist association, on its head. 
An example of this analogy is captured in the following words: “My Lord, the history of the world 
is full of similar examples. Perhaps the most striking illustration is to be found in the co-operation 
between Great Britain, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union in the fight against 
Hitler. Nobody but Hitler would have dared to suggest that such co-operation turned Churchill or 
Roosevelt into communists or communist tools, or that Britain and America were working to bring 
about a communist world” (Mandela, “An Ideal...”). What Mandela does with this analogy is 
employ irony to cause his accusers to examine their consciences and motives.  
It is interesting to note that the irony and analogy employed by Mandela in the above quote 
serve to draw attention to past occurrences and reveal the faulty logic of the regime’s charge of 
communism. It is also ironical that the Afrikaner Party, which campaigned on a racist ideology 
that fell in line with Hitler’s racist agenda, would use an excuse like communism to mask the racist 
agenda of the oppression of the ANC leaders and Mandela. To Mandela, it was hypocritical for 
Great Britain and the United States to be allying with apartheid South Africa right on the heels of 
Hitler’s failed racist project that these same nations had helped to foil. Such alliances were 
probably not surprising because the apartheid regime was emulating the US in conceptualizing 
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every form of dissent as pushing a communist agenda. That is because white supremacist 
oppression was as rife in the US as Hitler’s Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa.    
In denying the charge of communist influence, Mandela shows how his ideas enacted a 
divergence from communism. This divergence is made clear in the following words: “From my 
reading of Marxist literature and from conversations with Marxists, I have gained the impression 
that communists regard the parliamentary system of the West as undemocratic and reactionary. 
But, on the contrary, I am an admirer of such a system” (Mandela, “An Ideal…”). Despite the 
divergence between ANC and communist ideologies, Mandela is appreciative of the communist 
solidarity that Blacks had enjoyed. Mandela captures this appreciation in the following words: “[i]t 
is perhaps difficult for white South Africans, with an ingrained prejudice against communism, to 
understand why experienced African politicians so readily accept communists as their friends. But 
to us the reason is obvious. Theoretical differences amongst those fighting against oppression is a 
luxury we cannot afford at this stage” (Mandela, “An Ideal…”). Mandela’s employment of analogy 
to expose the “ingrained prejudice against communism” in this defense is emblematic of a stage 
performance. It is a form of epideictic rhetoric and a strategy similar to the performance of an 
imbongi. The performance is aimed at the Western international audience, who also shared this 
prejudice. In addressing the prejudice of the apartheid government, there was an indirect jab aimed 
at those at the larger stage (the international community). 
The jab can be described as rhetorically effective because the charge of communism (which 
was a rhetorical strategy on the part of the apartheid regime) was also being deployed against 
human rights activists like King in the US. The idea of branding “all exponents of democratic 
government and African freedom as communists and bans many of them (who are not communists) 
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under the Suppression of Communism Act” (Mandela, “An Ideal…”) is tantamount to giving a 
dog a bad name just to hang it. According to Mandela, “although I have never been a member of 
the Communist Party, I myself have been named under that pernicious Act because of the role I 
played in the Defiance Campaign. I have also been banned and imprisoned under that Act” (“An 
Ideal…”). The acceptance of communist into the ANC was a reciprocal gesture because “for many 
decades communists were the only political group in South Africa who were prepared to treat 
Africans as human beings and their equals; who were prepared to eat with us; talk with us, live 
with us, and work with us. They were the only political group that was prepared to work with the 
Africans for the attainment of political rights and a stake in society. Because of this, there are many 
Africans who, today, tend to equate freedom with communism” (Mandela. “An Ideal…”). As 
Mandela strategically shows in his argument, the concept of freedom modelled by the communists 
was more in line with ANC’s view of freedom as was embodied in the African society than what 
obtained in apartheid South Africa. 
It is interesting to note how Mandela appears to be speaking in plain English, but 
strategically braids African rhetorical modes into his language. Mandela’s evocation of the African 
rhetorical mode is made manifest in the argument that the communists were the only Whites “who 
were prepared to eat with us; talk with us, live with us, and work with us.” He draws upon the 
African idea of humanity and brotherhood in a way that is prevalent in the African tradition. The 
point being made here is that Mandela employs these words to mean more than just communist 
support as might be interpreted on the surface. The meaning extends to the way Africans view 
humanity, brotherhood, generosity, concern for others, and hospitality.  
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 According to Dugald Campbell, “hospitality is one of the most sacred and ancient custom 
in Bantuland” (45). To Mandela’s African audience, the concept of brotherhood is depicted in the 
concept of eating, living, and working together. That is because in traditional African societies, 
members of a community are invited to share food and homes without counting the cost. In fact, 
it will be offensive for a guest to refuse to eat together with their host/s because it was a sign of 
distrust. There is a practice of always having extra food just in case someone comes by. In my 
village in Nigeria, there is a saying that it is more important to pile human beings upon oneself 
than to pile on clothes. This saying is also captured in the Akan maxim that the human being is 
more beautiful than gold. In essence, Mandela’s inclusion of Communists in the struggle is because 
white Communists had acted like brothers towards Blacks in South Africa.  
 
Mandela’s Ambivalence towards Communism      
From Mandela’s argument, we get the impression that he is both attracted to and repelled 
by communism. That is because white communists had shown a more humane side than their 
capitalist counterparts. At the same time, he is repelled by communist ideologies that serve to 
demonize capitalism. It is of importance to note that Mandela had initially resisted the inclusion 
of Communists into the ANC because the ideals of Black Nationalism were at variance with 
communist ideals. Mandela would eventually accept the brotherhood exemplified by communists’ 
support. That is because “[a]lthough there is a universal condemnation of apartheid, the communist 
bloc speaks out against it with a louder voice than most of the Western world. In these 
circumstances, it would take a brash young politician, such as I was in 1949, to proclaim that the 
Communists are our enemies” (Mandela, “An Ideal…”). Therefore, it can be argued that the class 
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homogeneity in the society aimed at by communism was problematic for Mandela. Mandela did 
not see capitalism as the problem but blamed those who used it as an excuse to enslave others. 
Mandela points out that freedom and equality are universal concepts, which are innate in human 
beings regardless of whatever philosophy people uphold. Capitalism had become a tool employed 
by the apartheid regime to strip Black South Africans of freedom as well as keep them in perpetual 
poverty and deprivation. In essence, racial capitalism needs to be deconstructed; but the 
homogeneity of communism is not a better alternative.  
Racial capitalism, as tool of enslavement, was captured by Robert Davies, Dan O’meara, 
and Sipho Dlamini, who argue that “the various changing historical forms of national oppression 
and racism in South Africa are organically linked with, and have provided the fundamental basis 
for, the development of a capitalist economy in the country” (100). In essence, racism helps to feed 
the capitalist greed of the apartheid regime, which in turn keeps the capitalist machinery of the 
developed countries running. Therefore, “the various complex and intersecting class struggles 
through which capitalist forms of production and relations of production were developed and 
consolidated under colonialism in South Africa, themselves generated racist ideologies and a 
racially structured hierarchy of economic and political power. The national oppression of Black 
people in South Africa is a product of, and was indeed the necessary historical condition for, the 
development of capitalism in that country” (Davies, O’meara, and Dlamini 100). Despite the role 
of capitalism in enabling racism, Mandela does not want to replace capitalism with a system that 
will not help Blacks accomplish self-actualization and development.  
The connection between capitalism and racism is the power dynamic that produces 
oppression wherever it exists. Mark Stern and Khuram Hussain view racism as a product of 
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capitalism. They argue that “one cannot separate the emergence of capitalism from racism, slavery, 
colonialism, imperialism, and nationalism” (Stern and Hussain, 68). Although Stern and Hussain 
hold capitalism accountable for racism, Mandela argues that like any concept, capitalism can be 
easily abused and manipulated for gaining and maintaining economic/political power. Therefore, 
capitalism was exploited to enforce the oppression of Blacks in racist orders like apartheid. 
Mandela captures the legal and systemic means by which Blacks were kept poor in the following 
words: “The complaint of Africans, however, is not only that they are poor and the whites are rich, 
but that the laws which are made by the whites are designed to preserve this situation. There are 
two ways to break out of poverty. The first is by formal education, and the second is by the worker 
acquiring a greater skill at his work and thus higher wages. As far as Africans are concerned, both 
these avenues of advancement are deliberately curtailed by legislation” (Mandela, “An Ideal…”). 
The policy of denying education to Blacks was mainly responsible for their poverty. Blacks were 
denied education because they were accused of lacking the cognitive capacity for acquiring one. 
It is ironic that the systemic oppression of Blacks was a deliberate design, which was justified 
using metaphors of ineptitude, laziness, and cognitive incapacity.  
Therefore, the apartheid regime controlled the system that was manipulated to deprive 
Blacks of economic and political power. The same regime crafts and controls the rhetoric and 
narratives used to justify such a system. According to Mandela “The other main obstacle to the 
economic advancement of the African is the industrial color-bar under which all the better jobs of 
industry are reserved for whites only. Moreover, Africans who do obtain employment in the 
unskilled and semi-skilled occupations which are open to them are not allowed to form trade 
unions which have recognition under the Industrial Conciliation Act” (“An Ideal…”). The 
connection between racism and capitalism emanates from the way racism was deployed to feed 
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capitalist greed. Thus, racial capitalism serves the purpose of fostering a hierarchy of class 
distinction with Blacks at the bottom of that hierarchy. 
In essence, to maintain the political and economic hierarchy, Blacks have been depicted as 
being a threat to the culture and lives of whites if given any form of power. The metaphor of life 
and death (with Blacks representing death) was deployed to keep Blacks suppressed in order to 
preserve the lives and culture of whites. Consequently, legal, rhetorical, and physical force were 
utilized for accomplishing the suppression. Therefore, the charge of communism was a rhetorical 
force that gained for the apartheid regime the support of their Western counterparts. To counter 
this rhetorical force, Mandela employs repetition, irony, and analogy in order to expose the 
insidious nature of such a rhetorical strategy. According to Mandela: “Our fight is against real, and 
not imaginary hardships or, to use the language of the State Prosecutor, `so-called hardships`. 
Basically, we fight against two features which are the hallmarks of African life in South Africa 
and which are entrenched by legislation which we seek to have repealed. These features are poverty 
and lack of human dignity, and we do not need communists or so-called `agitators` to teach us 
about these things” (“An Ideal…”). What can be deduced from the accusation of communist 
association is that there is a real fear of communism by racial capitalists. That is because 
communism aims to deconstruct capitalist greed. 
Therefore, communism signified a threat to the power and privilege of capitalist 
dominance. The fear of communism produced a cycle of violence, whereby every voice of dissent 
was labelled a communist. The desire to hold on to their privileged position blinded the Western 
powers to the fact that the privilege they sought to protect at all cost was itself a consequence of 
past revolutions. According to Martin Luther King (MLK), “it is a sad fact that because of comfort, 
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complacency, a morbid fear of communism, and our proneness to adjust to injustice, the Western 
nations that initiated so much of the revolutionary spirit of the modern world have now become 
the arch anti-revolutionaries” (Conscience, 18). King’s words also apply to South Africa because 
the ideology and philosophies that govern Western modern democracies and by extension 
apartheid South Africa were fostered by the various revolutions in the Western world.  
In essence, the oppression that these past revolutions sought to end in the Western world 
has resurfaced in racial capitalism. “This had driven many to feel that only Marxism has the 
revolutionary spirit. Therefore, communism is a judgement against our failure to make democracy 
real and follow through on the revolutions that we initiated” (King, Conscience, 18). King’s words 
echo Mandela’s, who argues that white supremacists had made their democracies a sham. White 
Communists had shown more acceptance and charity towards Blacks than their capitalist 
counterpart. 
 However, Mandela had a problem with the communist project. Although capitalism had 
been deployed by the apartheid regime to impoverish Blacks, Mandela viewed capitalism - when 
devoid of greed and racism - as a system with the potential to create equal opportunities for all. 
The working-class idea of communism projects a form of social, economic, and psychological 
homogeneity. This homogeneity was as problematic as essentialism. The problematic nature of 
Marxist communism would undercut the ANC position of heterogeneity, which opens up the space 
for equal opportunity. According Van Herpen, “[n]ow that Marx has replaced the ethically loaded 
concept of ‘species being’ by the ethically neutral [emphasis in the original] concept of ‘ensemble 
of the social relations’, a moral critique on human rights seem no longer possible” (13). This 
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problematic nature of Marxist communism partly accounted for Mandela’s ambivalence towards 
communism. 
 Mandela states quite clearly that the ANC philosophies are different from that of 
communism. However, he admitted to having been influenced by Marxist concept of classlessness 
in the following words: “[t]oday I am attracted by the idea of a classless society, an attraction, 
which springs in part from Marxist reading and, in part, from my admiration of the structure and 
organization of early African societies in this country. The land, then the main means of 
production, belonged to the tribe. There were no rich or poor and there was no exploitation. It is 
true, as I have already stated, that I have been influenced by Marxist thought” (Mandela, “An 
Ideal…”). The classlessness Mandela identified with, which is similar to that of communism, is 
depicted as a form of tribal community. 
 However, this communal belongingness did not mean that people were prevented from 
owning properties as is evident in his various narratives. In essence, Mandela evokes the political 
and economic philosophies of Marxist communism embodied in a classless society like the ancient 
African society of his dreams; however, these philosophies contradict the democratic ideals of the 
ANC. It can be argued that the support of Communists reinforced the African communal 
brotherhood that had been a part of his childhood, and this brotherhood is evoked for rhetorical 
effect among his followers. Mandela’s ability to draw from various philosophies gave verve to his 
braided rhetoric.  
Mandela’s desire for freedom and equality for his people made him open to any means for 
achieving that purpose. As a result, he refused to be contained by the charge of communism 
because dynamism is a necessary part of good leadership. According to Mandela, this openness to 
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various philosophies “is also true of many of the leaders of the new independent States. Such 
widely different persons as Gandhi, Nehru, Nkrumah, and Nasser all acknowledge this fact. We 
all accept the need for some form of socialism to enable our people to catch up with the advanced 
countries of this world and to overcome their legacy of extreme poverty. But this does not mean 
we are Marxists” (Mandela, “An Ideal…”). In essence, the struggle is greater than any singular 
interest or philosophy. Therefore, leaders who fail to look beyond their self-interest or any form 
of myopia will ultimately produce catastrophes like the Nazi holocaust.  
Mandela’s embrace of dynamic ideas is described by Hyslop as pragmatic. According to 
Hyslop, this dynamism developed from “a universalist set of values that derived both from the 
liberal Christianity of his missionary education in the Eastern Cape and from humanist elements 
in the Marxism to which he was exposed in Johannesburg” (Hyslop, 168). Mandela can be 
described as having soaked up different philosophies, some of which seemed incompatible. This 
ability to combine ideas that seem incompatible largely accounts for his rhetorical appeal. 
Mandela’s pragmatism helps connect his humanism to the classless society of Marxism, which is 
also evident in the African society. Therefore, the concept of a classless society emanated from the 
humane manner that people were treated within traditional African societies. Not necessarily 
because there were no class distinctions, or other forms of inequality – like gender inequality.  
Mandela was himself a product of his class. His father was a chief, and after the deposition 
and death of his father, he was raised in the home of the regent. According to Mandela, “[b]ecause 
of the universal respect the regent enjoyed – from both black and white – and the seemingly 
untampered power that he wielded, I saw chieftaincy as being the very center around which life 
revolved. The power and influence of chieftaincy pervaded every aspect of our lives in 
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Mqhekezweni and was the preeminent means through which one could achieve influence and 
status” (Long Walk, 20). There were members of the African society who were more privileged 
than others. However, the democratic system that aimed to produce some form of equity and 
equality (which he witnessed in the home of the regent) held an attraction for Mandela. Mandela 
describes this democratic structure in the following words: “[m]y later notions of leadership were 
profoundly influenced by observing the regent in his court. I watched and learned from the tribal 
meetings that were regularly held at the Great Place. These were not scheduled, but were called as 
needed, and were held to discuss national matters such as a drought, the culling of cattle, policies 
ordered by the magistrate, or new laws decreed by the government” (Long Walk, 20-21). The 
African democratic system, whose leaders related with the people in a father-children manner, 
exerted a huge influence upon Mandela. Despite the hierarchy that was evident in this system, the 
sense of belonging enjoyed by everyone made it devoid of exploitation.  
The inclusive nature of this African system of government made apartheid a particularly 
difficult pill to swallow. Mandela describes the democratic proceedings in the following manner: 
“[a]ll Thembus were free to come – and a great many did, on horseback or by foot. On those 
occasions, the regent was surrounded by his amaphakathi, a group of councillors of high rank who 
functioned as the regent’s parliament and judiciary. They were wise men who retained the 
knowledge of tribal history and custom in their heads and whose opinions carried great weight” 
(Long Walk, 20-21). The freedom captured in this system of government remained indelible in 
Mandela’s mind.  And this captivation gave impetus to the passion and commitment he exhibited 
during the struggle. With the African democratic system in mind, communism did not intrinsically 
represent the freedom that allows for diversity, which can be harmonized with a potential for 
development along individual lines.   
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The African system recognized individualism, with freedom of expression, as a necessary 
ingredient for peace and development. Mandela’s desire for such a system made the homogeneity 
prescribed by communism unattractive. The beauty of the African political system is captured in 
the following words:  
Letters advising these chiefs and headmen of a meeting were dispatched from the 
regent, and soon the Great Place became alive with important visitors and travelers 
from all over Thembuland. The guests would gather in the courtyard in front of the 
regent’s house and he would open the meeting by thanking everyone for coming and 
explaining why he had summoned them. From that point on, he would not utter another 
word until the meeting was nearing its end. Everyone who wanted to speak did so 
(Mandela, Long Walk, 20-21).  
Mandela could not accept that such a system should be replaced by one like apartheid, 
where Black freedom of expression, speech, association, and self-actualization were proscribed. 
Neither could he accept the homogeneity of communism, which can be stifling.  
The African system of government was captured as both romantic and factual. For 
example, Mandela says that “[i]t was democracy in its purest form. There may have been a 
hierarchy of importance among the speakers, but everyone was heard, chief and subject, warrior 
and medicine man, shopkeeper and farmer, landowner and labourer. People spoke without 
interruption and the meetings lasted for many hours. The foundation of self-government was that 
all men were free to voice their opinions and equal in their value as citizens. (Women, I am afraid, 
were deemed second-class citizens.)” (Long Walk, 20-21). In Mandela’s own words, women were 
regarded as second-class citizens; and thus, women’s position in the society indicated that African 
societies were not as classless as he indicated. Nevertheless, the democratic deliberations 
witnessed by Mandela left an indelible mark on him.  
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The Western parliamentary system (which he came to love) and his love for the African 
democratic system accounts for Mandela’s resistance to communism. Mandela’s actions and 
speech pushed for the enthronement of the values of African democratic and Western 
parliamentary systems of government. Despite acknowledging that there was indeed a hierarchy 
in both the African and Western parliamentary systems of government, the freedom that those 
systems allowed were absent in apartheid and communism. Therefore, such freedom was enough 
to temper the danger of hierarchical oppression. Mandela’s love for African democratic and 
Western parliamentary systems of government is expressed in his braided rhetoric. Mandela’s 
rhetoric evolved from the coalescing of African and Western – cultures, language, political 
systems, and rhetorical traditions. This evolution is captured quite aptly by Norman Fairclough, 
who argues that “[l]inguistic phenomena are social in the sense that whenever people speak or 
listen or write or read, they do so in ways which are determined socially and have social effects. 
Even when people are most conscious of their own individuality and think themselves to be most 
cut off from social influences ‘in the bosom of the family’, for example – they still use language 
in ways which people are subject to social convention” (23). The social conventions that formed 
Mandela account for his ability to use language in a way that his audience could easily understand.  
Mandela’s rhetorical appeal is enhanced by his African cultural connection and his ability 
to spice up his speech with tropes, which are made more effective by his dynamic leadership. 
Communal connectedness, brotherhood, and equality are a part of the ideal African social 
organization, and Mandela deploys such concepts as strategic tropes for making his followers feel 
valued. To support this point, Arthur L. Smith argues that “Delivery becomes for the traditional 
African speaker an opportunity to engage in a textual as well as a contextual search for harmony. 
The stability of the community is essential, and public speaking when used in connection with 
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conflict solution must be directed toward maintaining community harmony. As a microcosmic 
example of the traditional African society's base in the harmony of all parts, the meaningful public 
discourse manifests rhetorical agreeableness in all its parts” (16). Mandela’s employment of the 
communal trope operates by setting up a contrast that is etched in the memory of members of the 
society.  
This contrast has, on the one hand, an image of the ideal African society where freedom 
reigned, brotherhood was supreme, and class did not matter. On the other hand, there is the racist 
apartheid order that represents a negation of the humanist values held dear by Black South 
Africans. This contrast romanticized the traditional African society and demonized racist 
apartheid. The deployment of this trope is pragmatic and dynamic on the part of Mandela because 
it helped to maintain the hatred for apartheid, and such feelings were important for sustaining the 
momentum of the struggle. Mandela embodied a pragmatism and dynamic leadership that drew 
people to him. This leadership lit up a burning desire within him to deliver a system of government 
to his people that was to help them recover their lost freedom, identity, and humanity. Much as 
communism had some merits and Communists had extended a hand of fellowship to Blacks, 
communism was inadequate for the freedom struggle.    
Such were the various phenomena responsible for Mandela’s rhetorical evolution. The 
context that made Mandela into the rhetor that he became connects to Fairclough’s argument “that 
the language activity which goes on in social contexts (as all language activity does) is merely a 
reflection or expression of social processes and practices” (Fairclough, 23). The social and political 
contexts that influenced Mandela’s ambivalent relationship with communism were significantly 
diverse. Mandela’s description of the African system of government versus communism gives us 
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a sense of how “[p]eople sometimes explicitly argue about the meanings of words like democracy, 
nationalization, imperialism, socialism, liberation or terrorism [emphasis in the original]” 
(Fairclough, 23) to indicate that the contexts that produced those arguments are as important as the 
argument themselves. 
Mandela’s speech context indicates that his perceptions of class distinction in apartheid 
and his traditional society were at variance. The class distinction enacted by the apartheid regime 
was dependent upon race while the class differences of his African society were determined by 
birth and gender. The oppressive laws promulgated by apartheid, which constituted deliberate 
barriers to the upward movement of Blacks, made the class distinction of Mandela’s African 
society appear insignificant. As Fairclough argues, context is an indispensable aspect of language 
use. Therefore, the context of apartheid racial discrimination created a focal point, whereby the 
idea of a Marxist classless society was particularly attractive to Mandela. Class distinction takes 
on a fluidity for Mandela that is traceable to the perspectives that informed his understanding of 
political reality. Mandela identified the role of racism in creating a new form of class distinction 
that was different from what he was used to. That reality made the activism of Dr. King, Gandhi, 
and Malcolm X very similar, despite the divergences in their various strategies.  
 
Mandela’s Rhetorical Connectedness with Global Anti-Racist Activism 
The unique nature of anti-racist struggles dictates that the concerns of Mandela and other 
human rights activists like Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X remain comparable. 
That is because, though fighting similar causes, their modus operandi was determined by their 
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contextual and ideological peculiarities. Mandela shares the non-violence ideologies of Gandhi 
and MLK, while his move to armed struggle makes him seem to be at par with Malcolm X before 
X and MLK began to move towards each other’s methodical positions. It is imperative to indicate 
that Mandela, King, and X made shifts in positions in a way that showed that as dynamic leaders, 
their experiences helped to transform them in significant ways. However, the divergences and 
converges examined here occurred within the timeline before Mandela’s trials and long 
incarceration starting from 1962; and within six year from this time period, both X and king were 
assassinated.  
The significance of comparing these human rights activists stem from the manner in which 
the apartheid government appeared to have taken their concepts of segregation and discrimination 
from that of the United States. Mandela alludes to “such events as the Little Rock outrage and the 
activities of the Un-American Witch-Hunting Committee” (The Struggle, 76) as a way of showing 
that the US has a history of racial segregation. The segregation that was practised in the US also 
appears to have taken their cue from the Canadian Indian Act. The Canadian Indian Act was an 
unjust bill that was crafted to keep the indigenous people suppressed in a way that “created a 
disincentive for Indian persons to get a higher education” (Vic Satzewich and Nikolaos Liodakis, 
218). In essence, the apartheid regime had racist models that they were emulating.  
The South African context was similar to and yet different from the anti-colonialist 
movement in Indian and the anti-racist/human rights movements in the US. The fact is that unlike 
Gandhi, Mandela was fighting a minority government that was firmly entrenched and powerful. 
While Mandela was up against a settler group, Gandhi was fighting a colonial power that was 
ruling India all the way from Britain. The close connection between Mandela’s ideology and that 
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of MLK is located in the concept of non-violent resistance, which is akin to that of Gandhi. The 
point being made here is that contextual similarities tend to produce intertextuality because human 
rights activists inadvertently feed off each other’s ideas as a result of their similar experiences. 
 Despite the fact that the South African situation was different from that of the United 
States, an examination of MLK and Mandela’s rhetoric shows examples of strong intertextual 
connections. This connection validates the argument that American racial segregation must have 
produced a cross-pollination of ideas in apartheid South Africa. In essence, apartheid policies 
tended to mimic the Jim Crow laws in the United States, despite being situated on two different 
continents. The difference between the United States and South Africa lies in the fact that Blacks 
were in the majority in South Africa, while being in the minority in the United States. Blacks were 
taken from Africa in slave ships to the United States after having already been conquered, while 
the Blacks in South Africa were conquered on their own land. 
The Jim Crow laws in the Southern parts of United States legalizing racial segregation were 
similar to the laws vigorously enforced in apartheid South Africa. MLK describes the anti-racist 
struggle as occurring in phases in the following words:  
Today the question is not whether we shall be free but by what course we will win. In 
the recent past our struggle has had two phases. The first phase began in the early 
‘fifties when Negroes slammed the door shut on submission and subservience. 
Adapting non-violent resistance to conditions in the United States, we swept into 
southern states to demand our citizenship and manhood. For the south with its complex 
system of brutal segregation, we were inaugurating a rebellion (Conscience, 2).  
The rebellion referred to by MLK is reminiscent of the protest against the Pass Laws in 
South Africa. The point being made here is that although MLK and Mandela had adopted the non-
violence stance, the unjust nature of racist laws tended to produce violent rebellions among the 
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people. Such rebellions were reflections of the violence enacted against the people through 
government racist laws. Therefore, violence had become a means by which those oppressed in 
racist orders expressed their frustration. This frustration is captured by Mandela in the following 
words:  
There had been violence in 1957 when the women of Zeerust were ordered to carry 
passes; there was violence in 1958 with the enforcement of Bantu Authorities and 
cattle culling in Sekhukhuneland; there was violence in 1959 when the people of Cato 
Manor protested against pass raids; there was violence in 1960 when the Government 
attempted to impose Bantu Authorities in Pondoland. Thirty-nine Africans died in 
these Pondoland disturbances. In 1961 there had been riots in Warmbaths, and all this 
time, My Lord, the Transkei had been a seething mass of unrest (“An Ideal…”).  
Both MLK and Mandela accused the US and South African governments of being 
responsible for the prevalent violence in the society and not the people. The people were only 
reacting in kind to their oppression. The Pass laws were used to enforce the policy of segregation 
in South Africa. The police brutally occasioned by this law and similar oppressive laws would 
eventually bring the ANC policy of non-violent resistance to an end. The state-induced rebellion 
referred to by MLK is also resonant in Mandela’s word. Thus, the idea of rebellion reinforces 
MLK’s argument - that freedom “is a throbbing desire, [that] there seems to be an internal desire 
for freedom within the soul of every man” (“The Birth of a Nation”, 20). MLK and Mandela shared 
some common rhetorical strategies, especially the idea of turning the accusation of criminality 
upon their white accusers. This strategy served to show that rebellion is a deep human tendency, 
whereby “a Government which uses force to maintain its rule teaches the oppressed to use force 
to oppose it” (“An Ideal…”). As Fanon argued in Wretched, violence begets violence in a natural 
reaction to sustained violence. Some laws flagrantly flouted natural laws; therefore, such laws 
paved the way for rebellion. MLK pointed out that Blacks in the United States chose to defy such 
laws, albeit, in a non-violent manner. Similarly, Blacks in South African could not accept laws 
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that made them aliens in their own land. However, the manner of resistance adopted by Mandela 
would ultimately differ from the non-violent strategy of MLK.  
The necessity for rebellion was depicted by Mandela in the following words: “all lawful 
modes of expressing opposition to this principle had been closed by legislation, and we were placed 
in a position in which we had either to accept a permanent state of inferiority, or to defy the 
Government. We chose to defy the Government. We first broke the law in a way which avoided 
any recourse to violence” (“An Ideal…”). Defiance of these unjust laws in South Africa and the 
United States were deployed to expose the laws for what they really were, that is – malignant 
policies - meant to truncate the rights of Blacks. MLK and Mandela recognized the power in such 
resistance as a means of drawing international attention to the home situation. According to 
Mandela, “if mass action were successfully organized, and mass reprisals taken, we felt that 
sympathy for our cause would be roused in other countries, and that greater pressure would be 
brought to bear on the South African Government” (“An Ideal…”). Mandela and MLK’s activisms 
can be described as a form of performance. And the strategies employed by both men make 
Fairclough’s concepts regarding language and power evident in praxis.  
The power that language produces can be appreciated from the way Mandela drew upon 
the African rhetorical tradition to elicit different reactions in his African audience. For example, 
in addition to narratives, Mandela used other African rhetorical modes that were formulaic in 
nature. Such modes use salutations like “AMANDLA” - meaning “power” - to rouse the crowd 
Mandela addressed on many occasions. These greetings, which were used at the beginning and 
end of some of his speeches, were similar to the call and response of the performance of African 
folktales. The roused audience would respond “Ngawethu” [meaning - “it is ours”]. The next call 
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is often i-Africa, and the crowd would respond “Mayibuye!” [meaning – “let it come back] in his 
speech in Cape Town upon his release from prison (Mandela, “Now is the Time to Intensify the 
Struggle,” 19). This formulaic form of address is a strategy for identification, which places the 
audience on a higher power level than the speaker.  
To buttress this point, Mandela says: “friends, comrades, and fellow Africans: I greet you 
all in the name of peace, democracy, and freedom for all. I stand here before you not as a prophet 
but as a humble servant of you, the people. Your tireless and heroic sacrifices have made it possible 
for me to be here today. I therefore place the remaining of my life in your hands” (Mandela, “Now 
is the Time to Intensify the Struggle,” 19). Knowing that he had become the symbol of the struggle, 
he deploys a rhetorical strategy of giving power back to the people by elevating the struggle and 
people above himself. This rhetorical strategy is similar to what he had witnessed in the democratic 
proceedings of his youth.  
After the formulaic rousing of the crowd, he employs another African system of salutation. 
For example, Mandela salutes various individuals, clans, and communities by name. This practice 
is an African tradition whereby the speaker acknowledges the attachment individuals have to their 
ancestral homes, land, and lineage by paying respect to those communal heritages. For instance, 
he says: “I greet the traditional leaders of our country. Many among you continue to walk in the 
footsteps of great heroes like Hintsa and Sekhukhume” (Mandela, “Now is the Time to Intensify 
the Struggle,” 20). In so doing, he emulates the imbongi or griot and praise singers in African 
traditional societies, who deployed this rhetorical strategy for producing pride in the people. After 
saluting his African audience using the African rhetorical modes, he shifts attention to the 
international audience by saying: “On this occasion, we thank the world community for their 
contribution to the anti – apartheid struggle. Without your support our struggle would not have 
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reached this advanced stage” (Mandela, “Now is the Time to Intensify the Struggle,” 20). After 
saluting his African base and acknowledging his supporters on the international stage, he turns his 
attention to the enemy – the apartheid government and their supporters. He uses a strategy of 
speaking to the enemy indirectly. For example, he says that 
Today the majority of South Africans, black and white, recognize that apartheid has 
no future…Negotiations on the dismantling of apartheid will have to address the 
overwhelming demand of our people for a democratic, non-racial, and unitary South 
Africa. There must be an end to white monopoly on political power and a fundamental 
restructuring of our political and economic systems to ensure that the inequalities of 
apartheid are addressed and our society thoroughly democratized. It must be added 
that Mr. de Klerk himself is a man of integrity who is acutely aware of the dangers of 
a public figure not honouring his undertakings (Mandela, “Now is the Time to 
Intensify the Struggle,” 19).  
Mandela’s performance here exemplifies the kind of epideictic rhetoric practiced by the 
imbongi, who employs the praise and blame strategy for addressing a social problem. This strategy 
whereby he blames the apartheid government for their destructive oppression of Blacks after 
praising his African compatriots is quite effective. However, he tempers the blame game by 
praising de Klerk, the leader of the apartheid regime, with whom he was negotiating a peaceful 
resolution to the lingering conflict. It is interesting to note that Mandela switched from the African 
rhetorical mode to the Western rhetorical forms within one speech for the purpose of addressing 
his multiple audiences. This is a regular pattern for him. Mandela also deployed rhetorical modes 
like African clothing and war regalia that were emblematic of the historical wars fought and won 
by his progenitors like Shaka the Zulu. These clothes that Mandela wore for rhetorical effect 
symbolized African power and resilience. This rhetoric of clothing always had a rousing effect on 
his Black audience and caused panic among his white adversaries. Consequently, he was no longer 
allowed to wear such clothes in the courtroom.  
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The point being made here is that Mandela’s performances incorporated various tropes like 
the rhetoric of clothing, communal identification, African brotherhood, and past legends. Such 
tropes served to show that African historical past and cultures, as Bhabha and Fanon argue, can be 
effective tools for dismantling white supremacy. Racial domination was established upon the 
rhetoric of essentialism; and to resist such domination, human rights activists like Mandela and 
MLK required creativity and doggedness. Fairclough argues that “[p]ower, ‘in’ discourse, is not a 
permanent and undisputed attribute of any one person or social grouping. On the contrary, those 
who hold power at a particular moment have to constantly reassert their power, and those who do 
not hold power are always liable to make a bid for power” (68). The tussle for power is captured 
by Fairclough as on-going process.  
As a result, the power holder at any particular time is the one who has successfully 
outwitted or arm-twisted the other. “This is true whether one is talking at the level of the particular 
situation, or in terms of a social institution, or in terms of a whole society: power at all these levels 
is won, exercised, sustained, and lost in the course of social struggle” (Fairclough, 68). In essence, 
power is negotiated, gained, and lost in discourse, and discourse is instrumental for shaping how 
power is perceived and enacted. The point being made here is that racist discourse was the 
foundation upon which racist policies in apartheid were formulated, and Mandela needed to 
deconstruct such racist discourse effectively in order to persuade his various audiences, 
particularly his white audience. 
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The Convergences and Divergences of Anti-Racist Activists  
   Mandela, MLK, and Malcolm X had a lot in common, but there were a lot of divergences 
in their rhetorical strategies for fighting against Black oppression. They all lay the blame for Black 
violence at the doorstep of white supremacy. According to MLK: “[a] million words will be written 
and spoken to dissect the ghetto outbreaks, but for a perspective ad vivid expression of culpability 
I would submit two sentences written a century ago by Victor Hugo: If the soul is left in darkness, 
sins will be committed. The guilty one is not he who commits the sin, but he who causes the 
darkness. [emphasis in the original]” (Conscience, 4). MLK argues that the darkness caused by 
the policies resulting from white supremacy was criminal. Therefore, such darkness had the 
potential to envelop the entire nation if left unchecked. In essence, “[t]he policy makers of the 
white society have caused the darkness; they created discrimination; they created slums; they 
perpetuate unemployment, ignorance, and poverty. It is incontestable and deplorable that Negroes 
have committed crimes; but they were derivative crimes. They are born of the greater crimes of 
the white society” (MLK, Conscience, 4). The similar threads that run through Mandela and 
MLK’s rhetoric are significant; however, Mandela’s move to arm struggle, which was never an 
option for MLK, was a huge point of divergence.  
The non-violence tactic connects Mandela, Gandhi, and MLK. For Gandhi and MLK, non-
violence was a religious principle, while Mandela regarded the principle as a temporary political 
strategy. Gandhi believed in changing the opinion of others through praxis and education, while 
MLK believed in using love to win over hatred. However, Mandela saw non-violence as a strategy 
that was predicated on exigency. The armed struggle eventually adopted by Mandela puts him at 
par with Malcolm X. It can be argued that X’s speech “The Ballot or the Bullet” has a strong 
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connection to Mandela’s defence of his move from non-violent resistance to armed struggle. It is 
very important to point out here that despite Mandela’s move to armed struggle, his ideas and 
rhetoric were far more in tune with MLK’s ideas and rhetoric than the extreme radicalism of X 
before various experiences started to temper X’s radicalism.  
Initially, X espoused the idea of Black Nationalism, which advocated for separatism. On 
the other hand, Mandela and MLK advocated for the integration of races. In that sense, Mandela’s 
and MLK’s concepts of Black empowerment were very different from X’s. According to X, “[t]he 
political philosophy of Black nationalism only means that if you and I are going to live in a Black 
community – and that’s where we’re going to live, ‘cause soon as you move out of the Black 
community into their community it’s mixed for a period of time, but they’re gone and you’re right 
there by yourself again” (“The Ballot…” 73).  X’s ideas, which were in consonance with the 
extreme principles of Black Nationalism presumes the homogeneity of Blacks that does not exist. 
Mandela and MLK recognized that to assume homogeneity among any group of people is as 
fallacious as essentialism.  
This difference between how these human activists viewed themselves versus others is 
partly responsible for X’s opposition to MLK’s non-violence principle. The vehemence of X’s 
opposition is captured in the following words: “anytime you’re living in the twentieth century, and 
you’re walking around here singing “We Shall Overcome,” the government has failed us. This is 
part of what’s wrong with you. You do too much singing. Today, it’s time to stop singing and start 
swinging. You can’t sing up on freedom. You can swing up on some freedom” (“The Ballot…”, 
75). X’s rhetoric can be described as having been born out of the frustration experienced by Blacks. 
The deplorable state of Black existence in the United State was systematically and politically 
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entrenched; hence, X was intolerant of MLK’s peaceful protests. X considered such non-violent 
resistance to be too passive for dismantling systemic racism. 
X’s impatience is evident in the following words, “[i]t’ll be the ballot or it’ll be the bullet. 
It’ll be liberty or it’ll be death. And if you’re not ready to pay that price, don’t use the word freedom 
in your vocabulary” (“The Ballot…” 79). X’s frustration is very similar to the account Mandela 
gave of the restless youths in South Africa. These restless youth were demanding for more action 
and this demand served as the tipping point for the move towards armed struggle. Malcolm X 
argues that non-violent resistance has not achieved anything for Blacks. To him, non-violence as 
a philosophy had become ineffective. Mandela also made that argument in justifying his adoption 
of the armed struggle. According to X,  
Once you change your philosophy, you change your thought pattern. Once you change 
your thought pattern, you change your attitude. Once you change your attitude, it 
changes your behavior pattern. And then you go on into some action. As long as you 
got sit-down philosophy, you’ll have a sit-down thought pattern. As long as you think 
that old sit-down thought, you’ll be in some kind of sit-down action. They’ll have you 
sitting everywhere. It’s not so good to refer to what you’re going to do as sit-in (The 
Ballot…” 76).  
Malcolm X equates the position of sitting as a metaphorical state of defeat or weakness.  
The analogy of “sitting” is used in contrast to standing and fighting. Sitting represents inaction and 
cowardice, while standing and fighting are metaphors of action. Therefore, the idea of sitting 
“castrates you. Right there, it brings you down…Think of the image of someone sitting. An old 
woman can sit. An old man can sit. A chump can sit. A coward can sit. Anything can sit. For you 
and I have been sitting long enough and it’s time today for you and I to be doing some standing. 
And some fighting to back that up [emphasis in the original]” (X, The Ballot…” 76). X employs 
the tropes that depict his perceived notion of non-violence as cowardice. Mandela straddles the 
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middle position in the divergence between MLK and X. In essence, Mandela believed that non-
violence has some value, while X did not see any value in non-violence. The sarcasm in X’s 
rhetoric depicts his beliefs. Malcolm X’s analogy of “old woman”, “old man”, “coward”, and 
“chump” “sitting” paints a picture of non-violence as a form of weakness. Neither Mandela nor 
MLK view non-violence in that manner. The wisdom of Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence was 
not lost on Mandela and MLK. The only difference is that Mandela viewed non-violence as a 
strategy that could change whenever it proved ineffective.  
Mandela’s armed struggle was not only a shift from his earlier stance; it enacted a 
divergence from MLK’s philosophy. Despite this divergence, there were clear occasions of 
convergence in the rhetoric of these two human rights activists. For example, both MLK and 
Mandela employed complicit rhetoric, but explicitly exonerated themselves of the fallacy of racial 
essentialism. According to MLK, “[l]et us say boldly that if the total slum violations of law by 
white man over the years were calculated and were compared with the law-breaking of a few days 
of riots, the hardened criminal would be the white man” (Conscience, 4-5). The generality of the 
term “the white man” depict McPhail’s ideas of complicit rhetoric. However, MLK is aware of the 
danger of such complicit rhetoric and as such, is quick to say “[i]n using the term white man, I am 
seeking to describe in general terms the Negro’s adversary. It is not meant to encompass all white 
people. There are millions who have morally risen above prevailing prejudices. They are willing 
to share power and to accept structural alterations of society even at the cost of traditional 
privilege” (Conscience, 4-5). In essence, just as Blacks in South Africa and the US had support 
from some sincere whites, such support was not enough to change the minds of those in 
government.    
86 
 
MLK argued that to deny the existence of such support was to deny an evident truth.  “More 
than that, it drives away allies who can strengthen our struggle. Their support serves not only to 
enhance our power, but in breaking from the attitudes of the larger society, it splits and weakens 
our opposition. To develop a sense of Black consciousness and peoplehood does not require that 
we scorn the white race as a whole. It is not the race per se that we fight, but the policies and 
ideology that leaders of that race have formulated to perpetuate oppression” (MLK, Conscience, 
4-5). While alluding to race, MLK excused the use of the racial polarity of Black versus white as 
a dictate of the prevailing discourse context. The convergences between MLK and Mandela are 
manifold. One point of convergence was the need to always excuse the use of racial terms.  
This exoneration indicates intolerance to racism. This intolerance is captured by Dyslop in 
the following words: “non-racialism implied both the inclusion of sympathetic whites and Indians 
in political struggles and the inclusion of people of all races in a future political dispensation. Non-
racialism became a fixed part of Mandela’s personal beliefs” (169). Both Mandela and MLK 
acknowledged that the support of certain liberal whites proved to be very important in their 
struggle against racial oppression. Therefore, there was a need to reciprocate the support of these 
liberal whites, whose sense of justice outweighed whatever power and privilege they stood to lose 
by the emancipation of Blacks. Non-racialism is a concept that both Mandela and MLK shared, 
and this concept ties into their philosophy of racial integration. Racial integration counters the 
radical separatism of Black Nationalism held by other Black activists like Richard Wright and X.   
Despite the obvious divergence on the part of Mandela, MLK, and X, the point of 
convergence can be found in the rhetoric of identification they all employed. Rhetoric of 
identification is inevitable, particularly in conflict situations. The pronouns employed in the 
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rhetoric of identification, such as “we” versus “them”, project the exclusion of others, who 
represent the enemy. The divergences and convergences identifiable in their rhetoric are largely 
dependent on the peculiar contexts they had to contend with. The peculiar contexts connect 
strongly to Stephen C. Levinson’s description of the scope of pragmatic captured in the following 
words: “interpretation of the words I and you [emphasis in the original] relies on the identification 
of particular participants (or ‘user’) and their role in the speech event, so the words here and now 
[emphasis in the original] rely for their interpretation on the place and time of the speech event” 
(5). In essence, particular participants and their roles in the speech event cannot be taken out of 
the context. Context can be “understood to cover the identities of participants, the temporal and 
spatial parameters of the speech event…the beliefs, knowledge and intentions of the participants 
in that speech event” (Levinson, 5). It can be argued that the difference in the South African and 
American situations, coupled with the personalities of the individuals, made room for the different 
ways they chose to negotiate their political terrains. 
It is interesting to note that Levinson and Burke’s ideas of identification conflate in the 
rhetoric of Mandela, MLK, and X.  Levinson is concerned with context of a speech event in 
combination with the identities of participants, while Burke is preoccupied with how context 
accounts for the psychodynamics that govern motives. The prevailing contexts surrounding 
Mandela, MLK, and X’s rhetoric are similar, yet different. For example, Blacks in the US are in 
the minority, but the Blacks in South Africa are in the majority. Blacks in the US were uprooted 
from their land and taken as slaves, while the Blacks in South Africa were subjected to conditions 
similar to their counterparts in the US in their own land. Despite these similarities, major 
differences accounts for the peculiarity of Mandela’s anti-racist rhetoric. The main source of 
difference is the African flavour, which is closely connected to his African roots.  
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That is not to say that MLK and X are totally divorced from their African roots; however, 
they are many times removed from the African soil. Therefore, it can be argued that the African 
culture is intricately woven into the fabric of the African tribes in South Africa by virtue of their 
connectedness to their land of origin. Blacks in the US have a collective memory that has been 
partially modified by displacement and enslavement. However, South African Blacks are still 
strongly embedded within the land and culture that have built up a different collective memory. 
This difference is made manifest in Mandela’s rhetoric, which is often enriched with symbols and 
narratives of the African culture and language. These symbols and narratives are deployed to stir 
up the pride of Blacks in their African histories and cultures. The cultural experiences often drawn 
upon by Mandela are not of a distant memory. Blacks in South Africans had not experienced a 
cultural loss accruing from enforced language change, as is the case of African Americans. In 
essence, land, culture, and language help to form human identity as was argued by Fanon and 
Ngugi. African Americans have a rich cultural past, which has been captured and preserved in art. 
These cultural modes have evolved over time into distinct forms; however, the fact remains that a 
lot has been lost over centuries of displacement.  
 
Black Art as Tools of Resistance 
Black art in the US performs the role of resistance as well as the creation of a new identity 
meant to replace the identity that was distorted through slavery. Paul Gilroy captures the essence 
of Black art and cultural music as distinct forms, which are both modern and modernist. The duality 
of Black art has been marked by their hybrid, creole origins in the West (73).  According to Gilroy, 
“[t]he expressive cultural forms are thus western and modern…their special power is derived from 
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their doubleness, their unsteady location, simultaneously inside and outside the conventions, 
assumptions, and aesthetic rules, which distinguish and periodize modernity” (73). Black music 
can and have been used to “challenge the privilege conceptions of both language and writing as 
preeminent expressions of human consciousness” (Gilroy, 74). The idea of using art as a form of 
resistance is also identifiable in South Africa, where Mandela drew upon African art as a way of 
showing that Africa was far from the wasteland it was rhetorically constructed to be by the 
colonialists. The idea of using art to challenge and resist dominant ideologies connects with 
Frankie Condon’s argument that  
Spirituals composed and sung by slaves sustained the hope that fuelled resistance in 
multiple ways. Written in language and music intelligible to slaveholders as rehearsals 
of a Christianity that seemed to them to justify slavery, slave spirituals gave voice to a 
radical Christianity…Just as importantly – or perhaps more so – the words of spirituals 
offered instructions to resisting slaves, deeply coded to be sure, on how to escape, 
where to find support along the way, and how to keep hope alive until escape might be 
possible (4-5).  
Songs also played a significant role in keeping the hope of dismantling apartheid alive. 
Mandela described the manner in which songs were used as a means of catharsis in the face of 
apartheid brutality. In a similar way, African Americans employed songs as a way of coping with 
oppression during slavery and the Jim Crow days. 
Similarly, Black art in South Africa served to reinforce the identity that the apartheid 
regime sought to distort. Black art in South Africa took the form of songs, dances, and narratives 
that reinforce the collective memory of the people as a way of making their history come alive. 
African history comes alive in a communal sense because the main aim of African rhetoric is the 
maintenance of harmony in the community. In a similar manner, “Songs like Join the Band occupy 
a unique place in our collective history of racial oppression. They are not, in fact, merely [emphasis 
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in the original] hymns. Such songs are indeed expressions of faith, but they are also anthems of 
resistance” (Condon, 4-5). The faith in the emancipation of Blacks in the US kept their hope and 
spirit alive. Such songs did “not only evoke a historical moment during which the enslavement of 
African American men, women, and children was authorized by law and openly legitimated by 
racial ideologies of white supremacy, but also the hopeful struggle for racial justice by African 
Americans and, indeed, by all peoples of colour” (Condon, 4-5). Therefore, the idea of using Black 
art in resistance connects to Fanon’s argument for the deployment of national culture in the fighting 
phase of anti-colonialism.  
This strategy involves deliberate conjuration whereby storytellers use inert episodes to 
“bring conflicts up to date and to modernize the kinds of struggle, which the stories evoke, together 
with the names of heroes and types of weapons” (Fanon, Wretched, 193). Fanon’s argument can 
be likened to Bhabha’s ideas of scraps, patches, and rags of daily life that are deployed for raising 
awareness in order to resist colonial oppression.  The colonial subjects use such scraps as 
nationalist discourses for reproducing signs and traditions that repeatedly tell their history, perform 
the nation’s rituals, celebrate its great figures, and commemorate its anniversaries (Bhabha, 145). 
The collective memory of Blacks in South Africa can be likened to that of Native Americans or 
the Aboriginals, who were suppressed and stripped of their land. These oppressed people of North 
Americas had their identity reconstructed in derogatory terms, just like the Africans.  
Despite all odds, people of colour in South Africa and the US have struggled to hold on to 
their identity despite efforts to suppress them. The difference in circumstances between the Blacks 
in South African and the US is evident in the layers of symbols (like the regalia) Mandela used for 
resisting apartheid. Another difference between Mandela’s and MLK’s struggle is the successful 
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transition from the non-violent resistance to armed struggle. The numerical strength of Blacks in 
South African partly accounts for this transition. Mandela’s pragmatism enabled him identify this 
advantage of number as well as the right moment for making the shift to armed struggle. 
 
Mandela and Nonviolence as a Political Strategy 
It is significant to note that the change of strategy from non-violence to arm struggle, rather 
than undermine Mandela’s ethos, served to validate it. That is because the move was evidence of 
his resilience as well as his convictions regarding the anti-apartheid struggle. The pertinent 
question to ask at this point would be – why would Mandela in particular, and ANC in general, 
choose to move away from the policy of non-violence to that of an armed struggle? The ANC 
adopted a nonviolence policy of resistance in emulation of the Gandhian model of resistance. 
Gandhi’s philosophical concept was meant to encompass every area of human existence. The 
philosophy even extended to animals in the sense that no animal should be harmed, not even for 
food. The principle of non-violence has a lot of merits because the unequal power relations 
between the Black majority and white minority were skewed in favour of whites. Therefore, Blacks 
would be most vulnerable in the outbreak of violence.  
Though the Black population was more than triple that of whites, political and economic 
power was firmly in the hands of the whites. Consequently, violence implied a higher fatality rate 
for Blacks. However, the reasons behind the adoption of the nonviolence policy proved to be the 
catalyst for the policy change. Mandela argued that “[t]he new laws and tactics of the government 
had made the old forms of mass protest – public meetings, press statements, stay-aways – 
extremely dangerous and self-destructive” (Long Walk, 162).  The decision to change policy from 
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non-violence to violent armed struggle was an uneasy one, which threatened to break the ranks of 
important figures in the ANC. Mandela observed that there were passionate debates on whether 
this change of policy would not negatively impact the position of the ANC. According to Mandela, 
“[s]ome argue for nonviolence on purely ethical grounds, saying it was morally superior to any 
other method. This idea was strongly affirmed by Manilal Gandhi, the Mahatma’s son and the 
editor of the newspaper Indian Opinion, who was a prominent member of SAIC. With his gentle 
demeanor, Gandhi seemed the very personification of nonviolence, and he insisted that the 
campaign be run along identical lines to that of his father’s in India” (Mandela, Long Walk, 127).  
Despite having a great respect for the Gandhian model of nonviolent resistance, the South African 
reality differed much from that of Gandhi’s India.  
Gandhi’s movement sought to end British rule in India through nonviolent resistance, and 
he was successful. Despite this success, the policy proved inadequate in South African because the 
situation was different in several ways. The ambition of the ANC was to wage a mass struggle that 
served to engage the workers and peasants of South Africa in a campaign large and powerful 
enough to overcome the status quo of white oppression. The status quo that Mandela sought to 
overcome was different from Gandhi’s opposition in India. For example, in India, power was not 
in the hands of settlers like the Afrikaners who had vested interest in the South African land. This 
occupation of the land made the apartheid government bar any legal expression of dissent. Any 
form of legitimate protest was ruthlessly suppressed in South Africa. The reality was that South 
Africa had become a police state, which ensured that dissent was criminalized. According to 
Mandela, “[i]n India, Gandhi had been dealing with a foreign power that ultimately was more 
realistic and farsighted. That was not the case with the Afrikaners in South Africa. Nonviolent 
passive resistance is effective as long as your opposition adheres to the same rules as you do. But 
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if peaceful protest is met with violence, its efficacy is at an end. For me, nonviolence was not a 
moral principle but a strategy; there is no moral goodness in using an ineffective weapon” 
(Mandela, Long Walk, 158). Therefore, it was necessary for Mandela to make a distinction between 
a “moral principle” and a “strategy.”  
Mandela differentiates nonviolence as a strategy that could change when necessary from 
Gandhi’s religious principle. Gandhi’s principle of nonviolence called Ahimsa was a religious one 
that was context bound. Despite the religious bent to Gandhi’s non-violent philosophy, Mandela 
had identified some wiggle room. For example, despite Gandhi’s strong belief in nonviolence, he 
says that “[i]n life, it is impossible to eschew violence completely” (Murti, Gandhi: Essential 
Writings, 135). Mandela appears to have studied Gandhi intensely, and when he proposed a 
transition from nonviolent to armed struggle, he had himself done some internal dialectics. For 
example; when he says that “I had begun to analyze the struggle in different terms” (Mandela, 
Long Walk, 157), the internal debate is evident. This process of analyzing the struggle got him to 
a point where he had become persuaded about the necessity of a change in strategy.  
It is obvious that the decision to move from nonviolent to armed struggle was a hotly 
debated and highly controversial one within the ANC. The move to armed struggle was a necessary 
step because the nonviolent struggle had failed to yield the expected results. In justifying the 
change of strategy, Mandela argues that “[t]he position of the ANC on the question of violence is 
very simple. The organization has no vested interest in violence. It abhors any action, which may 
cause loss of life, destruction of property, and misery to the people. It has worked long and 
patiently for a South Africa of common values and for an undivided and peaceful non-racial state. 
But we consider the armed struggle a legitimate form of self-defence against a morally repugnant 
system of government, which will not allow even peaceful forms of protest” (Mandela, “The ANC 
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and the Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political Settlement,” 11). In this letter 
to P. W. Botha, Mandela proved that violence is often a last recourse when every other means of 
articulating dissent has failed. According to Mandela, “[n]ot only did the government ignore our 
demands for a meeting; instead it took advantage of our commitment to a nonviolent struggle and 
unleashed the most violent form of racial oppression this country has ever seen” (“The ANC and 
the Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political Settlement,”  12). It is pertinent to 
note that Mandela’s explanations for the modus operandi of the armed struggle remained faithful 
to Gandhi’s principles to a very large extent. In essence, Mandela held fast to the preservation of 
life in accordance to the principle of ahimsa. The idea of preserving life is a dialectical one. For 
example, Gandhi argues that the idea of violence is relative, and the question is where to draw the 
line (Murti, 134). Gandhi’s principle of ahimsa extended to animals because, he did not believe in 
the consumption of meat. However, ahimsa places life in a hierarchy, and the preservation of life 
begs the question: whose life?  
Despite Gandhi’s strong belief in ahimsa, he never sought to impose his own personal 
beliefs on other people. Rather, he argues “[w]hat is one man’s food can be another’s poison. Meat-
eating is a sin for me. Yet, for another person, who has always lived on meat and never seen 
anything wrong in it, to give it up simply in order to copy me will be a sin” (Murti, 135). Gandhi 
could have been accused of inconsistency, considering that he did not believe that the killing of 
animals who ate up a farmer’s crop goes against ahimsa. That is because it was more important to 
preserve human life.  According to Gandhi 
 If I wish to be an agriculturalist and stay in the jungle, I will have to use the minimum 
unavoidable violence in order to protect my fields. I will have to kill monkeys, birds, 
and insects which eat up my crops. If I do not wish to do so myself, I will have to 
engage someone to do it for me. There is not much difference between the two. To 
allow crops to be eaten up by animals in the name of ahimsa while there is a famine in 
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the land is certainly a sin. Evil and good are relative terms. What is good under certain 
conditions can become an evil or a sin under a different set of conditions (Murti, 135).  
Gandhi’s argument goes to prove that self-preservation is far more important than any other 
principle because failure to preserve the self would be regarded as folly.  And that is the point 
Mandela argues to prove in advocating for the armed struggle.  
The apartheid government can thus be compared to Gandhi’s “monkeys, birds, and insects” 
that eat up the crops needed to keep the people alive. In essence, apartheid policies were killing 
the South African people of color through violence, segregation, and deprivation. As Gandhi 
further explains, failure to use violence where necessary can be described as cowardice. This 
argument resonates with X’s view of non-violence as cowardice. Gandhi warns against conflating 
nonviolence with cowardice in the following words: “nonviolence and cowardice are contradictory 
terms. Nonviolence is the greatest virtue, cowardice the greatest vice. Nonviolence springs from 
love, cowardice from hate. Nonviolence always suffers, cowardice would always inflict suffering. 
Perfect nonviolence is the highest bravery. Nonviolent conduct is never demoralizing, cowardice 
always is” (Murti, 173). Gandhi’s words here particularly connect with Mandela’s paradigm shift. 
 To fail to move beyond nonviolent struggle would have been interpreted as an act of 
cowardice by the people, particularly the youths. Mandela’s and Gandhi’s ideas of cowardice are 
similar in the sense that it is the failure to take needed action. During one of his speeches, Mandela 
says that “[t]here were a great many young people present, and they were angry and eager for 
action” (Long Walk, 156). Mandela had intellectually arrived at the realization that the apartheid 
government was exploiting the nonviolent stance of ANC to unleash terror on the people and their 
leaders. The apartheid government was using violence to intimidate and discourage the leaders of 
the struggle. To be cowed by such intimidation would have been to risk being called cowards. It 
can be argued that despite the radicalism of X, his cynicism regarding the non-violent resistance 
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was valid. For example, when X says that “A coward can sit” (The Ballot…” 76), he implies that 
sitting is inaction, and inaction in the face of unwarranted hostility is cowardice. The desire to 
maintain moral and political integrity and yet keep the fight alive produced an important debate 
among the ANC leaders. The change to armed struggle was vital in order to sustain the confidence 
of the masses. In essence, the leaders had to prove that they were prepared to go to any length, 
even if it meant laying down their lives.  
Freedom fighters everywhere have had to lay down their lives, at least figuratively, because 
they practically have no lives during the struggle. The ultimate sacrifice was demanded of human 
rights activists like Gandhi, MLK, and X, all of whom were assassinated in the cause of their 
various struggles. Mandela was lucky to have survived the struggle compared to others activists in 
South Africa who lost their lives. The change from nonviolence to armed struggle was a very risky 
move. The threat of carnage was real. This threat made the move a very complex and difficult one, 
both at the transitional and implemental stages.  
 
Apartheid Government’s Attacks on Mandela as A Terrorist 
The complexities created by the apartheid regime were booby traps for the implementation 
of the armed struggle. For example, the ANC leaders were very much aware that they needed both 
internal and external support for the struggle to succeed. Adopting an armed struggle would 
significantly jeopardize such support. The challenge to produce a formula to balance the risks and 
benefits of armed struggle almost tore the ANC apart. The major risk came with being labelled 
terrorists by the apartheid regime and the international community. Mandela deployed his 
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rhetorical skill to convince the leaders that to be labelled as terrorists seemed like a smaller price 
to pay compared to the risk of being labelled as cowards by their followers.  
To be regarded as cowards would have greatly undermined the struggle particularly among 
Blacks, who suffered much from the constantly morphing apartheid policies. Despite the fact that 
the change of tactics called the ethos of leaders like Mandela into question, opportunity cost 
demanded that the choice of a lesser evil be made. Deciding when to make that choice was a 
testament of Mandela’s appreciation of kairos as a rhetorical device. The recognition of the 
opportune moment sprung from Mandela’s deep knowledge of human nature as well as an acute 
understanding of the mindset of the apartheid government. Such knowledge was captured in 
Mandela’s speech during the Defiance Campaign in the following words: “I began speaking about 
the increasing repressiveness of the government in the wake of the Defiance Campaign. I said the 
government was now scared of the might of the African people. As I spoke, I grew more and more 
indignant. In those days, I was something of a rabble-rousing speaker. I liked to incite an audience, 
and I was doing so that evening” (Long Walk, 157). Playing the role of a rabble-rouser was a 
political strategy that tied into the concept of identification. In essence, Mandela used the 
performance he described to show the impatient youths that he was as impatient for more decisive 
action as they were. That strategy became more obvious as Mandela condemned the government 
for its ruthlessness and lawlessness. According to him:  
I stepped across the line: I said that the time for passive resistance had ended, that 
nonviolence was a strategy and could never overrun a white minority regime bent on 
retaining its power at any cost. At the end of the day, I said, violence was the only 
weapon that would destroy apartheid and we must be prepared, in the near future, to 
use that weapon. The crow was excited; the youth in particular were clapping and 
cheering. They were ready to act on what I said right then and there (Long Walk, 157).  
At this point, the die was cast, and the days of non-violence as a strategy were over. 
Mandela’s shift from non-violent resistance to armed struggle did not occur in a vacuum. Neither 
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did it occur as a result of a mere desire to identify with the discontented youths. The shift to armed 
struggle was necessitated by exigency. Mandela’s speech depicts a conscious effort to avoid 
Fanon’s “Pitfalls of National Consciousness,” which can have significant implications for any 
freedom struggle. According to Fanon: “[i]t so happens that the unpreparedness of the educated 
classes, the lack of practical links between them and the mass of the people, their laziness, and, let 
it be said, their cowardice at the decisive moment of the struggle will give rise to tragic mishaps” 
(Wretched, 121). In essence, making the right decision at the right moment is a very important 
element in the anti-colonial struggle. Mandela argues that violence has always played a major part 
in the fight for freedom depending on who is crafting the narrative. For example, the violence that 
was employed by the Afrikaners against the British for the sake of freedom was deemed right at 
the time.  Therefore, Mandela argues that:  
“[d]own the years oppressed people have fought for their birthright by peaceful means, 
where that was possible, and through force where peaceful channels were closed. The 
history of this country also confirms this vital lesson. Africans as well as Afrikaners 
were, at one time or other, compelled to take up arms in defence of their freedom 
against British imperialism. The fact that both were finally defeated by superior arms, 
and by the vast resources of that empire, does not negate this lesson” (“The ANC and 
the Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political Settlement,” 12).  
In essence, whoever holds the power at any point in time controls the narrative in a conflict. 
Fanon corroborates Mandela’s argument in the following words: “Colonization and decolonization 
are simply a question of relative strength” (Fanon, Wretched, 48). Fanon describes the manner in 
which colonialists go into a strange land and with audacity, conquer them and take over their land 
as a calculated endeavour with a determined end in mind. According to Fanon, “[c]olonialism is 
not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural 
state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence” (Wretched, 48). This argument 
may appear to support the concept of survival of the fittest, but that is far from the truth. Instead, 
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Fanon is advocating for a more pragmatic solution to a problem that has defied other means of 
resolution. 
 Fanon’s argument validates the fact that violence, as a means of settling scores, is as old 
as mankind. Violence has always had devastating consequences. Violence in the anti-apartheid 
struggle was used as a means of demonstrating the frustration of the oppressed people when every 
other means of showing dissent had been blocked. Updesh, Kumar, and Manas K. Mandal’s edited 
book, Countering Terrorism: Psychosocial Strategies theorizes that violence and terrorism have 
evolved as tools for displaying dissent and opposition in every area of life. They argue that several 
factors like “religion, poverty, the lack of democracy, or history as prominent factors, and the state 
as perpetrator” (Kumar & Mandal, Preface, xvi) have been catalysts in the employment of violence 
and terrorism in conflict.  
Violence is often used by the state because they have access to immense resources that 
make it easy for them to use force against dissent. Mandela captures the use of violence in the 
struggle as a cause and effect phenomenon because the ANC adopted armed struggle as a reaction 
to the violence that the apartheid government had mounted against Black South Africans. In the 
address to South African Youth Congress on April 30, 1990 Mandela describes the way that 
apartheid violence had been unleashed against Blacks in the following words: “President de Klerk 
please take note: If people are becoming angry and intolerant, whatever you say, it must be 
measured against the activities of your police and your troops. As far as we are concerned, the 
government is doing very little to rein in its wild police force, which has been trained to look at 
every grievance by Blacks as a declaration of war” (“We Must Organize the Masses of Our People 
into the Struggle,” 45-46). Violence and terrorism have different definitions and connotations 
depending on who is using force. State use of violence is viewed as governance regardless of what 
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devastation is left in its wake. For example, “[t]he word ‘terrorism’ entered into European 
languages in the wake of the French revolution of 1789. In the early revolutionary years, it was 
largely by violence that governments in Paris tried to impose their radical new order on a reluctant 
citizenry, which serves as a healthy reminder that terror is often at its bloodiest when used by 
dictatorial governments against their own citizens” (Adam Roberts, “The Changing Faces of 
Terrorism”).  The framing of violence is dependent on who employs it and how it is deployed.  
When the government uses violence, it is explained away through massive propaganda; but 
the table is turned when other groups resort to violence. According to Mandela, “[t]errorism 
inevitably reflected poorly on those who used it, undermining any public support it might 
otherwise garner” (Long Walk, 282). The apartheid government massacred sixty-nine unarmed 
demonstrators on March 21st in Sharpeville, a state of emergency was declared, and ANC and PAC 
were banned. The killing of innocent protestors is hardly regarded as terrorism on the part of the 
government, but acts of violence against government structures by the anti-apartheid movement 
are described as terrorist acts. The reluctance on the part of ANC to use violence made the choice 
of what violent activities to consider very difficult. Consequently, between “sabotage, guerrilla 
warfare, terrorism, and open revolution”, choosing which of these represented the best option was 
agonizing for the ANC. Mandela described the difficulty of making this choice in the following 
words: “[g]uerrilla warfare was a possibility, but since the ANC had been reluctant to embrace 
violence at all, it made sense to start with the form of violence that inflicted the least harm against 
individuals: sabotage” (Long Walk, 282). The apartheid government was therefore responsible for 
forcing the ANC into an armed struggle. Therefore, government policies made violence by the 
African people inevitable. 
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According to Mandela, responsible leadership was necessary to canalize and control the 
feelings of our people; otherwise, there would be “outbreaks of terrorism, which would produce 
an intensity of bitterness and hostility between the various races of this country which is not 
produced even by war” (The Struggle, 157).  In addition, without violence there would be no way 
open for the African people to succeed in their struggle against the principle of white supremacy. 
If all lawful modes of expressing opposition to this principle had been closed by legislation, then 
the ANC leaders had no choice but to resort to violence. According to Mandela, “we were placed 
in a position in which we had either to accept a permanent state of inferiority or to defy the 
government. We chose to defy the law. We first broke the law in a way which avoided any recourse 
to violence; when this form was legislated against, and then the government resorted to a show of 
force to crush opposition to its policies, only then did we decide to answer violence with violence” 
(The Struggle, 157). The government launched a violent campaign against the people, the ANC, 
and all other affiliates of the party on all fronts.  
Apart from herding the people into reserves, their leaders were arrested under various 
pretexts and jailed. The war against the people was waged on the physical, psychological, and 
material levels with the intention of crushing their spirits. Mandela describes the policy of banning, 
as one of the ways that psychological warfare was waged against him and other leaders of the 
movement in the following words: “[m]y bans extended to meetings of all kinds, not just political 
ones. I could not, for example, attend my son’s birthday party. I was prohibited from talking to 
more than one person at a time. This was part of a systematic effort by the government to silence, 
persecute, and immobilize the leaders of those fighting apartheid and was the first of a series of 
bans on me that continued, with brief intervals of freedom, until the time I was deprived of all 
freedom some years hence” (Long Walk, 144). The psychology of banning was such a strategic 
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weapon deployed by the apartheid government that it did not only confine the person physically, 
“it imprisons one’s spirit. It induces a kind of psychological claustrophobia that makes one yearn 
not only for freedom of movement but spiritual escape. Banning was a dangerous game, for one 
was not shackled or chained behind bars; the bars were laws and regulations that could easily be 
violated and often were. One could slip away unseen for short periods of time and have the 
temporary illusion of freedom. The insidious effect of bans was that at a certain point one began 
to think that the oppressor was not without but within” (Mandela, Long Walk, 144). The 
intimidation of the opposition was orchestrated in a sinister manner such that the oppressed were 
stripped of their humanity.  
The dehumanization of the oppressed people was planned and executed with a determined 
goal.  And that goal, according to Fanon was to produce a neurosis as well as an inferiority 
complex. Mandela corroborates Fanon’s argument in the following words: “The lack of human 
dignity experienced by Africans is the direct result of the policy of white supremacy. White 
supremacy implies Black inferiority” (Long Walk, 367). Jean-Paul Sartre’s preface to Fanon’s 
Wretched of the Earth describes the systematic war against the natives in the following words: 
“Violence in the colonies does not only have for its aim the keeping of these enslaved men at arm’s 
length; it seeks to dehumanize them…Sheer physical fatigue will stupefy them” (Wretched, 13). 
Sartre’s conceptualization of the ulterior motive of an oppressive government connects to why the 
leaders of an opposition movement would want to ensure that such an aim is not achieved. 
According to Sartre, every aspect of the humanity of the colonized was attacked with violence – 
physically, socially, and psychology. The colonized were dehumanized that:  
starved and ill, if they have any spirit left, fear will finish the job; guns are levelled at 
the peasant; civilians come to take over his land and force him, by dint of flogging, to 
till the land for them. If he shows fight, the soldiers fire and he’s a dead man; if he 
gives in, he degrades himself and he is no longer a man at all; shame and fear will split 
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up his character and make his inmost self-fall to pieces. The business is conducted with 
flying colors and by experts; the “psychological services” weren’t established 
yesterday; nor was brain-washing (Sartre, Wretched, 13).  
The ANC leaders were already witnessing the devastation described by Sartre. Every fabric 
of the lives of Black South Africans was being attacked. Having failed to achieve liberation by 
peaceful means, the onus was on the leaders to find alternative methods. As Mandela argued, “[a] 
freedom fighter learns the hard way that it is the oppressor who defines the nature of the struggle, 
and the oppressed is often left no recourse but to use methods that mirror those of the oppressor” 
(Long Walk, 166). The fact that violence had been employed as a tool of the oppressor indicates 
that a precedent had been set. And that was why, despite the consequences, Mandela and the ANC 
decided to shelve nonviolence for armed struggle.  
The launching of media war against the people and their leaders by the apartheid 
government gave a strategic twist to the conflict. The media war was intended to help the regime 
further gain an upper hand. The media has always been a very powerful tool in conflict particularly 
because of the media’s potential for a wide reach. The government had a great influence over the 
media by virtue of the power and resources at their disposal. The media outfits as profit 
organizations need to be non-partisan and report news objectively. However, the media becomes 
victims along with the oppressed people; and to protect their business interests, they have to take 
positions that are contrary to non-partisanship. For example, Mandela says that: 
At the beginning of the [defiance] campaign the press gave us a fairly objective 
coverage and, acting on information supplied by their own reporters in different parts 
of the country, they reported growing support for the demonstrations and correctly 
predicted unprecedented response to the call. Until a week or so before the stay-at-
home, the South African press endeavored to live up to the standards and ethics of 
honest journalism and reported news items as they were without slants and distortions. 
But as soon as the government showed the mailed fist and threatened action against 
those newspapers that gave publicity to the campaign, the Opposition press, true to 
tradition, beat a hurried retreat and threw all principles and ethical standards overboard 
(The Struggle, 104-105).  
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The media plays an important role that serves to enlighten, educate, and sensitize the 
audience to events happening around the world. Such media aim ought to be achieved through the 
espousal of media ideologies that should be balanced with social responsibility. In essence, media 
reporting should be objective, accurate, and lucid in order to create a platform meant to produce a 
stable society rather than be an instrument of division and strife. The apartheid government forced 
the media to play a divisive role, and such a role deviated from the original objectives of the media. 
The divisive role forced upon the media by the government also negated the role of a legitimate 
government, which should serve to unite the people. Considering that the apartheid government 
had no legitimacy in the eyes of the black community, this divisive role was not surprising.   
The media, particularly the international media, was used to destroy the reputation of the 
ANC leaders. For example, Mandela recounts a visit from two foreign media personnel in the 
following words: “I had one not-so-pleasant visit from two Americans, editors of the conservative 
newspaper the Washington Times. They seemed less intent on finding out my views than on 
proving that I was a Communist and a terrorist” (Long Walk, 520). The fact that these media 
practitioners were so biased and unprepared to operate according to the tenet of their profession, 
shows that the Western media was being fed damaging information about the ANC leaders. 
Despite the destructive role of the media, it failed to hamper the struggle; tough as the struggle 
proved to be. 
Despite engaging in armed struggled, the importance of diplomacy was not lost on 
Mandela, who connected strongly with the Prussian general Karl con Clausewitz’s classic work, 
On War. According to Mandela, “Clausewitz’s central thesis, that war was a continuation of 
diplomacy by other means, dovetailed with my own instincts” (Long Walk, 277). Diplomacy as 
employed by Mandela cuts across race. His ability to draw upon various ideas and experiences 
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makes it necessary to draw the intertextual connections between his struggle and other human 
rights struggles. Despite the influences of the various ideologies that contributed towards the 
evolving of Mandela’s rhetoric, the divergences and convergences also contributed towards 
creating problems for him.  
For example, Mandela initially perceived the struggle as a Black-only affair, as lots of other 
Black South Africans did. This emotional space accounts for Mandela’s initial resistance to the 
admittance of others like the Coloureds, Indians, and Communists. The reason for wanting to 
exclude the other non-white groups is a combination of factors. One of the factors was the 
Industrial Conciliation Act, which reinforced the lower status of Blacks. Despite this initial 
resistance, Mandela made a turnaround on a number of his previous stances. Another turnaround 
was certainly the change of strategy from nonviolence to the arm struggle. This change of strategy 
was a huge step, especially because of the risk it held for him and the ANC of losing support from 
the international community. These turnarounds caused people to accuse him of being inconsistent, 
and thus, brought his ethos into question.  
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            Chapter Three 
Mandela’s Performative Ethos and Kairotic Ontology 
This chapter examines the rhetorical moves employed by Mandela to address apartheid 
policy changes that made him change some of his own strategies as well. These policy changes 
aimed to suppress the struggle, and the need to subvert such an aim forced a change in strategy on 
the part of the ANC and Mandela.  Mandela’s change in strategy on the following issues: (1) the 
acceptance of other people of other races and people of differing philosophies (like the Marxists) 
into the anti-apartheid movement; (2) the move from non-violence to armed struggle; and (3) the 
unilateral act of initiating talks with the government, despite the government’s failure to meet the 
demands of the ANC made his followers perceive him as inconsistent. Mandela’s change of stance 
and some of his unilateral actions caused suspicion among his followers. This situation called his 
ethos into question.  
Like Desmond Tutu, Mandela’s character embodied values like honesty and integrity in a 
way that made an impact on their audiences. This impact is strongly connected to Mandela’s 
rhetorical appeal. The following texts: Speeches 1990: Intensify the Struggle to Abolish Apartheid, 
which is an anthology of Mandela’s speeches, The Struggle is my life and Long Walk to Freedom 
are instrumental for showing that Mandela’s adaptive strategies reinforce rather than undermine 
his ontological and performative ethos. The autobiography Long Walk to Freedom can be 
described as a road map of Mandela’s life and rhetorical formations before, during, and after the 
anti-apartheid struggle as well as an account of the narratives that make up his life. This 
autobiography comes in very useful in the next two chapters for depicting Mandela’s evolving 
political career and rhetoric. The texts being examined in this chapter prove very fruitful for 
examining how Mandela’s shifting stances in the anti-apartheid struggle created suspicion among 
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his fellow leaders and followers and how effectively the situations were handled. These texts help 
to make visible Mandela’s performativity as his logos and ethos combine to form an important 
aspect of his rhetorical appeal.  
Mandela deployed his entire life experiences to persuade his audience into accepting his 
fidelity to the anti-apartheid project. The strength of Mandela’s rhetoric partly rested in his 
performative ethos, which encapsulated his ethical ontology as well as his experiential growth.  By 
performativity, I draw upon Walter Beale’s concept of the epideictic as a tool that performs a vital 
social role for “reinforcing traditional social values, by strengthening the “intensity of adherence 
to the values it lauds” (222). Beale’s argument that “the audience of the epideictic assumes the role 
of “observer” and “critic;” whereas in the other rhetorical types, the audience is a judge, a decider” 
(222) connects to Mandela’s audience, who observe and judge his performative role in the struggle. 
Mandela’s audience observes and critiques his performance to ascertain whether he upholds the 
traditional values of honesty and integrity. The audience will need to judge, before deciding 
whether to perform the act of believing and following or not, after ascertaining what value system 
the speaker represents.  
Mandela’s performative ethos was a strategy that served to affirm his commitment to the 
anti-apartheid struggle and the South African project. That is because from the moment he and the 
ANC leaders embraced the idea of a multi-racial movement in 1950, which allowed communists 
to join in the anti-apartheid struggle till the end of his presidency, his ethos was constantly called 
into question. Whenever Mandela displayed flexibility on any issue, be it calls for armed struggle 
or the extension of an olive branch to the government, he was required to reaffirm his ethos. 
Mandela’s performance acts upon his audience similarly to Searle’s and Austin’s ideas of 
illocutionary act. His persuasiveness was achieved through the political positions he advocated in 
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his writings and speeches as were made manifest in his political life. Consequently, his 
persuasiveness was rooted in the ethos he performed through his choices, both as a racialized 
African and as an activist. In addition, Mandela’s wide acceptability stemmed from his 
identification with the disenfranchised (identification that was enacted in speech and actions – 
symbolized by his personal sacrifices), whose rights had been taken away from them either because 
of the color of their skin or because they belonged to a different belief system.  
Mandela’s peculiar position helps to make understandable the relationship between his 
political rhetoric – his appeals for solidarity – and the cohesion produced among ethnically and 
ideologically diverse groups. It is significant to analyze the varieties of strategies and tactics 
Mandela deployed as he organized and agitated for overturning the racist apartheid order. Of 
particular note were the ways and degrees to which Mandela drew upon the facts of his own 
repression – deployed rhetorically, as it were, by the apartheid regime to produce strong mental 
images. Mandela’s rhetorical strategy served to undercut the apartheid regime’s approach of 
sowing seeds of discord among disparate groups of South African people of colour in order to 
suppress their resistance.  
Mandela’s counter-rhetoric for destroying this divisive strategy proved effective 
particularly because he demonstrated his steadfast commitment to the cause of the struggle. The 
deployment of his rhetorical strategies was quite significant because the complex socio-political 
situation in South Africa had succeeded in fragmenting Blacks. Therefore, Mandela’s stature, as a 
leader of high repute, became an important means of assuaging the frayed political and social 
nerves of Blacks. Mandela’s changing rhetorical strategies demonstrated how he had grown over 
time without compromising his commitment to the struggle and his values of honesty and integrity. 
To investigate the role of Mandela’s demonstrative ethos, this chapter examines: (1) Ethos as a 
109 
 
Human Symbol; (2) The Construction of Mandela’s Ethos; (3) Mandela’s Flexible and 
Performative Leadership; (4) Mandela’s Diplomatic Strategies; (5) Mandela’s Feminist 
Sensibilities; and (6) Identification as an Integral Part of Mandela’s Ethos. 
  
Ethos as a Human Symbol 
Ethos has acquired the status of the bastard child of modern rhetoric because “[t]he impact 
of rhetoric’s dissolution and scientific philosophy’s consolidation of power eventually helped to 
contribute to the intellectual crises of the early twentieth century” (James Crosswhite, 84). 
Crosswhite argues that the domination of science in the society has produced a dismissal of the 
deliberative and inventive powers of the art of rhetoric. Consequently, ethical discourse has been 
redefined as producing prescriptive and emotive meaning without a truth value. The result is 
relativism. The catastrophic wars of the twentieth century are evidence of the crisis of philosophy 
after its divorce from rhetoric. Wayne Booth and Burke’s contemporary examination of these 
conflicts depict the need to produce the kind of assent generated in mutual engagement that is 
required for resolving lingering conflicts. Crosswhite argues that these holocaust wars were partly 
responsible for the re-creation and recovery of traditional rhetoric, which has given birth to what 
he describes as “deep rhetoric.”  
Deep rhetoric accounts for the return of rhetoric as an enlargement of philosophy through 
which rhetorical frameworks are being developed for addressing contemporary problems. The 
recovery of traditional rhetoric plays a significant role in this chapter because of the role of ethos 
in traditional rhetoric.  This chapter is preoccupied with role of ethos for producing persuasion; 
and hence, there is the need to address the question: Why is ethos such an important rhetorical 
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means of persuasion? To answer this question is to answer another question: Why are human 
beings so preoccupied with integrity and truth? Nietzsche gives an insight into the answers by 
describing how the physical vulnerability of the human race demands the use of the intellect more 
than other animals. He argues that humans are the least equipped in terms of physical strength, 
which is needed for survival in the wild and untamed nature. However, what humans lacked in 
physical strength, they made up for in their intellect. According to Nietzsche, “For without this 
addition, they would have every reason to flee this existence as quickly as Lessing’s son” (889). 
The intellect has enabled the human race not only to survive, but also to dominate their 
environment.  
The human intellect is both a blessing and a burden because those referred to as the lower 
animals are not preoccupied with the same matters that produce divisions among people and 
groups. Thus, “as a means for the preservation of the individual, the intellect unfolds its principle 
powers in dissimulation, which is the means by which weaker, less robust individuals preserve 
themselves – since they have been denied the chance to wage the battle for existence with horns 
or with the sharp teeth of beasts of prey” (Nietzsche, 889). The human intellect predisposes people 
to seek to survive within the forces of nature in a way that makes them continuously grasp for 
control. This desire for control means that “insofar as the individual wants to maintain himself 
against other individuals; he will under natural circumstances employ the intellect mainly for 
dissimulation” (Nietzsche, 889).  Dissimulation is not peculiar to the human races; but, as George 
Kennedy argues, we would also have noticed that lower animals equally have the power to enact 
some level of concealment and deception. Nietzsche argues that: 
This art of dissimulation reaches its peak in man. Deception, flattering, lying, deluding, 
talking behind the back, putting up a false front, living in borrowed splendor, wearing 
a mask, hiding behind convention, playing a role for others and for oneself – in short, 
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a continuous fluttering around the solitary flame of vanity – is so much the rule and 
the law among men that there is almost nothing which is less comprehensible than how 
an honest and pure drive for truth could have arisen among them (889).  
In essence, human dissimulation is of a higher sort than that of animals. Therefore, speech 
is that aspect of the intellect that differentiates humans from animals. Despite the power that comes 
from the intellect and speech, nature has made it impossible for human beings to know nature and 
themselves in totality. Nature has concealed “most things from him – even concerning his own 
body – in order to confine and lock him within a proud, deceptive consciousness, aloof from the 
coils of the bowels, the rapid flow of the blood stream, and the quivering of the fibers! She threw 
away the key” (Nietzsche, 889). This description of nature as some being or force with the power 
to deliberately keep human beings from knowing the unknown is interesting.  This observation 
opens up the discussion on why human beings are uncomfortable with the unknown.  
One of the reasons why we are uncomfortable with the unknown is because what is 
considered to be “lies” within social conventions cast shadows over the world as it is known, and 
“truth” illuminates this world by making it seemingly more accessible. Human speech plays a 
fundamental role in unraveling the world as we know it and upon which the human cognitive 
faculties are perpetually fixated. Therefore, the “legislation of language likewise establishes the 
first laws of truth” (Nietzsche, 889). Despite the relativism that Nietzsche subordinates truth and 
lies to, dissimulation eclipses truth and creates curiosity and suspicion among human beings. The 
complication that comes from conflict creates a psychological space where ethos (as an expression 
of traditional values of honesty and integrity) plays a key role. Bruce Barry and Robert Robinson 
argue that “[r]egardless of how much acrimony attends a particular discord, the challenge of 
reconciling competing interest without sacrificing self-interest inevitably tempts conflicting 
parties to be cunning, guarded, or furtive, if not plainly dishonest. The imaginary line between 
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clever furtiveness and naked deception marks that ethical frontier along which those who research 
and teach applied techniques in conflict resolution ply their trade” (137 -138). Barry and 
Robinson’s argument indicate that conflicts tend to shake ethical lines because conflict exacerbates 
self-interest and often brings out the worst in people. The role of rhetorical ethos in conflict makes 
Burke’s idea of the “dialectical pair” of “opinion and truth” conventionally compatible. That is 
because “many of the “opinions” upon which persuasion relies fall outside the test of truth in the 
strictly scientific, T-F, yes-or-no sense” (Burke, A Rhetoric, 54).  Thus, what a society holds to be 
true is dependent upon what has been conventionally determined as truth (Nietzsche and Burke). 
The manner in which convention determines what is true or false and good or bad dates back to 
ancient times as can be seen in “Dissoi Logoi.” The ethical assumption upon which an orator seeks 
to persuade is connected to the configuration of the intended audience.  
 According to Burke, “if a given audience has a strong opinion that a certain kind of conduct 
is admirable, the orator can commend a person by using signs that identify him with such conduct” 
(A Rhetoric, 54) as a means of claiming credibility. What then are the motives behind such 
identification? To answer this question, there is the need to examine what Mandela had in common 
with South African people of color. What they had in common was the hardship that racial 
discrimination had inflicted on all minorities by apartheid. Mandela’s complex audience required 
that he projected an ethos that was consistent with the articulated position of the suffering masses 
in South Africa. It can be argued that Mandela employed identification in a way that demonstrated 
the transcendental nature of his motives, whereby putting the interest of his country above his 
personal interest was fundamental not superficial.  
Conflict presents occasions for suspicion; and to persuade the opposing side, credibility is 
needed in the course of finding a resolution. Truth and lies occupy important places in conflict, 
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and the power to persuade rests largely in the speaker’s ability to prove his trustworthiness. 
Conflict opens up the space for suspicion and fear, and these emotions place a high premium on 
ethos because trust becomes a prized commodity. Ethos is significant primarily because it projects 
a potent platform upon which persuasion, especially in a conflict situation, is heavily reliant. That 
is because ethos is that part of human nature, which can be both intrinsic and acquired. It is intrinsic 
considering that it is formed out of human conscience; and it is acquired through character 
formation. Mandela’s ethos is irrevocably tied to his convictions because he had experienced 
freedom in his African village before he experienced the ordeal of curtailment in the city, and this 
curtailment was evidence of the evil of apartheid. The refusal to accept the tokenism offered by 
the apartheid government (such as preferential treatment in prison or a conditional release) 
validates his ethos, and therein partly lies his rhetorical appeal. Mandela’s transcendental ethos 
enables him subject his interest to that of the general good, despite the cost. In counting the cost 
of the struggle, Mandela performative ethos is made manifest in the following words:  
I have chosen this latter course (of going underground) which is more difficult and 
which entails more risks and hardship than sitting in goal. I have had to separate myself 
from my dear wife and children, from my mother and sisters to live as an outlaw in my 
own land. I have had to close my business, to abandon my profession, and live in 
poverty and misery, as many of my people are doing. I will continue to act as the 
spokesman of the National Action council during the phase (armed struggle) that is 
unfolding and the tough struggles that lie ahead. I shall fight the government side by 
side with you, inch by inch, and mile by mile, until victory is won. What are you going 
to do? Will you come along with us, or are you going to co-operate with the 
Government in its efforts to suppress the claims and aspirations of your own people? 
Or are you going to remain silent and neutral in a matter of life and death to my people, 
to our people? For my part, I have made choice…The struggle is my life. I will 
continue fighting for freedom until the end of my days (The Struggle is My Life, 115). 
Mandela does something very interesting in the speech from which the above quote was 
taken. First, he sets up the circumstances that led to his adoption of the armed struggle by praising 
the people for their support so far. He juxtaposes this praise with the condemnation of the 
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repressive strategies of the government. Then he praises the people again for their courage in the 
face of such repression. For example, he says that “[t]oday is 26 June, a day known throughout the 
length and breadth of our country as Freedom Day. On this memorable day, nine years ago, eight 
thousand five hundred of our dedicated freedom fighters struck a mighty blow against the 
repressive colour policies of the Government. Their matchless courage won them the praise and 
affection of millions of people here and abroad” (The Struggle, 113). The epideictic nature of this 
speech, that is characterized by the praise and blame elements, is apparent. But more importantly, 
Mandela is deploying the African rhetorical mode of the South African imbongi or West African 
griot by evoking their past victories as a means of interrogating their current challenges in order 
to call the people to action.  
The manner in which Mandela exploits epideictic rhetoric, a rhetorical form that is present 
in the Western and African rhetorical tradition and the African mode of the imbongi/griot, 
exemplifies Campbell’s, Finnegan’s, and Kaschula and Diop’s concepts of African rhetorical 
tradition. These scholars argue that the African rhetorical modes function within the society as 
means of regulating the moral codes of the communities. Mandela’s strategy of deploying 
rhetorical questions in the speech echoes Campbell’s argument that griot oratory is sermonic, and 
it aims to stir the heart, to provoke, and to persuade. Mandela’s description of his own personal 
sacrifices is a performance of his ethos that was effective enough to gain him support for his change 
in strategy.   
 Mandela’s performative ethos is significant because the inter-racial and intra-racial 
conflict created suspicions that heightened the existent tension. The tension made Mandela’s 
braided rhetoric emblematic in the sense that it was used to build a bridge between the conflicting 
groups. Smith, Cambell, Finnegan, and Kaschula and Diop recognize that the most significant role 
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of African rhetorical modes is the way these modes function to create cohesion within the 
communities. Mandela always sought ways to perform this role of building bridges all through the 
struggle and beyond, even at the risk of appearing weak and compromising. His deep knowledge 
and appreciation of human nature combined with his diverse experiences helped him develop a 
knack for unifying various groups for a common cause. Mandela’s experiences are drawn from 
practical law court proceedings, a shared African and Western cultures, various false political 
starts, successes, and failures.  
 
The Construction of Mandela’s Ethos 
One of the factors that caused the intra-racial conflicts, which complicated things for 
Mandela and the ANC, was the paradigm shift on the part of the ANC. This paradigm shift was 
evidenced in the decision to include people of other races and ideologies in the anti-apartheid 
struggle. It is significant to discuss this paradigm shift because it served to both interrogate and 
validate Mandela’s ethos. The policy to include other races and people of other ideologies like the 
Communists stemmed from the desire to accommodate all who were commonly oppressed by the 
apartheid government. Despite the nobility of this policy change, it created huge problems that 
threatened the anti-apartheid struggle. Mandela and other ANC leaders were accused of betrayal 
and inconsistency.  
Mandela’s paradigm shift was a volte-face on his part; however, his performative ethos 
was instrumental for persuading the people to embrace this change. Other Black leaders opposed 
the inclusion of non-Blacks and communists because they believed in African-only anti-apartheid 
movement. Mandela’s Africanist fidelity had never been in question as his rhetorical strategies 
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proved. Despite having this fidelity challenged, the manner in which Mandela demonstrated his 
commitment to his African heritage can be seen in his braided rhetoric. This braided rhetoric, 
which served the dual role of calling his fellow Africans into a cohesive cooperation against 
apartheid, while appealing to his white audience to see the evil of apartheid, set him apart. 
According to Michael J. Hyde, “ethos has an ontological dimension because it emerges from the 
way one makes decisions, the way one lives on a day-to-day basis, the way one dwells. Those 
decisions are informed by one’s values, one’s practical wisdom, and one’s goodwill” (“The Ethos”, 
2). Hyde’s ideas are exemplified in Mandela’s life and experiences. His ethos was tied to that of 
the ANC and yet separate in the sense that his individuality propelled him to make certain difficult 
decisions without the consent of his fellow leaders. Some of these decisions had the power to 
impact the ANC as well as call his credibility into question. 
Another incident that both interrogated and validated Mandela’s ethos was his decision to 
write to the government from prison. Although this decision may have been taken on an individual 
level without first consulting with the leaders of the ANC, the motive behind it requires serious 
interrogation.  The letter from prison served to initiate peace moves, and this move captured the 
manner in which his ethos transcended his party affiliations in order to encompass the general 
good of South Africans. This letter from prison gives us an insight into his individualism, and this 
individualism would cause his ethos to be called into question a number of times. According to 
Philip Bonner, “Mandela simply bucked collective discipline and took initiatives that were 
profoundly controversial in the upper ranks of the ANC and had never been collectively approved. 
These include Mandela’s initiative to ditch passive resistance and move to armed struggle in 1961 
and his solitary decision in the late 1980s to enter into discussions with the white South African 
government over a negotiated settlement between the Nationalist Party and the ANC” (30). Bonner 
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considers such controversial tendencies on the part of Mandela to be an inherent contradiction in 
need of exploration.  
Despite the fact that this point may have some merit, Mandela’s actions, when examined 
from the complex political and racial situations in South Africa at that time, remain consistent with 
his commitment to the people of South Africa. The complex nature of apartheid caused him to 
continually strategize for the sake of exigency. Mandela’s ability to always put the interest of the 
people above his own accounts for his rhetorical appeal. Putting the interest of the people above 
personal interest is the mark great leadership. And that is because, there were leaders who, when 
faced with important choices, failed to live up to expectations. 
 For example, at the height of the Defiance Campaign, Dr. Moroka, the president-general 
and the figurehead of the campaign, took a stance that undermined the credibility of the ANC. The 
Defiance Campaign was meant to push for the repeal of unjust laws such as, “the Suppression of 
Communism Act, the Group Areas Act, the Separate Representation of Voters Act, the Bantu 
Authorities Act, the pass laws, and stock limitation laws” (Mandela, Long Walk, 123). When the 
key ANC members were arrested and accused of communism, Dr. Moroka who “shared the 
government’s animosity to communism” (Mandela, Long Walk, 137), despite the tradition of the 
ANC to work with anyone who was against racial oppression, turned his back against the struggle. 
He employed his own attorney, contrary to the plan to have all the arrested members tried together, 
and performed a role that almost destroyed the struggle.  
Dr. Moroka took the stand and “tendered a humiliating plea in mitigation to Judge Rumpff 
and took the witness stand to renounce the very principles on which the ANC had been founded” 
(Mandela, Long Walk, 137). This was a practical betrayal of the ANC because “[w]hen his own 
lawyer asked him whether there were some among the defendants who were Communists, Dr. 
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Moroka actually began to point his finger at various people, including Dr. Dadoo and Walter. The 
judge informed him that that was not necessary” (Mandela, Long Walk, 138). Mandela described 
Dr. Moroka’s betrayal in the following words: “[h]is performance was a severe blow to the 
organization and we all immediately realized that Dr. Moroka’s days as ANC president were 
numbered. He had committed the cardinal sin of putting his own interest ahead of the organization 
and the people. He was unwilling to jeopardize his medical career and fortune for his political 
beliefs, thereby, he had destroyed the image that he had built during three years of courageous 
work on behalf of the ANC and the Defiance Campaign” (Mandela, Long Walk, 138). The 
description of the self-serving Dr. Moroka captures Mandela’s deep regard for self-sacrifice as a 
necessary ingredient of great leadership.  
The depth of the betrayal is captured in the following words, “I regarded this as a tragedy, 
for Dr. Moroka’s faintheartedness in court took away some of the glow from the campaign. The 
man who had gone around the country preaching the importance of the campaign had now 
forsaken” (Mandela, Long Walk, 138). Dr. Moroka’s eclipsed ethos is exemplary of a failed 
leadership. It is important to evaluate the terms Mandela employed to describe Moroka’s betrayal. 
In describing Moroka’s sell-out as the cardinal sin of putting his own interest ahead of the 
organization and the people, Mandela raises the freedom movement to the level of spirituality. The 
deployment of such religious language is not far-fetched because the oppression of a group of 
people based on the colour of their skin is a sin against the God who created them. In that regard, 
the apartheid regime as well as Moroka are relegated to the level of fallen beings. The language 
employed by Mandela connects to the Judeo-Christian concept of ethical prescription. 
Furthermore, there is also a close link between what such ethical prescription represents in the 
Western rhetorical tradition and the values imbibed by Mandela from his African heritage. 
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Mandela describes this African heritage as a whole way of living that is encapsulated in customs, 
rituals, and taboos that were passed down by their ancestors and which shaped their lives (Long 
Walk, 11). To dishonour this heritage was to debase their ancestors, and such actions had serious 
consequences like ill fortune and failure in life. The only way to atone for such lapses was “to 
consult with a traditional healer or tribal elder, who communicated with the ancestors and 
conveyed profound apologies” (Mandela, Long Walk, 11). Such a belief system informed 
Mandela’s deployment of such religious language in describing Moroka’s betrayal. 
Moroka’s failed leadership is stark in comparison to Mandela, whose promising law 
practice had been sacrificed on the altar of the struggle. Having being forced to abandon his family 
and go underground, it became impossible to care for or protect them. His beloved wife and 
children were physically harassed and displaced on numerous occasions. Winnie, his young wife 
was imprisoned and dehumanized many times. He was unable to care for his mother and sisters 
and was equally unable to attend family gatherings like birthdays and funerals. All of these 
personal sacrifices brought him great agony, yet he remained committed to the convictions of the 
struggle. Mandela brooded over his personal affairs as much as he agonized over the affairs of the 
country. Thus, he exemplifies Burke’s idea of being consubstantiated with the people; and this 
merger helps to validate his ethos, which in turn made him rhetorically persuasive.   
The suffering people of South Africa are combined with Mandela’s immediate family to 
make up one big family. Mandela’s awareness of his consubstantiality with the people of South 
Africa is captured in the following words: “I had no epiphany, no singular revelation, no moment 
of truth, but a steady accumulation of a thousand slights, a thousand indignities, a thousand 
unremembered moments, produced in me an anger, a rebelliousness, a desire to fight the system 
that imprisoned my people” [italics is mine] (Long Walk, 95). Burke describes “consubstantially” 
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as “[a] doctrine…, either explicit or implicit, may be necessary to any way of life. For substance, 
in the old philosophies, was an act; and a way of life is an acting-together; and in acting together, 
men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them consubstantial” 
(A Rhetoric, 21). The “common enemy” identified in this struggle was the apartheid regime.  
The common enemy had inflicted immense suffering upon the oppressed South Africans, 
who had been dehumanized just for being human beings of a different color. Mandela identifies 
with the people through language at the surface level, and at a deeper level, acts together with 
them. All through the struggle, he used surface linguistic terms like the possessive pronoun “my” 
– “my people,” “my brothers and sisters,” “our mothers,” and “our sisters” to indicate that, at the 
metaphorical level, he belonged to the people and they belonged to him. In that belongingness, 
Mandela chooses to suffer for them and with them. Mandela’s language and actions, particularly 
his long incarceration, contributed towards his performative ethos.  
Mandela’s ethos is demonstrative because his suffering is evidence that his rhetoric goes 
deeper than mere talk. Mandela even jeopardized his ethos through some of his actions, despite 
the fact that these actions were taken for the good of the cause and the people. To buttress this 
point, Mandela explains in his letter to the government the need to break the impasse that had 
truncated previous peace moves. This destructive impasse acted as a motivating factor for his 
intervention. Mandela’s concern for the plight of the citizens is captured in the following words: 
“My intervention is influenced by purely domestic issues, by the civil strife and ruin into which 
the country is now sliding (Speeches, 10). In essence, Mandela cared more about the country than 
about his reputation.   
 The extent to which the situation of the country affected him is captured in the following 
words, “I am disturbed, as many other South Africans no doubt are, by the specter of a South 
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Africa split into two hostile camps-Blacks (the term Blacks is used in a broad sense to include all 
those who are not whites) on one side and whites on the other-slaughtering one another; by acute 
tensions, which are building up dangerously in practically every sphere of our lives – a situation, 
which in turn, foreshadows more violent clashes in days ahead. This is the crisis that has forced 
me to act” (Mandela, “The ANC and the Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political 
Settlement,” 10).  The terms used by Mandela to capture the South African situation can be 
described as a mission to rescue a haunted sphere. Thus, the metaphor of the “specter” that was 
created by the slaughtering on both sides by Blacks and whites produces a phantasmagoria that is 
more real than imagined. Mandela gives the impression that the images are real and heart-rending 
enough to occasion his intervention, regardless of how his action may have been misinterpreted. 
The dystopic descriptions of the South African milieu present a picture of a country on the brink 
of total collapse. In essence, the communal trope that has characterized Mandela’s braided rhetoric 
can be glimpsed yet again. Mandela’s reason for his action evinces the summation that every 
personal interest must be subordinated to the communal cohesion. 
 This communal cohesion necessitated Mandela to risk having his credibility questioned 
for initiating communication with the apartheid government. The communication channels had 
become closed as a result of the escalating violence on both sides on the divide; therefore, South 
Africa was fast becoming a wasteland. In saying “I am disturbed,” Mandela gives a glimpse of the 
emotional investment in the South African enterprise, which was being greatly threatened. At this 
point, Mandela gives the impression of making the shift from identifying with the Blacks and other 
oppressed people, to identifying with the entire South Africa – both Blacks and whites. 
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Mandela’s Flexibility and Performative Leadership 
Mandela’s intervention exemplifies Wayne Booth’s concept of assent, which argues that 
to resolve dissents and produce assent, people have to be ready to cross the lines of division. 
Mandela’s flexibility, despite his consistency on matters that required him to be so, has been 
largely misconstrued. According to Booth, “[t]his flexibility – not to say venality - can be made to 
look like a very serious fault, but it can be turned into a serious resource especially in a time when 
“everyone believes” that “there are no shared values any more” (xiii).  Booth argues that human 
engagement should go beyond just changing the minds of others, but it should extend to 
discovering good reasons to warrant assent.  
It is assent that enables conflicting parties to break down the lines of division, which keep 
people apart particularly when maintaining the lines of division does more harm than good to the 
general populace. To avoid rigid positions in conflict, Booth describes rhetoric as a way of 
“discovering together, in discourse, new levels of truth (or at least agreement) that neither side 
suspected before” (11). Therefore, despite the fact that Mandela had supported ANC’s resort to 
violent resistance, he recognized the role of incommensurability as the major cause for the 
cataclysmic situation plaguing South Africa. For example, Mandela argues for co-operative assent 
in the following words: “The most crucial task which will face the government and the ANC will 
be achieved only if both parties are willing to compromise…the move I have taken provided you 
with the opportunity to overcome the current deadlock and to normalize the country’s political 
situation” (“Now is the Time to Intensify the Struggle,” 18). Mandela’s role as a peacemaker and 
mediator coalesces the Western and African rhetorical traditions on more than one level. In other 
words, he exemplifies Booth’s idea of co-operative assent, Burke’s concept of transcendence and 
consubstantiation, and the African concept of the griot or imbongi both as a peacemaker and 
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defender of communal cohesion. Thus, the need to rise above rigid standpoints was paramount in 
order to bring about lasting solutions to the pressing problems of violence and poverty.  
Mandela’s attitude towards incommensurability is in synch with Lawrence Prelli’s 
argument that incommensurability is an insoluble problem when “linguistic, methodological, and 
valuational conflict or confusion” (296) are subjected to the concepts of mathematical meaning. 
As a result, “[i]ncommensurate communication is the failure of discussions to address the same 
situated ambiguities so that they, in effect, argue at cross purposes” (Prelli, 294). Mandela’s 
awareness that violence in South Africa had the possibility of escalating, should the channels of 
communication remain closed in deadlock, is a testament to the role of the father of the nation that 
he had begun to assume. The role he undertakes to break the deadlock is significant particularly 
because he spearheaded the arm struggle, and he was also a victim of apartheid violence  
The situation in South Africa can be likened to what Randy Harris described as “Brick-
wall incommensurability [that] labels situations in which communication is hopelessly stymied, 
where each party can only hear gibberish when the other speaks” (Introduction, 22). The 
implications of allowing the carnage that was decimating the country are captured in Mandela’s 
description of his suffering people. The violence had attendant economic and health ramifications 
for the poor, majority of whom were Blacks. Consequently, Mandela took upon himself the 
responsibility of addressing this incommensurability between the ANC and the apartheid 
government. According to Prelli, incommensurability can be resolved when the questioning of 
classical stasis doctrine is applied (299). Stasis questions such as – “Is it?” “What is it?” “Of what 
sort is it?” and “Is action required?” had to be taken into consideration in the South African context. 
Not only does Mandela address these questions, he even describes the actions that are required for 
a peaceful resolution.  
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Mandela’s willingness to put his integrity at stake, in order to subordinate his interest to 
that of the general good, gives credence to his leadership role and ethos. Although Mandela 
chooses to go solo in initiating talks with the government, the ethos that constitutes his African 
ontology is visible at all times. This African ethos is made manifest in the African rhetorical 
tradition of subordinating the individual to the communal good. For example, Mandela says in his 
letter to the government that “I must further point out that the question of my release from prison 
is not an issue, at least not at this stage of the discussion, and I am certainly not asking to be freed. 
But I do hope that the government will, as soon as possible, give me the opportunity from my 
present quarters to sound the views of my colleagues inside and outside the country on the this 
move. Only if this initiative is formally endorsed by the ANC will it have any significance” (“The 
ANC and the Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political Settlement,” 10). This 
quote is significant because while Mandela is being accused of having comprised his ethos as a 
result of his singular move, he is subordinating himself to the ANC as a collective body.  
The seeming doubleness of individual action that is separate from the collective whole but 
in consonance with the collective ANC agenda depicts the African rhetorical mode of persuasion 
as an imbongi. Mandela’s strategy is captured by Smith who argues that rhetoric for the African 
cannot be divorced from every day life. According to Smith, discourse cannot be removed from 
“the mutual compatibility of the entire traditional world view” (15). In this worldview, speech 
form and content must act harmoniously together in a logical link to the society. Therefore, the 
individual is not singular in a typical African society. According to Smith, this aspect of the African 
society will appear “rigid and constricting to most Western peoples, but, in reality, in customary 
African society, the possibilities are plentiful” (15). The possibilities are reflected in the confidence 
that gives a certain level of security to the individual to act within certain moral codes. This security 
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places pressure on the individual to be accountable on a communal scale because injury to one can 
be viewed as injury to all. The communal is a trope that is constantly deployed by Mandela, 
sometimes covertly.  
Mandela’s deployment of the African communal trope is visible in the following words: 
“far from responding to that call [of renouncing the South African Communist Party before there 
can be negotiation], my intervention is influenced by purely domestic issues, by the civil strife and 
ruin into which the country is now sliding. I am disturbed, as many other South African no doubt 
are” (“The ANC and the Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political Settlement,” 
10). Mandela’s words validate Smith’s argument that African rhetorical modes perform functions 
within the community. These functions are particularly significant in “instances of conflict or 
disagreement among members of the society [where] public discourse must function to restore the 
stability that conflict creates” (Smith, 16). It can be argued that in performing his ethos, Mandela 
aims to bring some harmony into the South African chaos. This argument holds sway if it is 
examined from the way Mandela reiterates his reason for initiating the peace move.  
The risk of being accused of selling out his party, by acting alone, may have deterred 
someone more selfish or cowardly. The fact that he acted before seeking the approval of his party 
makes Mandela appear presumptuous. But he chose to risk his reputation for the greater good. 
Such a self-sacrificing mindset makes Mandela’s ethos particularly exemplary. Scholars like 
Bonner describe Mandela as possessing characteristics that are “antithetical qualities of flexibility 
and intransigence” and question his “consistency and his impetuosity” (30). Such seeming 
contradictions give the impression that Mandela cannot be trusted. For example, “Mandela’s 
initiative to ditch passive resistance and move to armed struggle” (Bonner, 30) represents one of 
the several occasions when a volte-face is portrayed. Rather than see Mandela as inconsistent or 
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inherently contradictory, the actions in question should be viewed as contingency of leadership. 
For example, his actions actually evince a solid determination to use every necessary means to 
bring about the liberation of his subjugated people.  
His role as freedom fighter can be likened to the readiness of a father to do anything 
necessary in order to provide food for a dearly loved family. Mandela captures this exigency in 
the following words:  
At the outset, I must point out that I make this move without consultation with the 
ANC. I am a loyal and disciplined member of the ANC. My political loyalty is owed 
primarily, if not exclusively, to this organization and particularly to our Lusaka 
headquarters, where the official leadership is stationed and from where our affairs are 
directed. In the normal course of events, I would put my views to the organization first, 
and if these views were accepted, the organization would then decide on who were the 
best qualified members to handle the matter on its behalf and on exactly when to make 
the move (“The ANC and the Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective 
Political Settlement,” 9).   
The need to act now depicts Beale’s idea of a kairotic ontology, whereby rhetoric’s return 
as philosophy occurs in a linear progression of a deep rhetoric emanating from its humanism. 
Therefore, Mandela’s preoccupation with practical matters such as the near collapse of his country 
has produced a form of deep rhetoric that transcends the individual self.  
Mandela’s kairotic being is captured in the following words: “[b]ut in the current 
circumstances, I cannot follow this course, and this is the only reason why I am acting on my own 
initiative, in the hope that the organization will, in due course, endorse my action. I must stress 
that no prisoner, irrespective of his status or influence, can conduct negotiations of this nature from 
prison. In our special situation, negotiation on political matters is literally a matter of life and death, 
which requires to be handled by the organization itself through its appointed representatives 
(Mandela, “The ANC and the Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political 
Settlement,” 9). The Kairotic ontology embodied by Mandela came at a high prize. His tactical 
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manoeuvrings were emblematic of a rhetorical kairos, whereby he recognized an opportune 
moment that must be seized upon to bring about a favourable outcome. By saying that “in the 
current circumstances, I cannot follow this course, and this is the only reason why I am acting on 
my own initiative, in the hope that the organization will, in due course, endorse my action,” (“The 
ANC and the Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political Settlement,” 9) Mandela 
articulated the risk he was taking, which implied that a rigid stance at such a point would have 
been more detrimental than a badly needed flexibility.  
Bonner’s description of Mandela’s purported impetuosity requires interrogation. The 
contextual complexities in the South African polity must be considered when analyzing Mandela’s 
words and actions. According to Bonner, “[f]or long periods of his life, his political thinking and 
attitudes would remain unchanged, but he could also suddenly lurch forward or away from his 
established principles to adopt an entirely new political philosophy and persona” (30). Bonner’s 
depiction of Mandela’s unpredictability creates an impression of being a chameleon. However, 
Mandela’s purported chameleonic disposition evokes a self-preservation, which propels the 
chameleon to kairotically change its colour in order to merge with the surrounding flora. The 
constantly changing policies and tactics of the apartheid government made the political terrain an 
ever-shifting sand. Mandela took pains to explain that to remain rigid and unchanging in the face 
of such policy flux would have been tantamount to suicide.  
There is a need to differentiate between consistency and rigidity and to interrogate 
flexibility apart from integrity in order to avoid conflating the deeper implications of these 
concepts. Rigidity can be a flaw in conflict because various actions are often in a flux, and a 
pragmatic leader knows to move according to the dictates of such complexities. For example, 
Chinua Achebe captured the manner in which rigidity can be a tragic flaw in his novel Things Fall 
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Apart. Achebe’s major protagonist Okonkwo was a man of honour, but he was rigid in his 
opposition against the colonialists, who had infiltrated his community and were tearing his people 
apart. Okonkwo’s failure to be flexible and pragmatic in his approaches led to his downfall. The 
very act of suicide on Okonkwo’s part implied that he could not be buried properly; consequently, 
his body was thrown into the evil forest. In essence, in death, Okonkwo became the victim of the 
culture he tried to preserve with such rigidity while alive. Mandela’s flexibility enabled him to 
straddle his African culture, through which he was nurtured, and the Western culture, to which he 
owed his training as a lawyer and which oppressed him as a Black man. 
 Mandela’s flexibility is demonstrated on several accounts, yet his motivation remained 
consistent with the cause of the struggle. Mandela’s motivations are made manifest on every rigid 
stance he had once taken and chosen to rescind. He goes to great lengths to explain the necessity 
of acting alone in his letter to the government, where he calls for negotiations. But at the same 
time, he reiterates the main crux of the anti-apartheid movement, which remained non-negotiable. 
Mandela made the non-negotiable issues clear and they remained so. Issues like “votes for all, 
decent wages for all, end pass laws, end minority white domination” (Mandela, The Struggle, 103) 
formed the basis for the exigent actions that made Mandela appear inconsistent.  
Mandela’s so-called inconsistency appears to be multilayered; and while this chapter 
examines the various levels on which he shifts ground or changes course, the manner in which 
these changes occur buttress Mandela’s constancy and fidelity to the anti-apartheid cause. One of 
the issues on which Mandela changed his stance was the move to include people of other races and 
philosophies in the anti-apartheid movement. This move was kairotic, and it had a logical reason, 
which turned out to be beneficial to the cause of the struggle. The kairotic nature of the inclusion 
of others into the movement is captured by Mandela in the following words:  
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The democratic struggle in South Africa is conducted by an alliance of various classes 
and political groupings…all participate in the struggle against racial inequality and for 
full democratic rights. It was this alliance that launched the National Day of Protest on 
26 June 1950. It was this alliance that unleashed the campaign for the Defiance of 
Unjust Laws on 26 June 1952. It is this same alliance that produced the Freedom 
Charter. In this alliance the democratic movement has the rudiments of a dynamic and 
militant mass movement and, provided the movement exploits the initial advantages 
on it side at the present moment, immense opportunities exist for the winning of the 
demands in the Charter within our lifetime (The Struggle, 55-56). 
 Mandela’s deployment of repetition in the above quote is instrumental in showing the 
kairotic nature of his flexibility and the benefits accruing from it. He also employs repetition for 
playing the role of being the memory of the people like a typical imbongi whose persuasiveness is 
dependent on the ethos of their historical knowledge. In essence, the Freedom Charter that was 
produced in 1956 is drawn upon by Mandela to remind the people of the achievements of the 
alliance in the past and its potential for the future as a way of subverting those who called his ethos 
into question. Therefore, as with every shift that Mandela made, the reasons for such shifts were 
either directly related to or indirectly impacted by the indignities of racism or the injustices of 
apartheid policies.  
It can then be argued that Mandela’s supposed inconsistency reflects his flexibility on an 
inflexible matter of the anti-apartheid cause. Mandela’s single-mindedness of purpose makes him 
rigid when necessary and flexible when presented with a superior argument. His initial exclusion 
of communists and other races was informed by the idea of homogeneity among Black South 
Africans and the belief that Blacks were peculiar in their oppression. Much as such facts were real, 
other facts existed as well. The point being made here is that there existed a racial pyramid, which 
had the white supremacists at the top. At the bottom of this pyramid were Blacks. However, there 
were others in the spectrum who did not belong at the top, whether Black or white, and who were 
needed to further swell the number of those at the bottom of the pyramid. That is because politics 
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is a game of numbers, and it was absolutely important to isolate the white supremacists at the top. 
The isolation of the whites was made manifest at Kliptown where the Freedom Charter was 
promulgated and adopted. The Freedom Charter was a collaborative enactment, which was 
captured in the following words: “[t]he Congress of the People took place at Kliptown, a 
multiracial village on a scrap of a veld a few miles southwest of Johannesburg on two clear, sunny 
days, June 25 and 26, 1955. More than three thousand delegates braved police intimidation to 
assemble and approve the final document. They came by car, bus, truck, and foot. Although the 
overwhelming number of delegates were Black, there were more than three hundred Indians, two 
hundred Coloureds, and one hundred whites” (Mandela, Long Walk, 172-173). The decision to 
include ‘others’ in the anti-apartheid fight was pivotal in taking the fight to a new level, which 
gave a greater leverage to the ANC, even though the decision produced a fracture within the Black 
populace.  
Despite the danger of rupturing the fabric of unity within the ANC, the struggle was greater 
than any individual or group. Therefore, rather than destroy the ANC, there was a reverse effect. 
According to Mandela, “[t]he view of the ANC was that every person above the age of seventeen 
years, irrespective of the political views he might have, was entitled to become a member of the 
ANC” (The Struggle, 91). This inclusion brought a new lease of life to the ANC, but also tore the 
Black community apart. The power to fragment Blacks and turn them against one another was a 
strategy that the apartheid regime employed quite often. Though Mandela had supported the 
exclusion of the Communists initially, he changed his mind for exigent reasons. Mandela’s attitude 
reflects Booth’s idea that: “[w]hen I assent to your thought (or symphony or novel or account of 
your divorce) the line between us grows dim; in the ideal case, it in a sense disappears, and it is 
not surprising that many theologians and rhetoricians have echoed Newman’s effort to build a 
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grammar of assent and Kenneth Burke’s to build a grammar, rhetoric, and symbolic of 
identification” (xvi). It is significant to note that Mandela’s identification with the sufferings of 
Black South Africans motivated his strong inclination to assent to the inclusion of communists for 
the greater good. 
It can be argued that the inclusion of non-Blacks and Communists into the anti-apartheid 
movement served a political purpose, and it was a decision that worked to the advantage of the 
struggle. However, this decision rankled a lot of other Black South Africans and split up the Black 
community. This split gave birth to PAC (Pan Africanist Congress). The manifesto presented by 
PAC was called “government of the Africans, by the Africans, and for the Africans” (Mandela, 
Long Walk, 227). This division among Blacks can be described as a clog in the wheel of the 
struggle, and it became a powerful tool in the hands of the apartheid government. Such 
fragmentation was used to undermine the ANC as Mandela captured in the following words:  
Because of the PAC’s anticommunism, they became the darlings of the Western press 
and the American State Department, which hailed its birth as a dagger to the heart of 
the African left. Even the National Party saw a potential ally in the PAC: they viewed 
the PAC as mirroring their anticommunism and supporting their views on separate 
development. The Nationalists also rejected interracial cooperation, and both the 
National Party and the American State Department saw fit to exaggerate the size and 
importance of the new organization for their own end (Long Walk, 229).  
This divisive strategy connects strongly with Fanon’s argument that anti-colonial 
movements have many pitfalls, and Mandela and the ANC were determined to avoid such pitfalls. 
Such pitfalls arise because the colonialist “tries with success to revive tribal feuds, using agent 
provocateurs and practising what might be called counter-subversion. Colonialism will use two 
types of natives to gain its ends; and the first of these are the traditional collaborators – chiefs, 
caids, and witch-doctors” (Fanon, Wretched, 109). Though the apartheid government exploited the 
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cleavage among Blacks and complicated things for the ANC, attempts to deflect attention from 
the main agenda of the anti-apartheid movement remained unsuccessful.  
Fanon describes the strategies that the colonizer employs to destabilize the opposition 
movement as unpredictable. According to Fanon, “[a]t opportune moments, he combines his policy 
of brutal repression with spectacular gestures of friendship, manoeuvres calculated to sow 
division” (108-109). Such ploys remained unsuccessful in the anti-apartheid struggle because the 
cleavages that the apartheid government sought to exploit were born out of emotions, which 
emanated from personal interests of opposing Black leaders. The main reason that the apartheid 
ploys could not derail the momentum was because the general interest has the potential to always 
triumph over personal interest in a struggle such as the anti-apartheid movement.  
To support this point, Mandela argued that “[m]any of those who cast their lot with the 
PAC did so out of personal grudges or disappointments and were not thinking of the advancement 
of the struggle, but of their own feelings of jealousy or revenge. I have always believed that to be 
a freedom fighter, one must suppress many of the personal feelings that make one feel like a 
separate individual rather than part of a mass movement” (Long Walk, 228). How does this 
argument support Mandela’s decision to act unilaterally on several occasions? It can be argued 
that Mandela’s tendency to act alone contradicts his argument. At the same time, Mandela’s 
unilateral actions may have served to depict his consubstantiation with the country. To be 
consubstantial would imply that he was personifying the communal trope that aims for 
cohesiveness in a conflicted society.  
On a transcendental level, it can be argued that Mandela starts to incubate the troubled 
country whose birth into a nation he helps to enact after his release from prison. To support this 
point, Mandela further argues that “[o]ne is fighting for the liberation of millions of people, not 
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the glory of one individual. I am not suggesting that a man become a robot and rid himself of all 
personal feelings and motivations. But in the same way that a freedom fighter subordinates his 
own family to the family of the people, he must subordinate his own individual feelings to the 
movement” (Long Walk, 228). In exploiting the communal trope once again, Mandela 
demonstrates the extent to which he was willing to subordinate his individuality to the collective 
aim. The evocation of the collective ideal is significant because it is a technique that serves to 
neutralize the divisive strategy of the regime.  By sacrificing everything he held dear, Mandela’s 
performative ethos is made manifests amidst the many questions that trail his unilateral actions.  
Mandela claims that the disgruntlement of PAC members stemmed from “their objection 
to the Freedom Charter and the presence of Whites and Indians in the Congress Alliance 
leadership. They were opposed to interracial cooperation, in large part because they believed that 
white Communists and Indians had come to dominate the ANC” (Mandela, Long Walk, 228). 
Through his choice of words, Mandela sets up an antithesis between the ANC leaders and PAC 
members as a way of showing that the fear of the “other” was as prevalent among Blacks as their 
white oppressors. To reiterate this point, Mandela declares in a speech at a rally in Durban on 
February 25, 1990 that, “I personally believe that here in South Africa, with all of our diversities 
of colour and race, we will show the world a new pattern of democracy…To do this we must 
eliminate all forms of factionalism and regionalism” (“We are Committed to Building a Single 
Nation in Our Country,” 34). The antithesis is effective because it demonstrates that what the ANC 
has done in embracing everyone is an embodiment of what Bhabha describes as hybridity, which 
is a variation of diversity or multiplicity. Bhabha describes hybridity as “the name for the strategic 
reversal of the process of domination through disavowal (that is, the production of discriminatory 
identities that secure the ‘pure’ and original identity of authority)” (112). In essence, hybridity 
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deals the deathblow to complicit rhetoric, colonial segregation, and homogenous nationalism (a 
romantic and non-feasible idea), which aims to subdue diversity. 
To Bhabha, the homogeneity of the colonial discourse can only be disavowed through 
hybridity (112). PAC inadvertently favoured a homogeneity that supported the apartheid ideas of 
racial segregation. Paul Gilroy questions PAC’s concept of nationalism as he re-examines the 
concept of nationality and the desire for absolutism, exclusivity, and separateness that nationalism 
evokes in the discourse of race and ethnic identity. Gilroy interrogates such closed ideas of 
nationalism because the complexity of the various hierarchical formations within white and Black 
communities make homogeneity impossible. According to Gilroy, “[t]he essential trademark of 
cultural insiderism, which also supplies the key to its popularity, is an absolute sense of ethnic 
difference. This is maximized so that it distinguishes people from one another and at the same time 
acquires an incontestable priority over all other dimensions of their social and historical 
experience, cultures, and identities” (3). The way Mandela’s rhetoric depicts PAC’s 
discontentment with ANC’s inclusive policy connects with Gilroy’s description of “insiderism,” 
which is resistant to the accommodation of those who are considered to be “outsiders.” Mandela, 
on the other hand, redefines the concept of “insiderism” and African Nationalism through 
completely different modalities. 
 
Mandela’s Pragmatic and Diplomatic Strategies 
Some of the modalities richly deployed by Mandela are diplomacy and pragmatism that 
permeate his discourse. Using these strategies, Mandela creates the space for accommodating 
people of differing views. For example, despite his mistrust of PAC, he courted their friendship 
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while in prison in order to attempt to forge a united front with them against apartheid. According 
to Mandela: “I was keen to talk with Sobukwe and the others, most of whom were PAC, because 
I thought that in prison we might forge a unity that we could not on the outside. Prison conditions 
have a way of tempering polemics, and making individuals see more what unites them than what 
divides them” (Long Walk, 335). In essence, Mandela’s “keenness to talk” with PAC members can 
be described as an embodiment of the communal trope he has often deployed, which is also a 
portrayal of a typical imbongi who acts as a bridge builder in conflict. Mandela’s role of always 
initiating talks with those who were opposed to him echoes Fanon’s argument that “[t]he individual 
stands aside in favour of the community” (Wretched, 90). Mandela’s braided rhetoric is most 
discernible in his communal trope, which is drawn from the African rhetorical tradition and the 
way he bends the Western rhetorical tradition to his purpose. The braided rhetoric is deployed at a 
deeper level than merely an identification with the people. Despite suffering greatly, he was able 
to master his emotions, remain pragmatic, and deploy diplomatic language in handling difficult 
matters. This rhetorical strategy that enabled him negotiate the murky waters of apartheid’s fluid 
legislations in order to expose their malignant nature will be explored further in the next chapter.  
His pragmatism and diplomatic strategy are demonstrated through his ability to view issues 
from different perspectives, while maintaining his objectivity and commitment to the anti-
apartheid cause is evidence of Mandela’s doggedness. Mandela displayed this pragmatism in 
dealing with the PAC. For example, he says that, “I found the views and behaviour of the PAC 
immature. A philosopher once said that something is odd if a person is not liberal when he is young 
and conservative when he is old. I am not a conservative, but one matures and regards some of the 
views of one’s youth as undeveloped and callow” (Mandela, Long Walk, 228-229). Mandela’s 
antithesis of “young” versus “old,” “liberal” versus “conservative,” and “mature” versus “callow” 
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symbolizes the identification that enhances his flexibility and pragmatism. The ability to connect 
with human weaknesses on more than one level constitutes part of his rhetorical appeal. It is also 
another reason why he will appear weak to people of more rigid standpoints. The antithesis 
presents a panoramic view of human nature. Rather than dismiss PAC’s belligerence as a dividing 
point, he uses their attitude as a yardstick for reflecting on and judging his views as a young man.  
This identification is captured in the following words: “[w]hile I sympathized with the 
views of the Africanists and once shared many of them, I believed that the freedom struggle 
required one to make compromises and accept the kind of discipline that one resisted as a younger, 
more impulsive man” (Mandela, Long Walk, 228-229). Mandela’s discourse in this quote accounts 
for his diplomacy in extending the olive branch to the PAC officials. In addition, his articulation 
and appreciation of the fears of the white minorities, which made them reluctant to share power, 
demonstrates his objectivity. The rhetoric of diplomacy is embedded in etiquette; yet it has not 
succeeded in eliminating conflicts, and this makes diplomacy an evolving process. Diplomacy is 
closely related to what John Yule describes as linguistic politeness or the positive face, whereby a 
particular language use removes the assumption of social power. A face-saving act that emphasises 
a person’s positive face captures a speaker’s attempts to form solidarity with an interlocutor. By 
so doing, attention is drawn to a common problem and goal in a manner that implies, “let’s do this 
together...; [y]ou and I have the same problem” (Yule, 134). Yule’s ideas connect to Burke’s 
concept of identification, which is significant for effective diplomacy.  
Despite engaging in armed struggled, the importance of diplomacy is not lost on Mandela, 
who connects strongly with the Prussian general Karl con Clausewitz’s classic work On War. 
According to Mandela, “Clausewitz’s central thesis, that war was a continuation of diplomacy by 
other means, dovetailed with my own instincts” (Long Walk, 277). Mandela’s deployment of 
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diplomacy is not restricted to any race or class.  His diplomatic manoeuvrings and identification 
are rooted in his consubstantiality, which Burke describes as “either explicit or implicit” 
(Language, 21). According to Burke, “for substance, in the old philosophies, was an act; and a 
way of life is an acting-together; and in acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, 
images, ideas, attitudes that make them consubstantial” (Burke, Language, 21). Going by Burke’s 
ideas, Mandela is subsumed in the freedom movement and suffers for and with all the oppressed 
people of South Africa.  
 When Mandela says that the struggle is my life, the identification and consubstantiation 
he embodies is enacted in words and actions. His performative ethos implies that he subsumes 
himself in a cause that is bigger than himself. Mandela’s self-sacrificing life of deprivation, near-
death experiences, and long incarceration exemplifies a Christ-like redemption. He demonstrates 
that self-sacrifice is required of anyone who is entrusted with the position of leadership. However, 
some leaders have exploited their positions for personal gain. Such leaders end up causing more 
harm to the oppressed people they claim to represent than good.  
Mandela identified the different types of leaders at the rally in Durban after his release 
from prison in the following words: “Not only in Natal, but all through the country, there have 
been chiefs who have been good and honest leaders, who have piloted their people through the 
dark days of our oppression with skill. These are the chiefs who have looked after the interest of 
their people. We salute these traditional leaders. But there have been many bad chiefs who have 
profited from apartheid and who have increased the burden on their people. We denounce this 
misuse of office in the strongest terms” (“We are Committed to Building a Single Nation in Our 
Country,”34). Mandela deploys epideictic rhetoric, yet again, in this quote by blaming some and 
praising others based on their roles in the “dark days”.  
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The antithesis of “good and honest leaders” versus “bad chiefs” evokes the Biblical image 
of the relationship between good and bad shepherds and their sheep who need guidance. On the 
one hand, the good leaders piloted their people through the dark days of [their] oppression with 
skill and on the other, many bad chiefs profited from apartheid and increased the burden of their 
people. The metaphors he deploys make the selfishness of such bad leaders particularly 
reprehensible because some other leaders (like Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Walter Sisulu, etc.) were 
being hunted down and either killed or incarcerated. Despite the strong language employed to 
describe and denounce corrupt leaders, Mandela’s diplomatic rhetoric always left wriggle room 
within which to extend a hand of reconciliation to them.  
He plays the fatherly role of reprimanding bad leaders on the one hand and calling them 
back to the fold on the other, in a truly African way. His performative ethos is captured in the 
following words: “There are also chiefs who collaborated with the system, but who have since 
seen the error of their ways. We commend their change of heart. Chiefly office is not something 
that history has given to certain individuals to use or abuse as they see fit. Like all forms of 
leadership, it places specific responsibilities on its holders. As Luthuli, himself a chief, put it, “a 
chief is primarily a servant of the people. He is the voice of his people” (Mandela, “We are 
Committed to Building a Single Nation in Our Country,” 34). Part of Mandela’s ethos is intricately 
tied to the boldness required to make such distinctions among the leaders of Black South Africans 
and call them out accordingly.  
Although Mandela can be identified with the leaders who were basically more concerned 
with the interest of their people, leaders who used and abused their office for self-gratification do 
not represent anything new. Fanon describes such self-serving leaders in the following words: 
“Rich people are no longer respectable people; they are nothing more than flesh-eating animals, 
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jackals, and vultures, which wallow in the people’s blood” (Wretched, 153). Such leaders 
successfully lead their people astray because they have mastered the act of identification in a way 
that is highly persuasive and misleading. Juan Vives gives an insight to the various deployments 
of rhetoric and to how easily rhetoric can be perverted. Therefore, the persuasive power of a leader 
cannot be separated from the ethos they embody; otherwise, there is a danger of creating monsters 
out of leaders.  
Vives, like most humanist educators, reinforces the necessity for an orator to have good 
virtues, probity, and prudence. That is because an orator’s speech has consequences that can be far 
reaching. Therefore, a leader must demonstrate that their ethos is integral to their rhetoric because 
“if we hand over the means of speaking eloquently to people who lack such virtues, we will not 
really make them orators, but will put arms in the hands of madmen” (Cicero, 86). It is dangerous 
when people with a high mental acuity acquire eloquence without seeking its moral depths and 
limits. Such people use it to attain positions of importance and exploit it to accumulate wealth and 
honours in order to become tyrannical. When such people have attained power, they put a bridle 
on eloquence because “this activity of ours, frightened by the threat of arms, suddenly [falls] silent 
and [ceases]” (Vives, 88). A tyrant who has obtained power by eloquence perceives eloquence as 
a threat to that power. Consequently, free speeches and opinions become prohibited, and only 
speeches composed to flatter the powerful are allowed.    
The bad leaders among Black South Africans, who used opportunistic rhetoric to divide 
the people, were largely responsible for the implosion that occurred within the Black communities 
and further complicated an already bad situation. The implosion embodies the unleashing of 
violence by Blacks against other Blacks. Mandela decried this implosion in the following words: 
“[w]e are therefore disturbed that there are certain elements amongst those who claim to support 
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the liberation struggle who use violence against our people. The hijacking and setting alight of 
vehicles and the harassment of innocent people are criminal acts that have no place in our struggle. 
We condemn that” (“The Masses of Our People are Making History,” 24). Mandela’s pragmatism 
and diplomacy are reflected in the way he employs condemnatory language to condemn those he 
refers to as criminals and calls them to repentance at the same time.  
This strategy is consistent with the fatherly role he had begun to play through his 
intervention, conciliation, and negotiation. But the “criminal acts” had produced an implosion 
within the African communities that posed a threat to the fatherly role of bringing cohesion within 
the community. Fanon theorizes this implosion as the internalization of the violence that the 
colonized have experienced because “[f]rom birth it is clear to him that this narrow world, strewn 
with prohibitions, can only be called into question by absolute violence” (Wretched, 31). In 
essence, where violence rules, might become right; consequently, law and order break down. In 
his paper “Contextual knowledge management in discourse production: A CDA perspective,” 
Teun van Dijk examines the relationship between social power and discourse in order to reveal the 
manner in which power is enacted, concealed, expressed, described, or legitimised in text and talk 
within a social context. 
 Political leaders deploy ideologies, which exploit social cognition to form a link between 
the social power of classes, groups, and institutions at a deeper level of discourse to dominate their 
trusting followers. Social power can be claimed to belong within the relationships that occur 
among groups or classes, whereby hegemony produces an unequal power relationship. In an 
attempt to explain why the economically disadvantaged subject themselves to exploitation in a 
hierarchy of social power, social theorists have used ideology, hegemony, and discourse as 
matrixes to account for the connection between societal construction of knowledge and the 
141 
 
maintenance of unjustifiable power relations. Marxist concept of ideology has proved fruitful for 
describing how the dominant ideas within a society reflect the interest of the economic ruling class. 
Dijk argues that Antonio Gramsci further elucidates Marxist’s ideology theory by using hegemony 
to demonstrate how capitalist societies construct and perpetuate class hierarchies. These 
hierarchies are entrenched for dominance. Dijk argues that such hierarchies enact a form of power 
abuse that acts as a legally or morally illegitimate exercise of control over others, and this control 
often results in social inequality. He also posits that social power and dominance are often 
organized and institutionalized, thereby allowing for more effective control. However, such 
dominance is rarely absolute but is often gradual and may be met by resistance or a counter-power 
by dominated groups.  
The power of dominant groups may be enacted in laws, rules, habits, norms or even a 
consensus and these constitute hegemony, and such hegemonies can be seen in class domination, 
sexism, or racism. The consequent implosion Mandela had to deal with was a psychological 
phenomenon with catastrophic consequences. Therefore, such a complex situation required 
pragmatism, kairotic flexibility, and diplomacy on Mandela’s part because the trauma caused by 
the violence that accompanies colonial oppression leaves indelible scars. Consequently, the 
oppressed people are equally galvanized by violence in order to fight against that oppression. 
Fanon described the implosion engendered by such violence as a source of trauma, which in turn 
produces a sensitivity that indicates that violence is always bubbling beneath the surface. 
According to Fanon, “The settler-native relationship is a mass relationship. The settler pits brute 
force against the weight of numbers. He is an exhibitionist. His preoccupation with security makes 
him remind the native out loud that there, he alone is master. The settler keeps alive in the native 
an anger, which he deprives of an outlet; the native is trapped in the tight links of the chains of 
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colonialism. But we have seen that inwardly, the settler can only achieve a pseudo petrification” 
(Wretched, 43). The efforts to deprive the colonized an outlet for their frustration is a futile one. 
Unfortunately, when the dam breaks, those in direct reception of the violence may not be the 
settlers. 
The internal wrangling caused by the pent-up frustration can be as catastrophic as the 
brutality caused by the colonialists, which was evident in the South African situation. Fanon 
describes the futility of trying to force the colonized to swallow their frustration in the following 
words:  
The native’s muscular tension finds outlet regularly in bloodthirsty explosions – in 
tribal warfare, in feuds between sects, and in quarrels between individuals. Where 
individuals are concerned, a positive negation of common sense is evident. While the 
settler or the policeman has the right… to strike the native, to insult him and to make 
him crawl to them, you will see the native reaching for his knife at the slightest hostile 
or aggressive glance cast on him by another native; for the last resort of the native is 
to defend his personality vis-à-vis his brother. (Wretched, 43).  
The oppressed express their fury in ways that are depicted as hostility, aggressiveness, or 
sensitivity by the colonizer. Fanon argues that these psychological states are indeed the creation 
of the colonizer. This sensitivity is a symptom of the colonial brutality, yet the sensitivity is 
rhetorically constructed as depicting the essence of the Black man. The implication of such 
rhetorical construction is a projected absence that aims to show that the Black man lacks morality 
and self-control. Mandela called attention to the damage, which such an implosion had done to the 
Black communities as cohesive unites as well as the negative image it gave to the Black race and 
the entire struggle. Mandela says that “[w]e condemn, in the strongest terms, the use of violence 
as a way of settling differences amongst our people. Great anger and violence can never build a 
nation. The apartheid regime uses this strife as a pretext for further oppression” ((“We are 
Committed to Building a Single Nation in Our Country,” 36). Mandela captured the manner in 
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which the use of violence among Blacks was evidence of a crack in their unity, which was 
tantamount to loading the guns for the enemy, who used such strife as a pretext for further 
oppression. The implosion that Mandela and Fanon describe is fictionally captured by J. M, 
Coetzee in Waiting. According to Coetzee, the occupation army wreaked a lot of harm on the 
people, and the discontent among the people produced a similar implosion as was evident in 
apartheid South Africa.  
The psychological damage caused by state sponsored brutality and injustice leaves a 
festering wound. And if such wounds are not healed, they will haunt the society for a long time.   
The cause and effect of a state sponsored violence produced a rupture within the moral fabric of 
the society, and that rupture propelled Mandela to call out the bad leaders in very harsh tones. 
Mandela’s performative ethos is made manifest in the way that the violence within Black 
communities broke his heart, and he used every opportunity to call them to unite. Mandela 
describes apartheid as: “[A] deadly cancer in our midst, setting house against house and eating 
away at the precious ties that bind us together. This strife amongst ourselves wastes our energy 
and destroys our unity. My message to those of you involved in this battle of brother against brother 
is this: take your guns, your knives, and your pangas [machetes], and throw them into the sea. 
Close down the death factories. End this war now! [emphasis in the original]” (Mandela, (“We are 
Committed to Building a Single Nation in Our Country,”31). The language used to denounce the 
internal strife validated Mandela’s role as the imbongi and showcased his braided rhetoric. The 
braided nature of his rhetoric is evident in his deployment of his usual communal trope as well as 
his listing of “your guns, your knives, and your pangas.” The listing depicts how Mandela swings 
from one language and rhetorical tradition to another. The metaphor of the “death factories” is 
reminiscent of Nazi holocaust as a way of portraying the devastation of the implosion.  Mandela’s 
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description of the implosion caused by apartheid as “a deadly cancer in our midst” projected an 
image of morbidity that had the power to destroy the Black communities faster than the apartheid 
oppression.  
In addition, Mandela recognized apartheid as the major force behind this inter-tribal 
violence. His communal trope that condemned how the communal rupture was “setting house 
against house and eating away at the precious ties that bind us together” is a significant aspect of 
the African rhetorical tradition. This description of “house against house” echoes Chinua Achebe’s 
Things Fall Apart. Mandela is, however, the antithesis of Achebe’s protagonist, Okonkwo. 
Okonkwo’s rigidity constituted his tragic flaw, while Mandela’s misunderstood flexibility was an 
important part of his rhetorical appeal.  
 
Mandela’s Feminist Sensibilities  
It is important to examine Mandela’s feminist sensibilities because the role of women in 
conflict cannot be underestimated as he evinces. Mandela’s recognition of that fact added punch 
to his political rhetoric and depicted another form of shift.  The paradigm shift regarding the issue 
of gender inequality is further evidence of his flexibility, and it acts as a window into the pathos 
he has the ability to evoke. The manner in which the subordination of women was enacted in Black 
culture and within apartheid South Africa brought to the fore Mandela’s ingrained sense of justice 
and fairness. This flexibility on Mandela’s part can be described as something that occurs at a more 
conscious level, which also serves to deconstruct an idea he had internalized at an unconscious 
level. At an unconscious level, Mandela had accepted the subordination of women because that 
was the normal practice in his traditional society.  For example, Mandela states that “[t]he 
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foundation of self-government was that all men were free to voice their opinions, and equal in their 
value as citizens. (Women, I am afraid, were deemed second-class citizens.)” (Long Walk, 21). 
Mandela’s reference to the subordination of women shows what Burke refers to as an attitudinal 
shift that is first articulated in speech before the performative enactment. 
The attitudinal shift toward gender equality can be ascribed to Mandela’s connectedness to 
the subordination of Blacks in racialized South Africa. The point being made here is that at the 
bottom of the racial hierarchy, gender is redefined, and the female gender is doubly subjugated. 
Oyeronke Oyewumi argues that “African women suffered a “double colonization:” one form from 
European domination and the other from indigenous tradition imposed by African men” (340). 
Everyone, regardless of their gender, is subjugated, and every member of the populace is important 
in the fight against apartheid. According to Oyewumi, the colonial situation was a gendered one 
and the hierarchy fourfold, not two; with “beginning at the top, men (European), women 
(European), native (African men), and Other (African women). Native women occupied the 
residual and unspecified category of the Other” (340). Mandela’s paradigm shift proceeds from 
his recognition of this fourfold subjugation of women particularly in conflict. He empathizes with 
women because, having experienced oppression by the racist apartheid regime, a conscious 
awareness of female oppression is created.  
Mandela’s keen awareness that any form of discrimination, be it racial or gender, will 
ultimately result in injustice and oppression contributes towards his performative ethos. Mandela’s 
accommodation of women within his expanded paradigm indicates the extent to which he had 
come to identify with them. His feminine sensibility was particularly significant because “African 
females were colonized by Europeans as African and as African women…They were dominated, 
exploited, and inferiorized as Africans together with African men and then separately inferiorized 
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and marginalized as African women” (Oyewumi, 340). Within the apartheid hierarchy, Black men 
and women are commonly inferiorized and subjugated, and this commonality creates a bond that 
proves useful for the anti-apartheid movement. Mandela recognized and seized the opportunity, 
which he deployed to an advantage. Mandela’s empathy for the suffering women had to endure by 
the national and inter-ethnic conflicts reflects his fatherly role. This empathy showed his humanity, 
humility, and appreciation of the significance of everyone in conflict management.  
Mandela’s recognition of women’s contribution to the anti-apartheid movement is 
remarkable. This is because most nationalist leaders have been accused of using women to achieve 
their aims and thereafter, dumping them when it came time to reap the benefits of the nationalist 
movement. Anne McClintock claims that “[a]ll Nationalisms are gendered; all are invented; and 
all are dangerous” (89). McClintock argues that “[e]ven Fanon, who at other moments knew better, 
writes: ‘The look that the native turns on the settler town is a look of lust… to sit at the settler’s 
table, to sleep in the settler’s bed, with his wife if possible’” (89). McClintock takes exception to 
Fanon’s narrow view of the contested space. Thus, “[f]or Fanon, both colonizer and colonized are 
here unthinkingly male, and the Manichean agon of decolonization is waged over the territoriality 
of female, domestic space” (McClintock, 90). Fanon’s view notwithstanding, women have been 
implicated in nationalism as active participants in national struggles, but “[m]ilitarization and the 
centralization of authority in a country automatically entail a resurgence of the authority of the 
father” (McClintock, 93). McClintock further argues that “[w]omen are typically constructed as 
symbolic bearers of the nation but are denied any direct relation to national agency” (90). The fact 
is that women were often used to actively engage the colonialist in military combat; however, they 
did not get to enjoy the gains of victory.  
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The metaphor of the doors of tradition getting slammed in women’s faces indicates that 
women were treated as tools to be used and afterwards dumped under the guise of tradition 
(McClintock, 110). In a pure nationalist revolution, both women and men should be empowered 
to decide which traditions are outmoded, which should be transformed, and which should be 
preserved. The argument of male nationalists, which claims that colonialism or capitalism has been 
women’s ruin with patriarchy merely a nasty second cousin destined to wither away when the real 
villain expires, has been disproved in independent nations as McClintock, Ann Laura Stoter, and 
Oyeronke Oyewumi have argued. The question then is – was Mandela merely paying lip service 
to feminism as a maidservant to nationalism or did he truly make a radical shift with regards to his 
former masculinist beliefs?   
The extent to which post-apartheid South Africa addressed issues of gender equality needs 
to be examined further, but within the scope of this project, gender roles are interrogated to reveal 
the extent to which they help to reinforce Mandela’s performative ethos. However, when Mandela 
says that “I pay tribute to the mothers and wives and sisters of our nation. You are the rock-hard 
foundation of our struggle. Apartheid has inflicted more pain on you than on anyone else” (“Now 
is the Time” 29), he is expressing the way women have suffered double colonization under 
apartheid; and therefore, he connects his pain to theirs. Mandela personally suffered alongside his 
wife, mother, daughters, and sisters. His wife, Winnie was hounded far more than most other 
females by virtue of her position as his spouse as well as the active role she played in the struggle.  
By applauding the women for their courageous role in the struggle, it can be argued that 
Mandela was connecting the women’s role to his communal trope within a new platform of female 
empowerment for the future. To support this argument, on assumption of office in 1994, Mandela 
sets up Women’s Day on August 9, 1994 to celebrate the women who fought to end apartheid. On 
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Women’s Day on August 9, 1996, Mandela gave a speech where he outlined some of his measures 
to promote equality between men and women like the ratification of The Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the promulgation of The 
Commission on Gender Equality. He also declared that “as long as women are bound by poverty 
and as long as they are looked down upon, human rights will lack substance” (“Women’s Day, 
Pretoria, 9 August, 1996”). It can also be argued that women were rewarded for their suffering in 
Mandela’s government, based on the positions they occupied. 
The fact is that even though the death toll is usually higher among the male gender in war 
situations than the female gender, women and children bear the brunt of the carnage caused by 
conflicts. Consequently, Mandela exhorts the women of Natal, the Black community worst hit by 
intra-Black violence, to rise up to the occasion in order to take control and stem the tide of violence. 
Mandela says: “[i]t is thus vital that we end the conflict in Natal, and end it now. Everyone must 
commit themselves to peace. Women of Natal, in the past and at crucial moments, you have shown 
greater wisdom than your menfolk. It was you who, in 1929 and again in 1959, identified and 
struck out at one of the roots of our oppression. You launched powerful campaigns around beer 
halls” (“We are Committed to Building a Single Nation in Our Country,” 37). Is Mandela 
indicating that women had the potential to pull down the apartheid regime as they had succeeded 
in fighting against social vices like alcohol abuse? Applauding the wisdom women had displayed 
in dealing with social problems in the society sets up a new social order. 
For example, Mandela says that “[w]omen such as Dorothy Nyembe, Gladys Manzi, and 
Ruth Shabane showed sharpness of mind by closing down the beer hall when the men were 
rendered useless by alcohol and families were being broken up. I hope that the women will again 
stand up and put their shoulders to the wheel together with the community to end the strife and 
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violence.” ((“We are Committed to Building a Single Nation in Our Country,” 37). Feminists must 
have applauded Mandela’s speech because he appeared to be raising women above men and 
upturning the existing social and cultural gender order. What Mandela actually does is a rhetorical 
move where he amplifies a past event as a means of drawing attention to a present situation in need 
of redress. Is Mandela playing one gender against another? Mandela deconstructs patriarchy by 
boldly calling out those he views as acting unwisely, and in this case, it is the Black men who have 
forgotten who their common enemy is. It can then be argued that Mandela celebrates the “immense 
strength” alluded to by Helen Cixious, which in itself would be a boost to his performative ethos.  
According to Cixious, “[m]en have committed the greatest crime against women. Insidiously, 
violently, they have led them to hate women, to be their own enemies, to mobilize their immense 
strength against themselves, to be the executants of their virile needs” (“The Laugh of the Medusa” 
in The Rhetorical Tradition, 1234). Can Mandela be accused of mobilizing this “immense 
strength” of women against men in his speech? 
 If that is the case, it can be argued that Mandela employed Kairos, yet again, as the 
occasion demanded. If Mandela pits women against men by turning the patriarchal premise on its 
head; he does so in keeping with his consistent ability to do whatever is necessary to advance the 
cause of the struggle. The point being made here is that patriarchy has been entrenched on the 
premise that the female gender is cognitively inferior to the male gender. But Mandela is here 
claiming that women have disproved this premise, particularly in a crisis situation. Mandela does 
something unique in the following words:  
I call on the women of Natal. Each and every one of you must play your part! I charge 
you with a special responsibility here today. It is you, in your wisdom now, who must 
begin the work of bringing peace to Natal. Tell your sons, your brothers, and your 
husbands, that you want peace and security. It is you who must show them the real 
enemy. All women know of mass poverty and homelessness, of children dying from 
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diseases caused by hunger, poverty, and repression. We must therefore end the strife 
and the fighting and the misunderstanding in the community so that we defeat our 
common enemy, the apartheid regime. Open the cooking pots and ask them why there 
is so little food inside. When the rains come into your homes, place the hands of your 
men in pools on the floor, and ask them: “Why?” When your child ails, and you have 
no money to take it to the doctor, ask them: “Why?” There is only one answer, and the 
answer is our common deprivation. Go out and meet the women of the other side. Their 
story is the same. Then take your men with you.  I want to hear from you. From each 
and every community, I want a report. I want to hear the story of how you made the 
peace. We place our trust in you. Viva our mother! Viva our sisters! Viva the women 
of our land! ((“We are Committed to Building a Single Nation in Our Country,”38).   
In upholding the important roles that women have played in the past, Mandela places a 
significant responsibility upon the shoulders of the Black women who demonstrated the essential 
bravery needed at that moment. Mandela depicts a picture of women who have agency in a way 
that is contrary to previous patriarchal portrayals of female weakness and subservience. These 
depictions that construct women as being preoccupied with the safety of their children and homes 
are traditional and longstanding. Such preoccupations tend to give women the moral authority to 
call upon others to do good. Mandela remodels these active roles as a tool for leadership and 
freedom fighting. In connecting the women with the land, Mandela’s communal trope and braided 
rhetoric is deployed to indicate that the liberation of the land is dependent on the agency of the 
women in light of the failure on the part of men. Mandela may have clothed his revolutionary ideas 
about women in traditional-sounding invocations; however, the post-revolution roles of women 
need to exceed the conservative duties of moral and educational authority in the home, care of 
men/children, and the maintenance of anticolonial ethnic identities and traditions to embrace 
political roles that are independent of those gendered roles.   
For these gendered roles to be reconstructed, female agency must be recognized and 
encouraged. Mandela says, “Tell your sons, your brothers, and your husbands, that you want peace 
and security. It is you who must show them the real enemy” (“We are Committed to Building a 
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Single Nation in Our Country,” 38). This exhortation was significant because he creates this binary 
picture of female wisdom versus the folly of their menfolk. The inability of the menfolk to 
appreciate the divisive tactics of the “real enemy” fostered a toxic environment of in-fighting, 
insecurity, and lack of peace. We get a sense that the women named in Mandela’s speech and the 
actions described that had the power to bring a business like the sale of liquor to its knees were 
quite significant. The fact that such actions were publicly applauded in his speech showed that 
Mandela’s motives in the struggle extended beyond the liberation of Black South Africans. Such 
a public stamp of approval upon the women’s actions indicated an interest in the survival and 
cohesiveness of the African communities at the physical, financial, and psychological levels. In 
essence, the general activities in the public space make a huge impact on the domestic front, and 
the domestic space constitutes the bedrock of a strong community.  
The manner in which the domestic front can impact events in the public space is captured 
in Mandela’s speech as a ploy to make the men more accountable for the catastrophic conditions 
their families were forced to live in. Mandela evoked some new psychodynamics in calling upon 
women to make the domestic front impactful upon the public domain. This new order is far 
removed from the political configuration of his childhood whereby women neither had a say in 
nor had much of an impact on the male dominated political sphere. The power of women to change 
the political trajectory of the struggle was captured by one of the key leaders of the ANC in the 
following words: “[w]hen the women begin to take an active part in the struggle, no power on 
earth can stop us from achieving freedom in our lifetime” (Mandela, Long Walk, 220). The image 
conjured here is reminiscent of women’s capacity to muster their immense strength to build or 
destroy as Cixious argued.  
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It is pertinent to ask the following question – was Mandela’s rhetoric and feminist 
sensibilities an exploitation of the knowledge of female strength akin to a Machiavellian 
manipulation? Unlike Machiavelli, Mandela’s performative ethos was wrapped up in empathy and 
conciliation. It can be argued that Mandela was not interested in weakening the strong. The anti-
apartheid struggle was a movement that aimed to create equality for all. This equality would not 
suddenly make the poor rich or make the rich poor, but it would, instead, create equal opportunities 
for everyone regardless of race, gender, or creed. The terms under which to enthrone the equality 
sought in this struggle are clearly spelt out in the Freedom Charter such as equal pay for equal 
work for men and women as well as maternity leave on full pay for all working mothers. Therefore, 
Mandela’s flexibility in constructing a new rhetoric around gender roles can be described as a part 
of his kairotic ontology that stems from a strong desire to do whatever is exigent to minimize the 
suffering of the people, who have already suffered too much.  
 
Identification as an Integral Part of Mandela’s Ethos 
Although the apartheid regime made deliberate attempts to damage Mandela’s life and 
reputation, his empathetic side enabled him to identify with whites. For example, Mandela says 
that “[a] number of obstacles to the creation of a non-racial democratic South Africa remain and 
need to be tackled. The fears of whites about their rights and place in a South Africa they do not 
control exclusively are an obstacle we must understand and address” (“The Masses of Our People 
are Making History,” 28). Mandela’s appreciation of the fear that drove apartheid violence is a 
sign of both his flexibility and his performative ethos. Mandela’s empathy caused him to seek 
conciliation through the positive face. The idea of recognizing a person’s positive face informed 
Mandela’s show of sympathy towards the white minority, who were afraid of being dominated by 
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the numerical strength of the Black population. Mandela appreciated the fact that this fear was 
valid and could only be overcome through justice and equality. Considering the pain that the 
apartheid regime of racism had caused him, he was able to recognize that ‘fear’ was a strong 
enough emotion to complicate the idea of white supremacy. The manner in which a white 
superiority complex can be complicated by fear can best be appreciated in systemic racism. The 
brutality that emanates from fear-induced acts can be extreme.  
This extreme enacts a disconnect that accounts for how the psychodynamics of racism 
produces a cycle. This cycle causes the oppressor and the oppressed to become solidly trapped 
within essentialism, to the extent that both groups live in mutual fear of each other.  Consequently, 
apartheid laws that aimed to put Blacks in their place were inhuman. This inhumanity was decried 
by General Smuts, who was a white Nationalist himself, as “a crazy concept, born of prejudice and 
fear” (Mandela, Long Walk, 112). Despite this warning by one of their own, the white minority 
failed to recognize how deeply entrenched this fear had become. Mandela empathizes with the 
whites who harbour this fear. He says that “[w]e would like to assure our white brothers and sisters 
in this country that they have nothing to fear” (“We Must Organize the Masses of Our People into 
the Struggle,” 44). Mandela was aware that this fear had caused whites to be unyielding and 
unwilling to share power. They were afraid of losing their privilege position, of being outnumbered 
and dominated, and of possible retaliatory policies.  
Mandela argued that the demand of the ANC for every South African to determine their 
fate through a policy of “one person, one vote” would ensure racial peace and harmony in the 
country. He further reasoned that: “[b]ut we are conscious of the fact that Whites are honestly 
worried that this demand may result in the domination of whites by blacks. We want to assure 
them that we, the African National Congress, are prepared to examine this fear. Because, although 
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it is mistaken, we believe that it is genuine. And we will do everything in our power, together with 
the National Party, to ensure that the whites do not fear a future democratic South Africa” 
(Mandela, “We Must Organize the Masses of Our People into the Struggle,” 45). Mandela’s 
performative ethos was particularly appealing because his words in the above quote re-echoed his 
famous speech in 1964 before his final sentencing and long incarceration. 
By addressing the concerns of white South Africans, Mandela’s rhetoric gains a different 
flavour. His identification and empathy depict a leadership style that begins to shift more 
decisively from that of a freedom fighter to that of a statesman. Mandela was not dismissive of the 
fears white South Africans had of being dominated; rather, he made it known that any form of 
domination of one race by another went against the principles he stood for. For example, in his 
famous speech from the dock, “An Ideal for which I am Prepared to Die,” Mandela argues that 
“we want equal political rights, because without them our disabilities will be permanent. I know 
this sounds revolutionary to the whites in this country, because the majority of voters will be 
Africans. This makes the white man fear democracy. But this fear cannot be allowed to stand in 
the way of the only solution which will guarantee racial harmony and freedom for all” (“An 
Ideal…”). The psychodynamics behind apartheid had always been used by Mandela to illuminate 
the root cause of a complex problem. His reference to this fear at every opportunity seemed like 
an effort to make excuses for the oppressors; however, this reference is deployed to force a self-
examination that no one can escape from.  
The fear of equality had long been wrapped in layers of falsehood and machinations, which 
were exemplified in racist policies. According to Mandela, “[i]t is not true that the enfranchisement 
of all will result in racial domination. Political division, based on colour, is entirely artificial and, 
when it disappears, so will the domination of one colour group by another. The ANC has spent 
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half a century fighting against racialism. When it triumphs as it certainly must, it will not change 
that policy…” (“An Ideal…”). Mandela’s appreciation of the problem that the Afrikaner’s fear of 
racial equality had created for South Africans did not mean he would embrace the position of a 
second-class citizen. That recognition enabled him see the struggle as a psychological war that 
must be won. His resilience in the face of danger is captured in the following words: “During my 
lifetime, I have dedicated my life to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white 
domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic 
and free society in which all persons will live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It 
is an ideal for which I hope to live for and to see realised. But, My Lord, if it needs be, it is an 
ideal for which I am prepared to die” (Mandela, “An Ideal”). Mandela’s preparedness to die for 
the ideal is responsible for his refusal to accept a conditional release from jail.  
This refusal of a conditional release was proof of his transcendental ethos, which was 
firmly rooted in his strong identification with his people. The employment of identification by 
Mandela is multilayered. At the surface level, his language reinforced his identification with the 
people by the way he referred to them, using the terms of ownership. On a deeper level, he suffered 
with them, in the sense that their pain was his pain. This phenomenon is quite common among 
leaders because, as Kenneth Burke argues, “[w]hen you are with Athenians, it’s easy to praise 
Athenians, but not when you are with Lacedaemonians” (A Rhetoric, 55). In as much as Mandela’s 
identification was articulated linguistically through his continual reference to his fellow Blacks as 
“my people”, “my brothers”, and “sisters’, he performed this identification through various 
actions. These actions were as persuasive as his actual words.  
Mandela’s actions proved that he was prepared to suffer the same fate as his fellow Black 
South Africans. Burke argues that “[y]ou persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language 
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by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his” (A 
Rhetoric, 55). Mandela made himself consubstantial with his people in their suffering in several 
ways. For example, in prison, racism was enacted through various methods, and one of them was 
through the “rhetoric of clothing” whereby short pants were given to Black prisoners. Clothes were 
used to differentiate races. According to Mandela, “[a]partheid’s regulations extended even to 
clothing. All of us, except Kathy, received short trousers, an insubstantial jersey, and a canvas 
jacket. Kathy, the one Indian among us, was given long trousers. Normally, Africans would receive 
sandals made from car tires, but in this instance, we were given shoes. Kathy, alone, received 
socks. Short trousers for Africans were meant to remind us that we were “boys.” I put on the 
trousers that day, but I vowed that I would not put up with them for long” (Long Walk, 383). When 
Mandela protested against the different treatment of prisoners according to their races, whereby 
Black prisoners were subjected to poorer diet and clothes, he was put in solitary confinement. 
Solitary confinement served to erode the identification Mandela performed all through the 
struggle.  
Mandela sought to foster communion and camaraderie with his fellow Blacks in prison in 
consonance with his communal trope. Though hating the humiliation of being poorly clothed and 
fed, “he readily reconciles himself to sharing the indignity of shorts and the deprivation of cold 
mealie pap” (Schalkwyk, 56) than to be separated from his fellow oppressed prisoners. 
Consequently, “[wh]en he is offered long trousers at the beginning of his second term on Robben 
Island, he refuses the offer unless everyone is offered a pair” (Schalkwyk, 56). Mandela’s 
performative ethos is demonstrated as a totality of being. In essence, his physical and 
psychological survival was important for the struggle. Mandela says that the condition in the 
“[p]rison is designed to break one’s spirit and destroy one’s resolve…the authorities attempt to 
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exploit every weakness, demolish every initiative, negate all signs of individuality – all with the 
idea of stamping out that spark that makes each of us human and each of us who we are” (Long 
Walk, 390).  The desire to crush the spirit of the opposition was the motivation behind solitary 
confinement.  
The psychological torture of solitary confinement was described to vividly capture the 
imagination. According to Mandela, “[a]fter a time in solitary, I relished the company even of the 
insects in my cell and found myself on the verge of initiating conversations with a cockroach” 
(Long Walk, 334). In essence, the leaders were targeted for physical and psychological 
dehumanization. This dehumanization was extended to anyone regardless of race who dared to 
oppose the apartheid regime. For example, Ruth First, who was a journalist, a communist, and a 
staunch supporter of the ANC, was a white woman. She was detained under the 90 days law, which 
had the power to detain anyone without charge or trial. First describes apartheid’s terrorist tactics 
of intimidation as operating through various trajectories. First’s attempt to “focus the world’s 
attention on the plight of the regime’s physical and mental torture machine” (First, 5) was avenged 
through several detentions and her ultimate assassination. First’s description of her detention 
echoes Mandela’s experience in the following words: “It was a technique based on a diabolically 
simple principle: assault the prisoner’s only companion in an isolation cell – the mind” (First, 5). 
What would make one group of people subject their fellow human beings to such cruel treatment? 
To attempt an answer to this question, it is pertinent to understand the metaphor often 
employed in racism. Fanon argued that the Black race was referred to in zoological terms. In 
essence, Blacks were not regarded to be human. According to Sartre in Fanon’s Wretched, “since 
none may enslave, rob, or kill his fellow-man without committing a crime, they lay down the 
principle that the native is not one of our fellow-men” (13). Therefore, if Blacks were not regarded 
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as human, then whites have already created a psychological distance that made the dehumanization 
of Blacks a natural sequence. The metaphor that enables such a poor treatment of Blacks requires 
severe interrogation, considering that no one who is psychologically stable goes out of their way 
to inflict violence on innocent animals. The metaphor employed for describing Blacks is similar 
to Hitler’s description of Jews. Hitler referred to Jews as vermin, pests, and parasite. Pests and 
parasites are naturally destroyed to preserve the life of the host. 
Using such metaphors to describe the Jews gained for Hitler the people’s support. 
Consequently, those Jews and other races, who had no service to render, were slaughtered in the 
holocaust. In the case of Blacks in South Africa, they still had some usefulness. They served as 
cheap labour, but they were not entitled to the same standard of life enjoyed by whites. Therefore, 
Blacks were viewed as beasts of burdens who could be used to till a white farmer’s land without 
adequate compensation. Blacks were treated as some hybrid creature who is half-human, half-
animal. When these so-called creatures began to agitate for human rights, there seemed to be a 
disconnect that the white minority could not handle. Mandela suffered the same inhuman treatment 
at the hands of the apartheid government as his fellow Blacks, and he joined his suffering with 
theirs, rather than enjoy any form of token privilege.  
This chapter surmises that Mandela’s rhetorical appeal was deeply rooted in his 
performative ethos, which was demonstrated over the course of the freedom struggle. His ethos 
was not the absence of human flaws; instead, it was evidence that despite his flaws, he remained 
committed to the anti- apartheid movement regardless of the personal cost. His ability to rise above 
primordial sentiments, despite his painful experiences, was evidence of his statesmanship. His 
contact with people of different races and ideologies partly informed his braided rhetoric. 
Mandela’s ethos was transcendental particularly because he did not aim to mainly gain advantage 
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over his adversaries; rather, he exemplified dynamic leadership through moral superiority (Burke, 
A Rhetoric, 60). Mandela’s leadership role placed him in a very difficult position because the great 
responsibility placed on his shoulders predisposed him to making difficult choices.  
Critics have pointed out the contradictions that trailed Mandela’s choices during the 
struggle. However, Mandela draws attention to the complexities he had to deal with; therefore, 
“[a]s a leader, one must sometimes take actions that are unpopular, or whose results will not be 
known for years to come” (Mandela, Long Walk, 390). The ethos upon which Mandela’s rhetoric 
gained global appeal stemmed more from his ability to embody identification than from the gift of 
a rhetorical garb. As Burke argues, the various meanings associated with rhetoric have to be 
contextualized because “though these meanings are often not consistent with one another, or are 
even flatly at odds, we do believe that they can derived from “persuasion” as the “Edenic” term 
from which they have all “Babylonically” split, while “persuasion” in turn involves 
communication by the signs of consubstantiality, an appeal in identification” (A Rhetoric, 61-62).  
Mandela’s identification was not constrained to any particular race or rhetorical tradition, but he 
displayed a unique rhetorical style that was eclectic as he appropriated different rhetorical and 
literary traditions. Mandela’s consistent fidelity to his ideals in prison and outside the walls of 
prison made him appealing to some and repelling to others. The flexibility he sometimes depicted, 
while being rigid at other times, meant that his rhetoric would often defy easy classification without 
undermining his ethos.  
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Chapter 4:  
Apartheid’s Legal Screens and Mandela’s Luminescence 
This chapter examines the legal framework of apartheid South Africa and how this 
framework was practically a racial subterfuge that was crafted to appear benign. The manner in 
which legal rhetoric was exploited in order to mask the racist ideologies of apartheid policies 
requires serious interrogation. The legal rhetoric was particularly complex because the racist 
ideologies were strongly embedded within the belief system of the Afrikaners. Therefore, it 
becomes difficult to draw the line between where the Afrikaners’ idea of self-preservation ends 
and the malignancy towards Blacks begins. In essence, the legal rhetoric with which the policies 
of apartheid were formulated amounted to screens for ideological baselines. According to 
Crapanzano, some laws were “blatantly discriminatory”, while others were covertly so. For 
example, “although no legislation specifically forbids integrated sports, most sports are in fact 
segregated” (xx). It can be argued that the apartheid government deflected attention from the overt 
discrimination their laws embodied, while the full range of the powers the policies constituted 
were evident in their implementation.  
To appreciate the implication of the unjust laws, it is instructive to see how such “policies 
are complemented by illegal pressures, threats, harassment, sabotage, and personal violence” 
(Crapanzano, xx) that were deployed for the enforcement of those policies. The manner in which 
the layers of moral disconnection enacted by white South Africans were justified using categories, 
images, and figures makes Mandela’s braided rhetoric particularly significant. Mandela’s overt 
rhetorical moves expose what Crapanzano describes as a classificatory system designed to legalize 
Blacks out of existence (20) and get the victims to take the blame.  This system employed various 
methods for suppressing Africans in ways that were often insidious and deceptive. 
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Of significant importance is Mandela’s nuanced rhetorical deployments of tropes similar 
to those used to justify apartheid policies in order to illuminate the implicit deceptions. The 
rhetorical strategies were effective because they brought into perspectives the moral bankruptcy 
behind the political and social structures of the apartheid regime. Mandela employed overt and 
covert methods for revealing what were deliberately concealed within apartheid policies that were 
instruments for oppressing Blacks. Mandela’s braided rhetoric effectively illuminated the 
injustices and inconsistencies entrenched within apartheid legal frameworks at every given 
opportunity. The policies in question were crafted to hide the racial prejudices of the regime, which 
resulted in the violation of basic human rights like freedom of speech, movement, and association. 
Kenneth Burke’s concept of “Terministic Screens” proves productive for theorizing the manner in 
which the apartheid government attempted to direct attention away from the unjust nature of their 
laws. 
Mandela’s speech “A Black Man in a white Court”, which was used in his first court 
defense from 15 October to 7 November, 1962 (when he was accused of two counts of inciting 
persons to strike illegally in the 1961 stay-at-home and for unlawfully leaving the country), 
captures the racist laws and unjust legal system in South Africa. He extracted symbols from the 
Western rhetorical tradition, juxtaposed with the narrative texture and tropes of the African 
rhetorical tradition, to portray how these laws continued to exploit the Western legal lexicon to 
keep Blacks dominated. In addition, A Long Walk to Freedom, his other writings, and speeches 
help to examine apartheid concealments and Mandela’s illuminating strategies in a way that 
symbolizes a rhetorical tug of war. To undertake this study, Mandela’s strategies will be examined 
under the following sub-headings: (1) Terministic Screens in the Apartheid Legal Framework; (2) 
Mandela’s Contextual Tropes; (3) Religious Rhetoric in Conflict Engagement; (4) Subverting 
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Apartheid Machiavellianism; (5) Mandela’s Narratives as a Legal Rhetorical Strategy; and (6) 
Illuminating Legal Racism in Civilization.  
 
Terministic Screens in the Apartheid Legal Framework 
Mandela’s braided rhetoric follows a trajectory, which intersects with his personal 
experiences for exposing apartheid equivocations. It is important to examine Mandela’s methods 
for exposing apartheid screens, which were intended to conceal racist motives. Burke describes 
“Terministic Screens” as a “selection of reality,” which function also as a deflection of reality 
(Language as Symbolic Action, 45). The idea of “selection of reality” or “deflection of reality” is 
compared to Pascal’s idea of “directing the intention” in his satire (Burke, Language, 45). This 
idea of directing the intention satirizes an act among the Jesuits whereby their actual intentions are 
masked in a subterfuge that is deliberately deceptive. According to Burke, Pascal describes a 
scenario whereby “[d] uelling was forbidden by the Church” (Language, 45), but in order to take 
part in a duel, the duellist came up with a clever plot.  
In this scenario, instead of intentionally going to take part in a duel, the duellist would 
merely go for a walk to the place where the duel was to be held. And they would carry guns merely 
as a precautionary means of self-protection in case they happened to meet an armed enemy. By so 
“directing the intention,” “they could have their duel without having transgressed the Church’s 
thou-shalt-not’s against duelling. For it was perfectly proper to go for a walk; and in case one 
encountered an enemy bent on murder, it was perfectly proper to protect oneself in self-defense” 
(Burke, Language, 45). Burke argues that the idea of directing the attention deploys terministic 
screens for such subterfuges. Terms such as ‘merely’ going for a walk and carrying a gun “merely” 
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for self-protection are used as excuses to undertake a well-conceived intention. The use of such 
terms as “merely” doing this or that connects to the apartheid policy of separateness as “merely” 
an intention to protect the whites against the “Black danger.”  
The idea of the so-called “Black danger” is deeply rooted in the racial consciousness of 
South African whites. At the unconscious level, the fear of the Black danger was to play a huge 
part in producing the moral disconnect behind apartheid laws and their implementation. For 
example, Dr. Malan, the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa in 1954, captured the 
psychodynamics behind the concept of the Black danger in the following words:  
It must be appreciated from the ousted that Apartheid, separation, segregation or 
differentiation - whatever the name given the traditional racial policy of South Africa 
– is part and parcel of the South African tradition as practiced since the first Dutch 
settlement at the Cape in 1652, and still supported by the large majority of white South 
Africans of the main political parties. The deep-rooted color consciousness of the 
White South Africans – a phenomenon quite beyond the comprehension of the 
uninformed – arises from the fundamental differences between the two groups, White 
and Black (Fiona Mclachlan quoting Dr. Malan, 95).  
Mclachlan examines the manipulation of colour difference as a phenomenon that goes 
beyond merely the physical manifestation of skin color to the contrast between two irreconcilable 
ways of life; between barbarism and civilization, between heathenism and Christianity, and finally 
between overwhelming numerical odds on the one hand and insignificant numbers on the other. In 
essence, Mclachlan undercuts Dr. Malan’s projection of racial difference as a given by arguing 
that such a projection was a manifestation of fear and long held beliefs. Racial difference was 
exploited at the psychosocial, spiritual, cultural, linguistic, and financial levels to keep the minority 
trapped in a moral prison. For example, Dr. Malan argues that “from the outset the European 
colonists were far out-numbered; there is no doubt that if they had succumbed to the temptation of 
assimilation, they would have been submerged in the Black heathendom of Africa as effectively 
as if they had been completely annihilated. Of necessity they had to arm and protect themselves 
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against this ever-growing menace, and how could it better be done than by throwing an 
impenetrable armor around themselves – armor of racial purity and self-preservation?” 
(Mclachlan, 95). Malan’s words were addressed to a group of Christian Reformed Church 
ministers in Grand Rapids, Michigan, who wanted to understand the situation in South Africa. 
Because these people were fellow whites like Dr. Malan, there was no need to conceal the racist 
bent of Apartheid policies from them.  
Basically, the apartheid regime presented a selection of reality to an audience they believed 
would be sympathetic to their sentiments, while deflecting attention from this racialized reality 
when addressing a different audience. Mandela depicted the “selection” and “deflection” of reality 
of apartheid policies by interrogating the motives behind those policies. His interrogation helped 
to expose the deeper semantic implications of the surface lexical structure of apartheid policies. 
The point being made here is that laws like the Groups Areas Act and the “Keystone of Apartheid: 
The Bantustan or “Homeland” Act of 1950 (Mclachlan, 76-77) were based on the idea of self-
governing homelands that let Blacks develop along their own lines. According to Mandela, 
“[p]olitically, the talk about self-government for the Reserves is a swindle. Economically, it is an 
absurdity” (The Struggle…81). Most significantly, the policies were crafted in a language that 
masked the intentions of racial subjugation.  
For example, the concept of development along their own lines in an independent 
homeland of the Bantustan Act appears beneficial, but the semantic implication of separate 
unequal development and deprivation is well concealed. That is because “once a homeland 
becomes “independent,” its “citizens” automatically lose their South African citizenship, whether 
they live in the homeland or not” (Mclachlan, 77). To buttress this point, Mandela declares that:  
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Dr. Verwoerd may deceive the simple-minded Nationalist voter with his talk of 
Bantustans, but he will not deceive anyone else, neither the African people, nor the 
great world beyond the borders of this country. We have heard such talks before, and 
we know what it means. Like everything else that has come from the Nationalist 
Government, it spells nothing but fresh hardships and suffering to the masses of the 
people. Behind the fine talk of ‘self-government’ is a sinister design (The 
Struggle…81).  
The deceptive nature of Dr. Verwoerd’s fine talk, apartheid oppressive policies, and the 
real meaning plus the implications of those policies formed the premise for Mandela’s move for 
recusal in “A Black Man in a white Court.” Apartheid deceptions depict how conflict makes 
terministic screens oscillate in very interesting ways. Burke’s description of how photographs are 
produced captures apartheid legal practices. Burke says that, “I have particularly in mind some 
photographs I once saw. There were different photographs of the same objects, the difference being 
that they were made with different colour filters. Here something so “factual” as a photograph 
revealed notable distinctions in texture, and even in form, depending upon which colour filter was 
used for the documentary description of the event recorded” (Burke, Language, 45). Mandela 
identified the polarity of Black versus white as the nexus around which the “colour filter” and 
screens of all apartheid policies revolve. These colour filters are depicted in Mandela’s move for 
recusal.  
 Mandela’s premise for recusal was based on the need to illuminate the strategies devised 
for concealing apartheid racist intent. His rhetoric underscores the ideas depicted in terministic 
screens as a means of interrogating apartheid modus operandi in judicial matters. The rhetorical 
questions Mandela employed in court were a rhetorical strategy prevalent in the Western and 
African rhetorical traditions he drew upon, and he used them for exposing apartheid racism. To 
defend his call for recusal, Mandela asks: “What is this rigid colour-bar in the administration of 
justice? Why is it that in this courtroom, I face a white magistrate, I am confronted by a white 
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prosecutor, and escorted into the dock by a white orderly? Can anyone honestly and seriously 
suggest that in this type of atmosphere, the scales of justice are evenly balanced?” (“A Black 
man”). Mandela’s rhetorical questions set the tone for unravelling the courtroom setting, which 
was the most obvious sign of racial inequality. 
Mandela’s questions deploy symbolism – as a rhetorical move to call attention to the 
“colour-bar” and the unbalanced “scales of justice” of the apartheid legal system. Lady Justice is 
the symbolic bedrock of the Western legal system, and Mandela’s evocation of this symbol is 
effective for throwing light upon apartheid injustice.  Mandela’s employment of this symbol is 
theorized by Burke, who describes (the generic) man as “the symbol-using animal” (Language, 2) 
and Charles Morris, who describes human beings as “the dominant sign-using animals” (17). 
Burke’s and Morris’s concepts depict the manner in which symbols and signs transcend the 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic levels of communication. For example, the “colour bar” and “scale 
of justice” are lexical forms, which operate at the syntagmatic level that evoke phenomena that are 
easily recognizable in apartheid legal systems. However, these lexical forms that are identifiable 
in apartheid policies and legal system affect the lives of Blacks at every level of existence in very 
deep ways. Mandela’s use of symbols reinforces how these levels of communication contextualize 
the exploitation of apartheid power dynamics.  
 Morris claims that “[h]uman civilization is dependent upon signs and systems of sign, and 
the human mind is inseparable from the functioning of signs – if indeed mentality is not to be 
identified with such functioning” (17). Therefore, if Western civilization is directly dependent on 
the symbol of Lady Justice, Morris’s perspectives on the usage of signs and symbols prove quite 
fruitful for explaining why Mandela’s deployment of this sign is rhetorically appealing. Morris’s 
ideas are critical because they encompass the triadic relation of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics 
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as a way of engaging with Mandela’s employment of various signs and symbols in his interrogation 
of apartheid injustice. According to Morris, “[t]hese three components in semiosis may be called, 
respectively, “the sign vehicle, the designatum, and the interpretant; the interpreter may be 
included as a fourth factor” (19). Burke and Morris’s preoccupation with human motives and 
interpretation connect strongly with Deirdre Wilson’s idea of intersecting the modular and 
inferential approaches to discourse interpretation. According to Wilson, this intersection whereby 
the Chomskyan and Gricean concepts of communication act together as cognitive systems, which 
help to explain how people use language in a certain manner under different circumstances. Based 
on Wilson’s argument, the interpreter draws upon the contextual information to determine “what 
direct speech act the speaker intended to perform” (1131). Therefore, Mandela’s audience can very 
easily capture the irony of Lady Justice. For Blacks, the irony is depicted in the metaphor of 
unbalanced scales, which represent injustice; and for his white audience, the irony represents an 
obvious double standard. 
Mandela’s symbolic reference to Lady Justice is significant because as Morris argued, the 
“sign of an object may, at one theoretical extreme, simply turn the interpreter of the sign upon the 
object, while at the other extreme it would allow the interpreter to take account of all the 
characteristics of the object in question in the absence of the object itself” (20). It can thus be 
argued that the absence of justice for Blacks in the apartheid legal system makes Mandela’s 
juxtaposition of the symbolic Lady Justice with the colour-bar particularly potent. The attributes 
of Lady Justice are embodied in the balanced scales, the sword, and the blindfold. These symbols 
of justice, which only produce justice in favour of whites, are used by Mandela to draw attention 
to an absence in presence.  
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 Mandela draws attention to the scales of justice in order to reveal how the apartheid legal 
system has betrayed their Western heritage. It is pertinent to connect Burke’s preoccupation with 
motives to Morris’s idea of taking “account of all the characteristics of the object” (20) to account 
for Mandela’s strategy of drawing attention to the scales of justice. The designatum described by 
Moriris is the symbol of Lady Justice; while the blindfold, the sword, and balanced scales represent 
the function of her office (which is supposed to produce colourblind justice). However, these 
symbols like the sword of justice have been perverted and wielded against Blacks. Mandela 
employed such symbols in the courtroom to effectively expose the apartheid judicial system as an 
aberration.  
 Mandela’s symbol usage draws his audience into an overarching inferencing whereby a 
conjuration of Lady Justice exposes the paradox this image evokes for Blacks. Mandela’s semiotic 
discourse operates in line with Saussure’s ideas of semiology, which identifies three types of signs 
that are classified by the relations that occur between signifier and signified (Vincent Leitch, 9). 
According to Leitch’s examination of Saussure: “With the index, the relationship is causal: dark 
clouds mean rain; smoke denotes fire; sobbing signifies sorrow. With the icon, the relation is one 
of resemblance: a portrait bust depicts a particular person. With the symbol (or sign proper), the 
relationship is arbitrary: nodding the head signifies “yes” [ireser] connotes “eraser.” Saussure 
focuses mostly on the sign (symbol) – on the arbitrary signifier and signified” (9). Mandela’s subtle 
evocation of Lady Justice uses the un/balanced scale to indicate that the index, which represents 
the relationship between the legal system and the process of producing justice, has failed as far as 
Blacks are concerned. Therefore, based on Saussure’s semiotic signification comprising of the 
index, icon, and symbol as well as Morris’s designatum, Mandela’s deployment of Lady Justice 
implies that the signifier – the symbol of Lady Justice and the signified – justice based on fairness, 
169 
 
equity, and equality have lost their meaning and rhetorical appeal. That is because apartheid has 
created a system whereby the scale of justice is no longer a synecdoche of fairness based on the 
ironic reality of Black experience.  
Mandela’s rhetorical questions also force the audience into a provocative introspection 
regarding the distortions enacted by the apartheid legal system. For example, the blindfold implies 
that justice ought to be fair and (colour) blind, but the rigid color bar indicates that apartheid itself 
and its legal system have negated the symbolic blindfold. Therefore, the color blindness necessary 
for justice has been metaphorically ripped off the image. As Mandela further explains, the racist 
laws portend a system that is riddled with prejudice, and that prejudice is the root of the injustices 
suffered by Blacks. This injustice accounts for his call for recusal because the prejudices already 
depict a blindfold to truth and fairness. Mandela’s evocation of the symbols of the Western legal 
system is highly rhetorical.  
Therefore, as long as Blacks in South Africa are denied their basic rights; (as enunciated 
by Western law), the blindfold of Lady Justice takes on an ironic symbolism. Thus, the South 
African Lady Justice is neither blind, nor are her scales balanced because the executors of the 
justice system that was operating under apartheid have been blinded by racism. This blindness 
creates a moral vacuum and a psychological disconnect that makes the government unable to 
appreciate the sufferings of Blacks. The laws of the apartheid regime represent legal positivism 
that Gordon Tullock describes as a law that “was simply what the state decreed, and morals were 
not involved” (4). Black South Africans, who have been placed at the bottom of the social pyramid 
created by apartheid, are subjected to severe hardship as Mandela shows using his narratives.  
Mandela’s legal rhetoric acts as a form of moral luminescence that is constructed to expose 
the inherent contradictions in apartheid policies, which serve to dehumanize people of colour. 
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Mandela exploits his Western legal training, which finds a counterpart in his deeply ingrained 
African roots, to ironically lay bare the deception of apartheid legal rhetoric. By exploiting the 
Western legal framework, Mandela symbolically holds up a rhetorical mirror that reflects back to 
the Afrikaners a distorted image of their legal heritage in a way that is compelling. Mandela’s 
deliberative rhetoric acts as the foundation upon which he braids tropes like irony, symbolism, and 
narratives as instruments for exposing the chimeric nature of apartheid policies. The first step taken 
by Mandela is to subject himself to a legal system through which he has been cruelly oppressed. 
Mandela subjects himself to the law for one significant purpose that is captured in the following 
words:  
I hope to be able to indicate…that this case is a trial of the aspirations of the African 
people, and because of that I thought it proper to conduct my own defense. I wanted 
to make it clear to the bench, the gallery, and the press that I intended to put the state 
on trial. I then made application for the recusal of the magistrate on the grounds that I 
did not consider myself morally bound to obey laws made by a Parliament in which I 
had no representation. Nor was it possible to receive a fair trial from a white judge 
(Long Walk, 326).   
It is quite important to see how Mandela’s subjection of himself to the law is ironically a 
subjection of the apartheid legal framework to the law of scrutiny. Jacques Derrida describes 
Mandela’s subjection of himself to the apartheid legal system – as a deliberate strategy employed 
to showcase the illegality of the Afrikaner Nationalist policies. This subjection becomes a powerful 
rhetorical move for showing Mandela as a man of the law, who is fighting against unjust laws. 
This move is presented by Rhetorician and Philosopher Phillipe – Joseph Salazar in his description 
of Mandela’s rhetoric as “implicit” without aspiring to present itself as a mastery of public 
speaking, which would invariably seem redolent of the old regime. In essence, Mandela’s 
rhetorical appeal is dependent on the subtlety that characterizes his language, which he employs 
to expose the deceptive and violent nature of apartheid laws.  
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Mandela’s Contextual Tropes  
The multilayered conflicts in South Africa created a contextual complexity that made 
Mandela’s braided rhetoric and discourse particularly interesting. The role of context in 
communication is significant, and it is particularly so in the examination of Mandela’s rhetoric. 
Context to Dijk is two-fold: macro and micro. The macro context refers to the historical, cultural, 
political, and social formations under which communication takes place while the micro context 
is concerned with the proximate circumstances and contact in which a speech event takes place. 
Dijk views the micro context as located in cognition. This location makes communication a mental 
event through which symbols regulate the structure of text production and comprehension that are 
conveyed in genre, topic, cohesion, speech act, style, imagery, and more.  
The cognition Dijk refers to is evident in the irony employed by Mandela to construct 
juxtaposed narratives drawn from various rhetorical traditions. Dijk’s ideas echo I. A. Richards’ 
concept that the “macroscopic scale” consists of how the different channels through which large 
parts of a discourse are communicated. Likewise, the “microscopic scale” is the employment of 
the theorems whereby units of meaning and their contextual connections are made (24). Richards 
therefore theorizes context as the fundamental basis for meaning making. Richards’s idea is an 
extension of psychological associations whereby a cluster of ideas, rather than a single image, 
serves as the “reference” for a discourse. Thus, “context” represents that set of associations through 
which experiences are expressed in words. Consequently, the South African complex 
political/social milieu conveys experiences through discourse with layered semantic implications. 
Therefore, Mandela’s strategies for drawing attention to apartheid screens enabled his audience to 
move from abstractions to concrete realities and vice versa. For example, Mandela uses narratives 
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that describe his homeland experiences, through which the African rhetorical tradition is made 
most visible, to make a contrast of the existence of Blacks in South African slums (by drawing on 
the Western rhetorical tradition) to illuminate the realities of apartheid racist policies, state 
brutalities, and racial inequalities.  
 Dijk examines the relationship between discourse and context to give an insight into the 
cognitive aspect of discourse production and comprehension, which requires vast amounts of 
shared knowledge of the participants. This shared knowledge is highly active in interactions. In 
addition, the shared knowledge and interactions give room for manipulations and power abuse in 
communication. Knowledge of the world and the experiences that are real to members of a 
community (be it cultural, economic, political, social or whatever it is that brings them into contact) 
are represented within the semantic components and social memory that are in turn stored in the 
episodic memory. Mandela exploits this knowledge to strategically communicate his illumination 
of apartheid deception to his local South African as well as the international audience. 
The interconnectivity of context and meaning makes Critical Discourse Analysis, 
henceforth referred to as CDA, supportive of Burke’s preoccupation with human motives as having 
significant ramifications in conflict. Dijk summarizes the main tenets of CDA as follows: (1) 
addressing social problems, (2) power relations are discursive, (3) discourse constitutes society 
and culture, (4) discourse does ideological work, (5) discourse is historical, (6) the link between 
text and society is mediated, (7) discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory, and (8) 
discourse is a form of social action (“Critical Discourse Analysis”, 2). The complex nature of the 
apartheid context makes Mandela’s tropes particularly engaging because these tropes are 
effectively used to put the apartheid oppressive system on display.  
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Mandela’s tropes and narratives are recognizable as performing important functions for his 
audience because of the shared experience of South African people of colour. The metaphors 
employed by Mandela exemplify Nietzsche’s idea that language is comprised of layers of 
metaphors because human beings think in metaphors. This human predilection to think in 
metaphors enables the capacity to dilute “concrete metaphors into a scheme by which pyramids 
are built up according to castes and classes, a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations, 
boundary determinations, which now stands opposite the other” (Nietzsche, 250). For example, in 
saying that “I feel oppressed by the atmosphere of white domination that lurks all around in this 
courtroom” (A Black man in a white court), Mandela uses metaphor to evoke an image of being 
caged and hunted by white domination. The imagery employed depicts the courtroom as a 
microcosm of the South African state where Mandela has been hunted by apartheid 
policies/brutality all through his life as a lawyer and freedom fighter. The imagery is discernible 
to both white and Black South Africans, but it is only experienced by Africans. In essence, 
Mandela is producing an expository performance for this multiple audiences through imagery.    
Mandela deploys war tropes to further illuminate how the apartheid government regarded 
the ANC leaders in the following words: “No worthy leaders of a freedom movement will ever 
submit to conditions which are essentially terms of surrender dictated by a victorious commander 
to a beaten enemy, and which are really intended to weaken the organization and to humiliate its 
leadership” (Mandela, “The ANC and the Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective 
Political Settlement,” 17).  Mandela’s tropes draw on various contexts that he situates within 
apartheid racial oppression. For example, he evokes war metaphors to reveal that war generals are 
usually strategic and do not jeopardize their causes for any reason. Mandela captures the need to 
remain focused in a war situation in the following words: 
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The existence of genuine democratic values among some of the country's whites in the 
judiciary, however slender they may be, is welcomed by me. But I have no illusions 
about the significance of this fact, healthy a sign as it might be. Such honest and upright 
whites are few and they have certainly not succeeded in convincing the vast majority 
of the rest of the white population that white supremacy leads to dangers and disaster. 
However, it would be a hopeless commandant who relied for his victories on the few 
soldiers in the enemy camp who sympathize with his cause. A competent general pins 
his faith on the superior striking power he commands and on the justness of his cause 
which he must pursue uncompromisingly to the bitter end (“A Black Man in a white 
Court”).  
The deployment of the war metaphor in the text “A Black Man…” indicates that Mandela 
is not swayed by the token support of some whites. Mandela argues that the few whites who are 
not in support of apartheid policies represent neither the views of the entire white populace nor the 
apartheid regime. Mandela sees the few whites who support the aspiration of Blacks as significant 
exceptions. This white support is significant because it depicts an active conscience on the part of 
some whites in the face of blatant injustice. However, such exceptions cannot achieve much in 
halting the oppressive activities of the government. Mandela deploys the war metaphor to draw 
attention to how the apartheid regime had practically declared war on all forms of opposition. 
Mandela describes the token support of a few white supporters in the following words:  
Some of our judicial officers have even openly criticized the policy which refuses to 
acknowledge that all men are born free and equal, and fearlessly condemned the denial 
of opportunities to our people. But such exceptions exist in spite of, not because of, 
the grotesque system of justice that has been built up in this country. These exceptions 
furnish yet another proof that even among the country's whites there are honest men 
whose sense of fairness and justice revolts against the cruelty perpetrated by their own 
white brothers to our people” (“A Black man in a White man’s Court”).  
Acknowledgment of white support was important because any form of support for the 
oppressed represent some victory. But, how does Mandela assess such support/victory? The need 
to gain support from the white community does not blind Mandela to the fact that tokenism aims 
to break the ranks of opposition without delivering any lasting gains. The ANC leaders make up 
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the competent general captured in the war metaphor, whose vigilance and doggedness are prized 
above the emotions that token support elicits. Hence, the war metaphor employed is very 
compelling. The reason that Mandela is not moved by the token support is because every conflict 
is a type of war, be it conflict of identity, wills, culture, or ideology, and the South African conflict 
that eventually degenerated into bloodshed was further complicated by racism as well as the 
struggle for land and resources.  
It is important to show how Mandela’s employment of contextual tropes was strategic 
because context was the foundation upon which his rhetoric hung.  In essence, to produce energeia 
through imagery, he lays a point and builds on that point for emphasis. The point being made here 
is that if “[a] competent general pins his faith on the superior striking power he commands and on 
the justness of his cause which he must pursue uncompromisingly to the bitter end” (Mandela, “A 
Black Man in a white Court”), the justness of the anti-apartheid cause must remain the main focus 
for the generals – the ANC leaders. Rather than be swayed by token support, Mandela’s 
employment of the war metaphor goes beyond the metaphorical because the cruelty suffered by 
South African people of color was not an abstraction. That is because Mandela was a war general 
in the anti-apartheid struggle both figuratively and in actuality. The “justness of the anti-apartheid 
cause” required him and the ANC leaders to fight on all fronts regardless of what the end would 
be. And in his case, the bitter end was 27years in prison and the death of thousands of people of 
color.  
Mandela’s plea for recusal depended heavily on phrases that were contextually symbolic. 
For example, “I entered the court that Monday morning wearing a traditional Xhosa leopard-skin 
kaross instead of a suit and tie. The crowd of supporters rose as one and with raised, clenched fists 
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shouted “Amandla” and “Ngawethu!” (Long Walk, 324-325). Interestingly, the employment of the 
symbolic by Mandela transcends language into the emblematic. He exploits the apartheid context 
to embody rhetoric of clothing in symbolism. For example, Mandela describes his employment of 
symbolism in the following words: “The kaross electrified the spectators, many of whom were 
friends and family, some of whom had come all the way from the Transkei. Winnie also wore a 
traditional beaded headdress and an ankle-length Xhosa skirt. I had chosen traditional dress to 
emphasize the symbolism that I was a black African walking into a white man’s court” (Long 
Walk, 324-325). Mandela’s braided rhetoric is made manifest in this court appearance where his 
African rhetoric symbolized through clothing is counterpoised with the Western rhetorical 
tradition symbolized by the apartheid legal system.  
Clothing in the African rhetorical tradition is used in a similar way that African talking 
drums and dance perform “deep-seated rhetorical functions” (Michael J. K. Bokor, 166) differently 
from how these cultural artefacts are deployed in the Western cultural contexts. Mandela employs 
clothing to validate Bokor’s argument that “the drum-dance enactment is a primal symbol that 
serves important rhetorical purposes – to influence the people’s psychosocial behaviour, to 
generate public awareness, and to prompt responses for the realization of personhood, and the 
formation of group identity in the various communities” (166). Although clothing and drums are 
not languages per say, they belong among the system of signs, symbols, and gestures used in 
communication. Bokor argues that certain socio-cultural milieu and rhetorical situations 
necessitate and validate the use of symbols like drums (and clothing for Mandela) for achieving 
rhetorical impact (168). It can be argued that both the African and Western rhetorical traditions 
deploy clothing as rhetorical strategies for different purposes. However, Mandela uses African 
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clothing to enact a contrast of African pride from the distorted image of African identity 
constructed by apartheid racism. 
In essence, Mandela is braiding a rhetoric whereby he combines the contrast he constructs 
and his knowledge of kairos with the shared knowledge he has of the symbolism of African 
clothing like the kaross. According to Mandela, “I was literally carrying on my back the history, 
culture, and heritage of my people. That day, I felt myself to be the embodiment of African 
nationalism, the inheritor of African’s difficult but noble past and her uncertain future. The kaross 
was also a sign of contempt for the niceties of white justice. I well knew the authorities would feel 
threatened by my kaross as so many whites feel threatened by the culture of Africa” (Long Walk, 
324-325). The rhetoric of clothing that Mandela exploited in court had a keen rhetorical effect, in 
the sense that the emotions that connect people to their culture can be powerful.  
The anticipated audience response become part of the rhetorical moment and Mandela 
builds that reaction into the power of the symbolism. This reaction helps to accentuate the contrast 
created by Mandela as he walks into the courtroom where he judges the morals of the white court 
system to be empty. This rhetorical strategy is effective as he appears regal in his decolonization, 
and he marshals the community behind him as a voice and as collective energy to depict Black 
numerical power. Mandela ‘s employment of symbolism and narratives in court can be likened to 
a psychological mirror. This mirror also acts as a moral searchlight, which is metaphorically turned 
upon the whites in order to expose their fears, biases, and self-contradictions.  
The apartheid regime sought to protect their culture and tradition, while destroying that of 
the Africans. The contextual symbolism of the kaross is captured aptly by Zolani Ngwane, who 
describes the costume as a visual inscription, which forms part of a set of symbols that coalesce 
on Mandela’s body that is derived from the world of his childhood (128).  The kaross, which serves 
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to sensationalize Mandela’s court appearance, is employed rhetorically to enhance his 
performance. Ngwane describes the performance undertaken with the kaross in the following 
words: “[a]lthough some of his biographers, perhaps a reflection of their own fantasy, describe it 
as either a patchwork of “jackal skins” or, more ambitiously, a “lion skin,” it is the leopard that is 
traditionally considered a Thembu royal symbol of power, majesty, grace, and agility. In that 
costume Mandela not only reached back, but reached higher in stature than even his father, who 
was a headman to the ruling princely line of the Thembu” (Ngwane, 128).  Mandela’s performance 
exemplifies Fanon’s idea of how old tales are recreated for a new purpose in the active stage of 
anti-colonial struggle and Bhabha’s concepts of the scraps and rags of culture as strategies for 
uniting the people against colonial oppression.  
 Mandela is “[no] longer simply the counselor to kings that he was groomed to be as a 
young man, he is now, in that witness box, as if on his throne meting out justice on the system that 
put him on trial. In a classical folktale twist of fate, where the lowly becomes elevated, Mandela 
the prisoner sits in judgment at the end, particularly with his closing statement” (Ngwane 128). 
The symbolism of the kaross plays a significant role in Mandela’s rhetorical strategies in court. 
According to Sitze: “[t]he kaross Mandela donned in 1962 – in no less a juridical space than the 
“dock,” so named because of its resemblance to a “cage” for animals – was not simply a costume 
for representing the opposition between “Africa” and “the West”; it was a cunning way to 
personify the non-identity of Western law with itself, to deploy the machine of Western 
sovereignty in order to short-circuit the sovereignty of the very court that claimed to be defending 
the West from its mortal enemies” (152). Mandela’s continuous deployment of terms like “African 
people” draws attention to the fact that it is the entire African people who are on trial in this 
courtroom.  
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The phrase, “African people” is used to deliberately draw attention to the class structure 
and racial pyramid that the apartheid regime had created. This pyramid had the Black majority at 
the bottom, but disconnected at the top is the white minority. This pyramid is neither holistic nor 
enacting a continuum. The whites at the top represented the white supremacist (disconnected from 
the rest of Africans), while the other whites who did not subscribe to apartheid policies in addition 
to every other race, including the Asians and the Coloureds, were submerged underneath the 
policies of oppression. According to Mandela, “[t] he premise of apartheid was that whites were 
superior to Africans, Coloureds, and Indians, and the function of it was to entrench white 
supremacy forever” (Long Walk, 110). Thus, the pyramid is the hegemony kept in place by laws, 
which are screens of deception and hypocrisy. Mandela braids together a rhetoric through 
strategies inherent in African contextual tropes with other rhetorical strategies like kairos, a shared 
knowledge, and common experiences. These tropes were effectively deployed in line with the 
African and Western rhetorical traditions to illuminate the terministic screens in the apartheid legal 
system.  
 
Religious Rhetoric in Conflict Engagement  
The way apartheid policies were constructed to reflect the beliefs and value system of the 
Afrikaners depict how religion played a key role in the deceptions that were being sold to the 
world. In essence, religion was used to mask the terministic screens that underpinned the apartheid 
legal system. The religious beliefs that were used as the basis for apartheid policies exemplify 
Burke’s concept of logology. Burkes describes logology as “a purely empirical study of symbolic 
action” that connects to the theological theorem of ““Believe, that you may understand” [which] 
has a fundamental application to the purely secular problem of “terministic screens”” (Language, 
180 
 
47). This connection acts as the basis for the convictions that informed apartheid policies. Burke’s 
concept of logology is particularly interesting when used to interpret Crapanzano’s observation 
that apartheid had been greatly influenced by the belief in the Biblical Tower of Babel. In essence, 
this belief in the Biblical concept of the Tower of Babel was used to account for the idea of 
apartheid, which means separation. The idea of the Tower of Babel, which practically describes 
the origin of languages in the Bible, depicts how human speech was mixed up so that people were 
unable to understand each other’s language. The Bible depicts this idea in the following words:  
At first, the people of the whole world had only one language and used the same words. 
As they wandered about in the East, they came to a plain in Babylonia and settled 
there. They said to one another, “Come on! Let’s make bricks and bake them hard.” 
So they had bricks to build with and tar to hold them together. They said, “Now let’s 
build a city with a tower that reaches the sky, so that we can make a name for ourselves 
and not be scattered all over the earth.” Then the Lord came down to see the city and 
the tower, which they had built, and he said, “Now then, these are all one people and 
they speak one language; this is just the beginning of what they are going to do. Soon 
they will be able to do anything they want! Let us go down and mix up their language 
so that they will not understand each other. So the Lord scattered them all over the 
earth, and they stopped building the city. The city was called Babylon, because there 
the Lord mixed up the language of all the people, and from there he scattered them all 
over the earth (Good News Bible, “Genesis,” 11:1-9). 
 However, this idea of the Tower of Babel that was exploited by the Afrikaners in South 
Africa was a selection of reality in the sense that what was lost in “Genesis,” 11:1-9, was restored 
in “Acts…” 2: 1-12 of the same Bible. Language harmony was restored because the 
communication gap created in “Genesis” 11 was bridged in “Acts…” 2 with the descent of the 
Holy Spirit on the Apostles when people from all over the world could understand the Apostles, 
who had been given the strange gift of speaking in other tongues. Thus, the Apostles “were all 
filled with the Holy Spirit and began to talk in other languages, as the Spirit enabled them to speak. 
There were Jews living in Jerusalem, religious people who had come from every country in the 
world…They were all excited, because all of them heard the believers talking in their own 
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language” (Acts, 2: 4-6). In essence, if “Genesis” is important, so should “The Acts of the Apostle” 
be accounted for in the apartheid policies. The Afrikaners were obviously employing ‘selection of 
reality’ in their so-called Christian motivated policies.  
To the Afrikaner, the separation of races, which was premised on the belief in the Tower 
of Babel, was partly responsible for the policies of racial segregation. The separation of races and 
its accompanying principle of “baasskap, literally boss-ship, a freighted word that stood for white 
supremacy in all its harshness” (Mandela, Long Walk, 111) gave rise to Black oppression. It did 
not help that the Dutch Reformed Church had put a stamp of religion on the notion of white 
supremacy and the policy of: “Die wit man moet altyd baas wees” (The white man must always 
remain boss) … The policy was supported by the Dutch Reform Church, which furnished apartheid 
with its religious foundations by suggesting that Afrikaners were God’s chosen people and that 
Blacks were a subservient species. In the Afrikaner’s worldview, apartheid and the church went 
hand in hand” (Mandela, Long Walk, 111). The exploitation of biblical signs and symbols for such 
a negative phenomenon, as the suppression of another race, brings home St Augustine’s 
admonition against the misuse of scripture.  
According to Augustine, “all signs in the scripture must be interpreted in a way that they 
are not in contradiction to “charity.” Because the sign of true worship is revealed in charity, such 
as when the converts in the “Acts of the Apostles” sold their property and donated the money to 
the church for the care of those in need” (85).  The locution/language of scripture can be interpreted 
figuratively or literally depending on the context. Augustine recommends scriptural interpretation 
in the following words: “if a locution is admonitory, condemning either vice or crime, or 
commending either utility or beneficience, it is not figurative. But if it seems to commend either 
vice or crime or to condemn either utility or beneficience, it is figurative” (93). Therefore, the 
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Afrikaner’s interpretation of the Tower of Babel, which eschews charity in all ramifications, is 
erroneous.  
Augustine compares the power of scripture to shape the mind to that of rhetoric, and the 
consequences can be great. This phenomenon was evident in the fact that the Nationalist Party 
“refused to support Great Britain and publicly sympathized with Nazi Germany” (Mandela, Long 
Walk, 110) during World War II and literally campaigned on a racist platform. The Nationalist 
Party’s racist platform was “centered around the swart gevaar (the Black danger), and they fought 
the election on the twin slogans of Die kaffer op sy plek (The nigger in his place) and Die koelies 
uit die land (The coolies out of the country) – coolies being the Afrikaner’s derogatory term for 
Indians” (Mandela, Long Walk, 110). The fact that the Afrikaner identified with Nazi Germany at 
such a crucial time as the Second World War is indicative of what belief system motivated 
apartheid.  
Religion has often played a significant role in persuasion. Hitler gained recognition and 
support from his fellow Germans when he raised racism and anti-Semitism to a religious level. 
Therefore, Richard Weaver’s ideas in “Language is Sermonic” prove quite fruitful for 
understanding how persuasion is achieved using a cause-and effect relationship. (1048). People 
are persuaded to cooperate when the speaker is “asking in the name of highest reality, which is the 
same as saying, [the speaker is] asking in the name of their highest good” (Weaver, 
“Language…,”1048). Weaver argues that people are more likely to accept a policy if they have 
cause to believe that such policies emanate from authorities who are respected or reliable (1048). 
According to Weaver, rhetorical appeal of this nature “goes back to a very primitive 
metaphysics…because it ascribes to the highest reality qualities of stasis, immutability, eternal 
perdurance – qualities that in Western civilization are usually expressed in the language of theism” 
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(1049). In essence, when a religious belief is employed as the platform for a particular policy and 
it is presented as being benevolent, such a policy is elevated to the status of a religious dogma.  
Hitler employed rhetoric that had religious coloring to derogate Jews and other races in 
order to persuade his fellow Germans to believe that the Jews, particularly and other races 
generally, were responsibility for their economic woes. Hitler’s rhetoric of violence employed a 
systematic vilification of Jews by labelling them “vermin,” “parasites,” and as the enemies of the 
Germans. As Karen King-Aribisala points out in her inaugural lecture:  
When man wishes to oppress an ‘other’; he gives that ‘other’ a sub-human designation 
of ‘name’ which enables him to camouflage and overlook his inhumanity. Another 
case in point is the fate of the character Piggy in William Golding’s Lord of the Flies, 
(1954). A group of school boys find themselves on a deserted island without adult 
supervision, and without the rules of ‘civilized’ society to guide them. They kill 
“Piggy”; the most vulnerable person among them. However, before doing so, they 
dehumanize him by calling Piggy, instead of his ‘real’ name. By so doing, they 
disguise their evil from themselves (8).  
Hitler made no attempt to disguise his evil intentions in his rhetoric of violence; instead, he 
employed animal metaphors for engaging the minds of his followers, by preaching a gospel of 
hate, in order to prepare them for the extermination of six million Jews. As King-Aribisala 
observes, Jews were not regarded as human but as less than human through labelling, which “gave 
the ‘Hitlerites’ the license to engage in conscience-free ethnic cleansing in a bid to create a 
lebensraum inhabited exclusively by the Aryan race” (8). Hitler’s speeches emphasized and 
exhorted such human values as bravery, justice, diligence, and patriotism, which he linked with 
the emotions of his audience and in very rational tones, explained how these German values were 
under threat from outside influences. Hitler’s rhetoric of violence is described by Felicity Rash in 
the following words:  
The pathos of MK is supported by hyperbole: superlative forms and meanings, 
excessive repetition, accumulation (haufung) of words and phrases, aggressive and 
apocalyptic vocabulary, and exaggerated evaluative descriptions of people and 
institutions that he despised…Hitler’s hyperbolic language served a number of 
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purposes in MK, all of which were closely linked and interdependent: derogation of 
his enemies, glorification of the German Volk, exposition of his belief in a racial 
hierarchy (44).  
It is observed that Hitler did not woo the people with his charisma, as it is often assumed, 
but with his passionate outpouring of hatred. By embellishing his rhetorical styles with a religious 
passion, he captivated an entire nation. Consequently, when religion is used with the ultimate aim 
of reducing the collective worth of a group or race, the hate crime against such a group can be 
tragic. The Germans were made to believe that the extermination of such parasites was an act of 
self-preservation. Such a belief system helps to appreciate apartheid laws. The white minorities in 
South Africa were also made to believe that the Black danger had to be kept in their place at all 
cost through various laws. The laws and their attendant dehumanization of other races showed that 
both the “letter” and the “spirit” of the law were dead.  
Attention is being drawn to the Biblical distinction between letter and spirit whereby the 
spirit serves to regulate the letter of the law. Mandela’s questions in court served to demonstrate 
that the “spirit” of the law was dead. The spirit of any law that is not grounded in mercy is dead, 
and justice over mercy is cruelty. The appeal to religious mercy is not culture bound because this 
idea is captured in Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, where Portia admonishes Shylock for 
demanding justice rather than mercifully seeking to save Antonio’s life. Mandela’s questions and 
narratives in court resonate with Portia plea to Shylock in the court scene of Shakespeare’s 
creation. According to Portia:  
The quality of mercy is not strain’d, - / It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven/ 
Upon the place beneath: it is twice blest, -/ It blesseth him that gives, and him that 
takes;/ ‘Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes/ The throned monarch better than 
his crown;/ His scepter shows the force of temporal power,/ The attribute to awe and 
majesty,/ Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings;/ But mercy is above this 
sceptered sway, - / It is enthrone in the hearts of kings,/ It is an attribute to God 
himself;/ And earthly power doth then show likest God’s/ When mercy seasons justice. 
Therefore, Jew,/ Though justice be thy plea, consider this, - / That, in the course of 
justice, none of us/ Should see salvation: we do pray for mercy; And that same prayer 
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doth teach us all to render/ The deeds of mercy. I have spoken thus much/ To mitigate 
the justice of thy plea (Merchant of Venice, IV. I: 183 – 202). 
Portia uses Christian virtues to make an appeal in court to indicate that human beings 
should be concerned for the wellbeing of others. In essence, apartheid insistence on keeping the 
races apart was inimical to Christian virtues. The fact that the laws that implemented such 
separation inflicted great suffering on Black communities and practically deprived them of their 
basic human rights in their own country shows the extent to which the apartheid government used 
religion that was empty of any Christian virtues to further their cause. The similarity between 
Merchant of Venice and the South African reality is resonant because the Christian morality 
espoused by Portia ought to be binding on Afrikaners who professed Christianity. In addition, 
Blacks in South Africa did not commit any crime for which they needed to be pardoned. Their 
only offense was an existential crime of being Black. In essence, apartheid laws were in themselves 
illegal according to the United Nations Statutes of basic human rights. The absurdity of apartheid 
laws stems from the fact that the Western culture that Afrikaners sought to preserve on the basis 
of religion denies a large group of people essential rights based on the color of their skin; a reality 
for which they had absolutely no control.  
Mandela creatively employs rhetorical devices, which draw upon religious imagery to 
point out the paradoxes of apartheid laws in order to amplify the hypocritical nature of the regime. 
Apartheid laws perform the Biblical concept of the voice of Jacob in their crafting and the hand of 
Esau in their implementation. Mandela takes the pain to show that, rather than serve as a tool for 
uplift, religion has been used to suppress Blacks in South Africa. For example, Mandela uses 
another biblical imagery to show the cruelty of apartheid in the following words, “is there no 
danger that an African accused may regard the courts not as impartial tribunals, dispensing justice 
without fear or favour, but as instruments used by the white man to punish those amongst us who 
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clamor for deliverance from the fiery furnace of white rule?” (Mandela, “A Black Man…”). The 
fiery furnace of white rule draws on the biblical story of Meshach, Shadrach, and Abednego, in 
“Daniel” chapter 3, who are condemned to die in a fiery furnace because they would not obey 
Nebuchadnezzar’s decrees, which went against their consciences.  
There is a strong connection between the biblical trio, who were innocent yet were condemned to 
die for their beliefs and Mandela, a prisoner of conscience, in conjunction with the entire South 
African people of color, who were condemned to death in a sense through deprivation, 
imprisonment, displacement, and violence. According to Mandela, “I have grave fears that this 
system of justice may enable the guilty to drag the innocent before the courts. It enables the unjust 
to prosecute and demand vengeance against the just. It may tend to lower the standards of fairness 
and justice applied in the country's courts by white judicial officers to Black litigants” (“A Black 
Man…”). It is instructive to note that Mandela employs layers of tropes, and particularly draws 
upon tropes in the Western rhetorical tradition, which can be easily identified by his white 
audience. For example, after using the metaphor of the burning furnace, he conjures the image of 
violence by saying that “I have grave fears that this system of justice [irony] may enable the guilty 
to drag the innocent [image of violence] before the courts. It enables the unjust to prosecute and 
demand vengeance [symbol of intimidation] against the just” (“A Black Man…”). Mandela paints 
the picture of unequal power relations between whites and Blacks in the imagery he employs. We 
get the sense that the idea of lowering the standards of fairness and justices manipulates the laws, 
which throws the symbolic scale of justice out of balance. 
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Subverting Apartheid Machiavellianism 
Terministic screens operate through terms that direct attention to one field rather than 
another (Burke, Language, 50). The apartheid government deflects attention from the unjust nature 
of their laws to a deceptive benevolence of such laws as they affected Black Africans. One of such 
deceptive laws is the Bantustan system, which originated out of the Tomlinson Commission for 
the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas. According to Mandela, “[t]he Bantustan 
system had been conceived by Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, the minister for native affairs, as a way of 
muting international criticism of South African racial policies, but at the same time 
institutionalizing apartheid. The Bantustans, or reserves as they were also known, would be 
separate ethnic enclaves or homelands for all African citizens” (Long Walk, 190). The deflection 
of reality that Mandela points out in the above text rests in the way the legal separation of races 
was enacted. Rather than move for a purposive integration of races, the apartheid regime chose to 
promulgate laws that were outright deceptive. For example, “Africans, Verwoerd said, “should 
stand with both feet in the reserves” where they were to “develop along their own lines.” The idea 
was to preserve the status quo where three million whites owned 87 percent of the land, and 
relegate the eight million Africans to the remaining 13 percent” (Mandela, Long Walk, 190). The 
idea of causing Africans to develop along their own lines was the screen behind which apartheid 
separation was masked. 
Deception in government is neither new nor restricted to the apartheid government. 
Deception is as old as humanity, and it is a trait that other animals possess as well. Deception is 
often used as a tool for gaining power over others, and Niccolo Machiavelli defends deception in 
government in the following words:  
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A ruler must be half lion and half fox, a fox to discern the toils, a lion to drive off the 
wolves. Merciful, faithful, humane, religious, just, these he may be and above all 
should seem to be, nor should any word escape his lips to give the lie to his profession: 
and in fact, he should not leave these qualities but when he must. He should, if possible, 
practice goodness, but under necessity should know how to pursue evil. He should 
keep faith until occasion alter, or reason of state compel him to break his pledge. Above 
all, he should profess and observe religion, ‘because men in general judge rather by 
the eye’ than by the hand, and everyone can see, but few can touch (W. E. Henley, 
“Introduction”, xxxiii – xxxiv).  
Apartheid deception connects with Machiavelli’s idea of driving away the wolves, which 
in this case have been depicted as the Black danger. This connection supports Machiavelli’s 
recommendation that whatever evil a ruler does, it “must be deliberate, appropriate, and calculated, 
and done, not selfishly, but for the good of the State of which he is trustee” (Henley, 
“Introduction”, xxxiii). It is important to examine in what ways terministic screens, direction of 
intention, selection of reality, deflection of reality, deception, and lies are interwoven in the 
apartheid context. The screens revolve around a deliberate attempt to conceal facts through 
legislations. That is because deception is far more successful when the discourse contains some 
modicum of truth. Sperone Speroni argues that an “orator will speak with the intention of deceiving 
people, leading them to think his aim is the truth, rather than something merely similar to the truth” 
(115). In essence, the apartheid policy of separate development in the Bantustan system belies their 
intention of deprivation and impoverishment. The same method of deception was employed in 
several other oppressive policies. The deceptive nature of the Bantustan or Homeland is captured 
by McLachlan in the following words:  
The intention behind the influx control laws is that all Africans must live in their 
respective “self-governing homelands.” Therefore, unless an individual qualifies to 
live in a white area, he requires permission to work in “white” South Africa as a 
migrant contract laborer and may not bring his family to live with him. Furthermore, 
in terms of government homelands policy, once a homeland becomes “independent,” 
its “citizens” automatically lose their South African citizenship, whether they live in 
the homeland or not (77).  
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Mandela deliberately illuminates the Machiavellian nature of apartheid policies in order to 
deconstruct them. Apartheid concealing and Mandela’s revealing play out before a worldwide 
audience. Mandela refers to this drama as “A Black man in a white court,” which depicts a trial of 
the entire opposition who are part of the complex socio-political group he refers to as the African 
people. Mandela views the people as African people and not as Blacks because he aims to draw 
attention to the fact that Africans were far from homogenous. That is because the apartheid regime 
recognized the lack of homogeneity among Blacks; they exploited that heterogeneity for divisive 
purposes but formulated policies that attempted to homogenize them as a group. And thus, 
Mandela’s implicit reference to the heterogeneous nature of the African people is a strategy 
through which he shows that in attempting to strip Africans of their humanity, a crime has been 
committed against the entire human race because almost all races are represented within South 
Africa. 
Mandela exposes apartheid as a distortion by evoking the Western legal system, which is 
the bedrock of a democratic society.  In “A Black Man in a white Court,” Mandela’s employs 
exordium, which is addressed to the prosecutor, in an epideictic manner. This deployment portrays 
Mandela’s great respect for the Western legal framework to which he owes his legal formation. 
Mandela’s praise of Western law is what Jacques Derrida describes as interiorizing the law to the 
extent that “he has interiorized the principle of interiority.” Mandela’s great respect for the rule of 
law, his training, and expectations proved antithetical to his experience of apartheid laws and their 
implementation. The reality of apartheid laws is captured by Adam Sitze in the following words: 
“Academic jurisprudence under apartheid doubled as a form of social discipline: it was a mode of 
controlling, subjugating, and normalizing thought, a training in obedience and quietism, a point of 
entry into a regime that used the legal lexicon to reassure itself of its own rectitude and to rage 
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against its adversaries with self-righteous cruelty” (135). Mandela’s experiences in court were 
clear indications that the white man’s court had no place for a Black man. 
Mandela’s rhetoric amplifies the double jeopardy embedded within apartheid policies. He 
tactically illuminated the inherent contradictions of Afrikaner political undertones of racism. The 
nuanced manner through which he absolved himself of complicit rhetoric and the fallacy of 
essentialism is very compelling. For example, he enters a plea for recusal in “A Black Man in a 
white Court” with the following caveat: “In the course of this application, I am frequently going 
to refer to the white man and the white people. I want at once to make it clear that I am no racialist, 
and I detest racialism because I regard it as a barbaric thing, whether it comes from a Black man 
or from a white man. The terminology that I am going to employ, will be compelled on me by the 
nature of the application I am making” (Mandela, “A Black Man…”). Mandela turns the table by 
overtly shifting the blame for essentialism to his white accusers.  
The charge of racism against his accusers is deliberately overt when he describes the nature 
of his application. Mandela’s “implicit,” or “subtle,” or “covert” rhetoric employs imagery and 
irony especially in court for illuminating the concealed deception of apartheid policies. Mandela 
draws upon multiple rhetorical genres and employs surface linguistic structures that are nuanced 
with deep semantic implicatures to argue for recusal in “A Black Man in a white Court.” He 
combines deliberative rhetoric, forensic logic, and narratives, which are layered with contrasts and 
antithesis, to evoke images of injustice. These images draw attention to a dis(connect) in the moral 
fabric of the apartheid legal structure.  
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Mandela’s Narratives as a Legal Strategy 
Apartheid laws were informed largely by the haunting fears Afrikaners had of being 
outnumbered and dominated in a free and democratic system. Interestingly, white superiority 
complex sought to camouflage this fear by constructing sophisticated legal terms. As a result, the 
complex emotions that produced apartheid laws needed to be addressed at a cognitive level in 
order to deconstruct them.  The fear that led to the promulgation of apartheid laws was carefully 
concealed to reflect a different reality of separate development. The laws of separate development 
were smoke screens deliberately crafted to mask their racist bent of curbing the “Black danger.” 
Even though the laws were couched to deceive, their implementation made it obvious that the laws 
protected one group and oppressed others. Mandela exposed the racist nature of the laws through 
the narratives that were woven in a highly rhetorical manner.  
Why would Mandela choose to use narratives in a court session? Narratives constitute an 
integral part of Mandela’s braided rhetoric, and narratives perform a dual role in his rhetoric. 
Mandela acquired the love for stories from both the African and Western rhetorical traditions that 
helped to form him. Narratives were used to draw attention to apartheid injustices and to 
demonstrate how helpless Blacks had become in a skewed system like apartheid. Mandela makes 
manifest the rhetorical contrast being constructed in the following narrative:  
Many years ago, when I was a boy brought up in my village in the Transkei, I listened 
to the elders of the tribe telling stories about the good old days, before the arrival of 
the white man. Then our people lived peacefully, under the democratic rule of their 
kings and their amapakati, and moved freely and confidently up and down the country 
without let or hindrance. Then the country was ours, in our own name and right. We 
occupied the land, the forests, the rivers; we extracted the mineral wealth beneath the 
soil and all the riches of this beautiful country. We set up and operated our own 
government, we controlled our own armies and we organized our own trade and 
commerce. The elders would tell tales of the wars fought by our ancestors in defense 
of the fatherland, as well as the acts of valor performed by generals and soldiers during 
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those epic days. The names of Dingane and Bambata, among the Zulus, of Hintsa, 
Makana, Ndlambe of the AmaXhosa, of Sekhukhuni and others in the north, were 
mentioned as the pride and glory of the entire African nation (“A Black Man…”). 
Mandela deploys the above narrative like a typical imbongi to bring into the current context 
the significance of the people’s collective memory. By drawing upon his African sociocultural and 
political heritage, Mandela employs the African rhetorical trope of communal cohesion and 
freedom in contrast to apartheid curtailment. Mandela’s narratives in “A Black Man in a white 
Court” make visible the paradox of the apartheid legal framework. Mandela pointed out in this 
court scene that the apartheid laws represented a fait accompli for Blacks because they were more 
often than not denied justice. Apartheid laws were founded upon a concept of white-protection, 
and a change to such laws was an obvious threat to white interest. The unjust nature of apartheid 
laws was captured by Mandela in the following words: “[i]t is true that an African who is charged 
in a court of law enjoys, on the surface, the same rights and privileges as an accused who is white 
in so far as the conduct of this trial is concerned. He is governed by the same rules of procedure 
and evidence as apply to a white accused. But it would be grossly inaccurate to conclude from this 
fact that an African consequently enjoys equality before the law” (“A Black Man…”). The 
discrepancy between the letter of the laws and their implementation indicated that there was a 
deliberate ploy to mask the inequality between whites and Blacks. 
Mandela argues that equality before the law goes beyond paying lip service to the concept 
of equality. In essence, equality implies the right to participate in the making of the laws by which 
a group of people are governed and to produce a constitution that guarantees democratic rights to 
all sections of the population. Equality also means the right to approach the court for protection or 
relief in the case of a violation of the rights guaranteed in the constitution and the right to take part 
in the administration of justice as judges, magistrates, attorneys-general, law advisers and similar 
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positions (Mandela, “A Black Man…”). According to Mandela, the absence of these safeguards 
indicated that the phrase 'equality before the law,' in so far as the laws are applied to Blacks, is 
meaningless and misleading. Whites monopolized all the rights and privileges in apartheid laws, 
and Blacks enjoyed none of them.  
Mandela captures the inequality in the apartheid legal system in the following words: “[t]he 
white man makes all the laws, he drags us before his courts and accuses us, and he sits in judgement 
over us” (“A Black Man…”). It can be deduced that those in charge of the apartheid legal system 
were either oblivious or pretended to be oblivious to the inequity of the rigid coloured bar described 
by Mandela. The moral disconnect of apartheid made it impossible for the regime to enthrone an 
equitable legal system. Mandela deployed logical deductions and forensic logic, which were 
woven into his narratives to expose the realty of apartheid racist order. For example, Mandela 
describes the equity in the African society in contrast to apartheid in the following words:  
All men were free and equal and this was the foundation of government. Recognitions 
of this general principle found expression in the constitution of the council, variously 
called Imbizo, or Pitso, or Kgotla, which governs the affairs of the tribe. The council 
was so completely democratic that all members of the tribe could participate in its 
deliberations. Chief and subject, warrior and medicine man, all took part and 
endeavored to influence its decision. It was so weighty and influential a body that no 
step of any importance could ever be taken by the tribe without reference to it. (“A 
Black Man…”).  
Mandela deployed narratives like the above in the courtroom because the legal system and 
court proceedings proved that no matter the strength of the argument he put forward, it would 
prove ineffective. That is because the laws were made by whites, for whites, interpreted by whites, 
and implemented by whites. In essence, Mandela was confronting a peculiar democracy that 
demarcated justice along racial lines and excluded Black interests. Mandela pragmatically deploys 
stories to draw attention to the deplorable situation of Blacks in order to prick the conscience of 
his white audience.  
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Mandela’s rhetorical appeal lies in the manner in which he crafts narratives that draw on 
the communal tropes of the African rhetorical tradition to counter the apartheid deceptive legal 
rhetoric and framework. Mandela’s love of stories helped him to internalize the principles that 
guided his life, and this idea is captured in the following words: “The structure and organization 
of early African societies in this country fascinated me very much and greatly influenced the 
evolution of my political outlook” (“A Black Man…”). African societies inculcate values using 
the African rhetorical tradition, and these values are highly narrative in texture in the form of 
folktales, proverbs, songs and dances. The narratives Mandela wove are drawn from both the 
Greco-Roman and the African rhetorical traditions. The narratives served to create images that 
exposed the sufferings of South African people of color. These images, in turn, generate cognitive 
activities in the minds of the complex audiences to whom Mandela needed to make an appeal.   
Mandela’s narratives in court served to demonstrate how the spirit of freedom enjoyed by 
the South Africans before the advent of whites had been destroyed by apartheid laws. Narratives 
are deployed by Mandela in a way that is imitative of Jesus Christ’s employment of stories and 
parables in his earthly ministry. For example, whenever Jesus needed to teach a lesson with deep 
insight, he used narratives. Many of Jesus’ parables were succinct with deep moral lessons.  For 
example, when the teacher of the law asked Jesus who his neighbour was, Jesus told him the 
parable of the Good Samaritan (“Luke” 10:29-37). The Good Samaritan has become a metaphor 
for any charitable person who takes care of the poor and needy.   
Why did Jesus employ stories and parables in his teaching? It might be argued that a 
straightforward answer would be inadequate to teach some profound lessons. Therefore, Jesus 
always used the stories and parables to capture the conscience of his audience in order to build 
ethical values. Narratives depend on tropes to effectively capture the minds of an audience because 
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the human mind will most likely be unable to shake the images produced by such narratives. 
Therefore, persuasion is achieved by taking the human imagination captive. The manner in which 
moral virtues are instilled through the imagination is portrayed by authors like Vigen Guroian, 
Flannery O’Connor, and Bruno Bettelheim who explore the role of fairy tales in developing the 
moral compass of children.  
According to Guroian, “[t]he great fairy tales and fantasy stories capture the meaning of 
morality through vivid depictions of struggles between good and evil, where characters must make 
difficult choices between right and wrong, or heroes and villains contest the very fate of imaginary 
worlds” (“Awakening the Moral Imagination: Teaching Virtues through Fairy Tales”). Ethical 
morality is the foundation upon which the consciences of children are built, and for adults, 
narratives serve to stimulate the metaphors that already exist. The narratives that Mandela 
deployed in the courtroom were a rhetorical strategy that was used to stir up the conscience of his 
audience by conjuring images of the South African glorious past in contrast to the present 
deplorable condition of Blacks.   
 
Illuminating Legal Racism in Civilization 
The concept of civilization has played a significant role in colonialism because imperialist 
claimed that Africans needed to be civilized. This claim was used as a ploy to enslave Africans 
and plunder their land. Civilization becomes what Burke describes as a god-term, which is 
employed to produce a contrast with the so-called “primitive” life of Africans. The freedom 
enjoyed by Africans before the advent of whites in South Africa became eroded by the so-called 
civilization of Africans. Mandela overtly refers to racism as it operates within the context of the 
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“civilized world” of apartheid South Africa. Mandela’s constant reference to the term “civilized” 
is ironical because civilization takes on a burden in contrast with primitiveness when scrutinized 
under the searchlight of apartheid human rights abuses. A civilized society has the responsibility 
of ensuring that there are equal rights and equity for all. Mandela’s strategy for drawing attention 
to the inherent contradictions in apartheid laws and the disastrous consequences for the people of 
color casts an ominous darkness on the idea of Western civilization.  
These laws that were supposed to represent “civilization” (another terministic screen for 
imperialist incursion) have brought with them death, in a theological, cultural, and psychological 
sense. Mandela deconstructs apartheid policies as terministic screens whose colour filters are 
“Black” versus “white” and “civilized” versus “uncivilized.” In essence, Western civilization 
helped to undermine the socio-political life of Africans through policies that were crafted in 
deception. The contradiction that is depicted by apartheid laws connects with Sitze’s argument that 
South African laws fail to represent the identity that they proclaimed rhetorically. According to 
Sitze:  
For Jabavu and Matthews, and for Plaatje as well, South African law was not at all 
self-identical with itself. Even prior to the dark years of the 1950s, and without any 
assistance from Gandhian satyagraphs or revolutionary Marxists, South African law 
already hosted within itself the very anomie Hoernle seemed to fear. Instead of the rule 
of law, it was governed by dictactorship; instead of peacetime norms, it was ordered 
according to the exceptions of martial law; instead of health, welfare, and safety, its 
administrative apparatus produced conditions for the extermination of the African 
populations (148).  
Sitze analyzes the position of scholars like D. D. T. Jabavu, Sol Plaatje, Z. K. Matthews, 
and R. F. A. Hoernle, who objected to apartheid laws but objected to Mandela’s agitation for armed 
struggle. These experts argue that “constitutional change ought to be accomplished within the 
limits of the existing constitutional order” (Sitze, 148). The premise for such a position rests on 
the idea that South African laws were self-identical with itself. Despite Mandela’s great respect 
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for the rule of law, his training in jurisprudence and his experiences acquainted him with the 
knowledge that “South African courts were defined by their non-identity with the very tradition of 
law in which they rooted their “Western” identity” (Sitze, 146). Mandela sheds light on the 
distorted nature of South African laws that preached one thing and practiced another. The idea that 
Western laws in South Africa are self-identical with itself is a subterfuge. Therefore, Mandela 
overtly and covertly exposed the inherent deception of apartheid laws or deflection of reality in 
the following words:  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that all men are equal before the 
law, and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. In May 
1951, Dr D F Malan, then Prime Minister, told the Union parliament that this provision 
of the Declaration applies in this country. Similar statements have been made on 
numerous occasions in the past by prominent whites in this country, including judges 
and magistrates. But the real truth is that there is in fact no equality before the law 
whatsoever as far as our people are concerned, and statements to the contrary are 
definitely incorrect and misleading (“A Black Man.”). 
 Mandela uses metaphor and narratives to amplify the deceptive concept of a civilized 
world, which was supposedly founded on the rule of law. The idea that apartheid laws were 
misleading is evinced by Mandela as a strategy for drawing attention to the lived experience of 
South African people of color. This strategy was “in response to a set of unprecedented possibilities 
that define Western law and yet that Western law – tragically divided against itself, fighting itself 
– neutralizes, restrains, excludes, and denies” (Sitze, 156) the very foundation upon which it was 
built. It can be argued that Mandela’s struggle attempts to re-institute Western laws that were self-
identifiable with the state. The Western laws he had fallen in love with and had spent many years 
of his life studying in order to understand and practice as a servant of Lady Justice did not exist in 
apartheid South Africa – at least not for Blacks. The legal system that was being applied to South 
Africa people of colour was a perversion of the Western legal system. Mandela and the ANC had 
embarked on heroic measures to rescue Lady Justice for the people they represented. The Freedom 
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Charter was the platform under which equal rights for all was promulgated.  Through the Freedom 
Charter, all oppressed groups like the ANC, the South African Indian Congress, the Colored 
People’s Organization, and the Congress of Democrats (all of whom unanimously adopted the 
Charter) hoped to gain back the rights they had been denied. The preamble of the Freedom Charter 
is captured in the following words:  
We, the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know: 
That South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government 
can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the people; That our people 
have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty and peace by a form of government 
founded on injustice and inequality; That our country will never be prosperous or free 
until all our people live in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities; That 
only a democratic state, based on the will of all the people, can secure to all their 
birthright without distinction of color, race, sex, and belief; And therefore, we, the 
people of South Africa, black and white together – equals, countrymen and brothers – 
adopt this FREEDOM CHARTER. And we pledge ourselves to strive together, sparing 
nothing of our strength and courage, until the democratic changes here set out have 
been won (Mandela, Speeches, 67). 
The Freedom Charter encapsulated the laws meant to ensure no one was disenfranchised 
in a new South Africa. The Freedom Charter directly countered apartheid racist laws as a correction 
of apartheid human rights abuses. The Freedom Charter was conceived and crafted to reflect the 
hopes and aspirations of the masses the way it should be in a civilized society. Apartheid practiced 
Western laws to reflect the moral disconnect that produced racial segregation in the first place. 
Mandela depicts why it was impossible to accept apartheid laws in the following words: “[t]he law 
as it is applied, the law as it has been developed over a long period of history, and especially the 
law as it is written and designed by the Nationalist government is a law which, in our views, is 
immoral, unjust, and intolerable. Our consciences dictate that we must protest against it, that we 
must oppose it and that we must attempt to alter it” (Long Walk, 330-331). Mandela and the ANC 
had employed constitutional means to attempt a change, contrary to what Jabayu, Plaatje, 
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Matthews, and Hoernle had inferred. However, apartheid policies and their implementation created 
insurmountable obstacles that made Mandela refer to himself and his people as having been caged. 
Mandela had fallen in love with a rule of law that was the ideal example of what was being 
enjoyed by whites in the Western (civilized) world and South Africa, but the reality for Blacks was 
a far cry from this ideal. Some of the apartheid laws like (1) the Population Registration Act 30 of 
1950, which classified each person according to their color or ethnic group upon registration of a 
birth; (2) the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950, which restricted different groups to separate 
geographical areas; (3) Pass Laws and Influx Control Law, which required Africans over the age 
of 16 to always carry on them a passbook showing they had a right to be in a white area; (4) the 
Bantustan or “Homeland” Law, which required that all Africans must live in their respective “self-
governing homelands;” (5) the Natives Land Act, which prevented Africans from acquiring land 
outside of “reserves;” (6) the Terrorism Act, which provided for indefinite detention without trial; 
(7) the Bantu Authorities Act, which removed Coloureds in the Cape Province from the 
Parliamentary Voter Roll; (8) the Native Trust and Land Act, which increased the reserves from 
about 7% to 13%; and (9) the elimination of African voting rights as well as other laws such as;  
the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages; the Bantu Education Act; Suppression of Communism Act; 
and the Immorality Amendment Act that represented the abolition of human rights of Blacks in 
one form or another.  
All the above laws are a deflection of reality, whereby there is a deliberate attempt to direct 
attention away from the ultimate aim of the act through a manipulation of the legal lexicon. In 
essence, the laws were deceptive in the way they were crafted; however, the implementation of the 
same laws betrayed the intention of the apartheid regime. According to Mandela:  
200 
 
As a student, I had been taught that South Africa was a place where the rule of law 
was paramount and applied to all persons, regardless of their social status or official 
position. I sincerely believed this and planned my life based on that assumption. But 
my career as a lawyer and activist removed the scales from my eyes. I saw that there 
was a wide difference between what I had been taught in the lecture room and what I 
learned in the courtroom. I went from having an idealistic view of the law as a sword 
of justice to a perception of the law as a tool used by the ruling class to shape society 
in a way favorable to itself. I never expected justice in court, however much I fought 
for it, and though I sometimes received it (Long Walk, 260).   
Mandela’s experience and narratives depict a reality whereby the rule of law, which ought 
to operate as the bastion of civilization, was being wielded against people of color in ways that 
were far from civilized. How, then, could whites justify their claims of wanting to civilize the 
uncivilized? How could the so-called civilized people lay claims to being civilized without the rule 
of law? The Afrikaner poet, Breyten Breytenbach, who was arrested in South Africa in 1975 and 
charged with terrorism, describes the South African situation as “the world of difference between 
pretensions and reality…[where] those in power in Pretoria claim that, as the arbiters of peace and 
progress, they are carrying the illuminating force of Western civilization into the heathen darkness, 
that they are God’s lonely soldiers battling against communism and barbarism. Many of them even 
believe it. Some powerful individuals abroad do too, or pretend to” (28). Apartheid laws exposed 
the heart of a pseudo-civilization, which the apartheid regime projected as civilized rule of law 
that withheld human rights on the basis of skin color. According to Breytenbach, this was a “world 
of madness, of calculated madness, of sublimated madness” (28). The madness conceptualized by 
Breytenbach pervaded all the apartheid laws both in their formulation and in their execution.  
For example, the Population Registration Act 30 of 1950 laid the foundation for all of the 
oppressive laws. According to McLachlan, “[u]pon the registration of a birth, each person is 
classified as white, Colored or African. Coloreds and Africans are further divided into ethnic or 
other groups. Generally, a child will have the same classification as his/her parents, but for those 
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who do not fall into any definite category, their status will be determined by criteria such as 
descent, appearance (hair, lips, nails, etc.), social acceptance, habits, speech, and education” (76). 
From this law, it is obvious that the foundation of the apartheid laws that were applied to people 
of colour was created in chaos, and the ultimate consequence was confusion. The confusion is 
captured in the following words: “A person may apply for reclassification to another group or third 
parties may object to the official classification awarded. Any classification other than white means 
fewer rights. This Act causes much human suffering as families are torn apart by different 
classifications” (McLachlan, 76). The Population Registration Act was employed to redefine 
humanity; whereby, the more colour a person possessed in their pigmentation, the less human they 
were considered to be and the less rights they were entitled to.  
Mandela depicts how the classification of people of color was perpetrated to strip them of 
their humanity and power in a sly and derogatory manner. The devious nature of the scheme was 
cleverly masked as an attempt to keep people together within their own communities; but at the 
same time, such classifications divided the people through varying degrees of disempowerment. 
In addition to the stereotyping that informed the classification, it was inhumane and arbitrary. The 
arbitrariness with which a person’s race was determined made the rule of law a mockery. Mandela 
captures this mockery in the following words: 
Working as a lawyer in South Africa meant operating under a debased system of 
justice, a code of law that did not enshrine equality but its opposite. One of the most 
pernicious examples of this is the Population Registration Act, which defined that 
inequality. I once handled the case of a Colored man who was inadvertently classified 
as an African. He had fought for South Africa during World War II in North Africa 
and Italy, but after his return, a white bureaucrat had reclassified him as African. This 
was the type of case, not at all untypical in South Africa that offered a moral jigsaw 
puzzle. I did not support or recognize the principles in the Population Registration Act, 
but my client needed representation, and he had been classified as something he was 
not. There were many practical advantages to being classified as Colored rather than 
African, such as the fact that colored men were not required to carry passes. On his 
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behalf, I appealed to the Classification Board, which adjudicated the cases falling 
under the Population Registration Act. The board consisted of a magistrate and two 
other officials, all white. I had formidable documentary evidence to establish to 
establish my client’s case and the prosecutor formally indicated that he would not 
oppose our appeal. But the magistrate seemed uninterested in both my evidence and 
the prosecutor’s demurral. He stared at my client and gruffly asked him to turn around 
so that his back faced the bench. After scrutinizing my client’s shoulders, which sloped 
down sharply, he nodded to the other officials and upheld the appeal. In the view of 
the white authorities those days, sloping shoulders were one stereotype of the Colored 
physique. And so it came about that the course of this man’s life was decided purely 
on a magistrate’s opinion about the structure of his shoulders (Long Walk, 151-152).  
The arbitrariness described by Mandela in the above text resonates with Dijk’s depiction of 
“abuse of power” or “illegitimate exercise of power,” which produced inequity and inequality 
(“Critical Discourse Analysis,” 5). Mandela’s description connects to Dijk’s perspective of 
discourse as it operates at the micro level for constructing power in interaction. The unequal power 
relations, which has the potential to disempower the “other” through discourse at the macro level, 
is made manifest in the South African judicial system. The unjust nature of the Population 
Registration Act lies in its power to keep the visible difference of “the other” races starkly visible. 
The ominous nature of the stereotyping that accompany visible difference is theorized by Michael 
Omi and Howard Winant as well as Linda Alcoff as potentially disempowering the ‘other’ whose 
humanity is undermined.  
Omi and Winant argue that race is a social and political construct, which is operative at the 
micro level (individual identity) as well as the macro level (collective social formation), that has 
undergone various formation processes. However, the social construction has often revolved 
around the need for control, hegemony, and dominance of one group over another. Consequently, 
the construction of Blacks and other minority groups as inferior to the white race has become 
entrenched in historical and scientific postulations that rely on visible identities for the justification 
of white supremacy. And, “the categories employed to differentiate among human groups along 
racial lines reveal themselves, upon serious examination, to be at best imprecise, and at worst 
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completely arbitrary” (Omi and Winant, 55). The effects of the hegemony, which such race 
construction enacts, is captured in the following words: “How one is categorized is far from a 
merely academic or even personal matter. Such matters as access to employment, housing, or other 
publicly or privately valued goods; social program design and the disbursement of local, state, and 
federal funds; or the organization of elections (among many other issues) are directly affected by 
racial classification and the recognition of “legitimate” groups. The determination of racial 
categories is thus an intensely political process” (Omi and Winant, 3). Though preoccupied with 
the racial problem in the US, the argument of Omi and Winant is highly resonant with the Black 
experiences described by Mandela.  
The case described by Mandela is similar to a case study captured by Omi & Winant in the 
US. According to Omi and Winant, “[i]n 1982-82, Susie Guillory Phipps unsuccessfully sued the 
Louisiana Bureau of Vital Records to change her racial classification from Black to white. The 
descendant of an 18-century white planter and a Black slave, Phipps was designated “Black” in 
her birth certificate in accordance with a 1970 state law, which declared anyone with a least 1/32nd 
“Negro blood” to be Black” (53). The interesting similarity and difference between the cases 
described by Mandela and Omi and Winant lay in the fact that Mandela’s client was applying to 
belong to a racial spectrum that did not threaten the white class. However, Omi and Winant’s 
Phipps aimed to join the white class. Phipps was denied that right because the exclusivity of 
whiteness gives access to privileges that the whites were unwilling to share, whether in the US or 
in South Africa. 
 Omi and Winant argue that racial formation in the US has moved from biological 
Darwinism to Social Darwinism, whereby, “[t]heoretically, the ethnicity paradigm represents the 
mainstream of the modern sociology of race” (14). This paradigm “arose in the 1920s and 1930s 
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as an explicit challenge to the prevailing racial views of the period. The pre-existing biologistic 
paradigm that evolved since the downfall of racial slavery was used to explain Black racial 
inferiority as part of a natural order of humankind. “Whites were considered the superior race; 
white skin was the norm while other skin colours were exotic mutations, which had to be 
explained” (Omi and Winant, 14). The idea of racial norm and the practice of punishing the 
deviation from the racial norm produced the kind of psychological trauma described by Fanon. 
The trauma was particularly damaging to people of colour because “[r]ace was equated 
with distinct hereditary characteristics. Differences in intelligence, temperament, and sexuality 
(among other traits) were deemed to be racial in character. Racial intermixture was seen as a sin 
against nature, which would lead to the creation of “biological throwbacks.” These are some of the 
assumptions in social Darwinist, Spencerist, and eugenicist thinking about race and race relation” 
(Omi & Winant, 14). Having no biological reasons for racial segregation and oppression, the 
evolution of racism in the US and apartheid South Africa can be described as “internal 
colonialism,” which is made manifest in economic, political, and cultural exploitation (Omi and 
Winant, 44-45). The pushback against any form of colonialism, which led to the emergence of 
independent states across Africa and other parts of the world, makes understandable the reason the 
apartheid regime would need to employ a lot of smoke screens. These smoke screens, according 
to Mandela, were a way of making the racially defined laws look benevolent. According to 
Mandela, most of apartheid laws “epitomized the ethos of the Nationalist government, which 
pretended to preserve what they were attempting to destroy. Laws stripping people of their rights 
were inevitably described as laws restoring those rights” (Long Walk, 122). The need to continually 
reveal the deception of apartheid as a system whose schemes resulted in the cruelty meted out to 
people of colour depicted civilization in very negative light.  
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The insensitive manner with which Blacks were disenfranchised in every way imaginable 
revealed a barbarism that is far from civilized. For example, Sophiatown was one of the few places 
where Blacks could own homes and have a sense of identity and dignity. Despite the poverty and 
the lack of amenities, “Sophiatown had a special character; for Africans, it was the Left Bank in 
Paris, Greenwich Village in New York, the home of writers, artists, doctors, and lawyers. It was 
both bohemian and conventional, lively and sedate” (Mandela, Long Walk, 154). The government 
failed to take into consideration what Sophiatown meant to the people, but they executed an 
evacuation campaign of its residents. According to Mandela, “[t]he excuse given by the 
government was slum clearance, a smoke screen for the government policy that regarded all urban 
areas as white areas where Africans were temporary residents” (Long Walk, 154).  Such inhumane 
laws and policies made all attempts to project apartheid laws as benign or paternalistic fall flat.  
Mandela recognized that capitalism, fuelled by materialism, had displaced the humanism 
that ought to be the kernel of a civilized legal system. Materialist capitalism is persuasive in its 
allurements; an idea that is captured by Breytenbach in the following words: “Those in power in 
Pretoria fully insist that they are the only ones who can assure Western capitalist investment in the 
subcontinent. In the process of so pretending, they are, inter alia, corrupting the power brokers of 
the West – often, alas, so easily corruptible. They are also raping Africa; but that would seem to 
be by the way, as the West closes a complacent eye and leers tolerably at those goings-on as just 
a healthy sexual romping” (28). For the material rape of South Africa to go on unhindered, the 
apartheid regime needed laws designed to make Africans appear barbaric and, thus, keep them in 
their place.  
The intolerable nature of this material rape pulled Mandela to the ideas of Marx and Engels, 
Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and others who probed into the philosophy of dialectical and 
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historical materialism. According to Mandela, “Dialectical materialism seemed to offer both a 
searchlight illuminating the dark night of racial oppression and a tool that could be used to end it. 
It helped me to see the situation other than through the prism of Black and white relations, for if 
our struggle was to succeed, we had to transcend Black and white. I was attracted to the scientific 
underpinnings of dialectical materialism, for I am always inclined to trust what I can verify” (Long 
Walk, 118).  The materialistic analysis of economics appealed to Mandela because the idea that 
the value of goods was based on the amount of labour that went into them seemed particularly 
appropriate for South Africa. However, it riled him that the ruling class paid African labourers a 
subsistence wage and, then, added value to the cost of the goods that they retained for themselves. 
The oppression of any group of people, either racially or economically, will always create 
psychological trauma, which in turn will produce the kind of chaos that will undermine the so-
called civilized society.  
For economic oppression to succeed, political, cultural, and ideological oppression must 
occur pari passu. Robert Davies, Dan O’meara, and Sipho Dlamini describe the oppression of 
Black South Africans as a phenomenon that needs not be “explained simply in terms of racial 
prejudice” (99); rather, it should be conceptualized within the system of racial capitalism. 
According to Davies et al, “the various changing historical forms of national oppression and racism 
in South Africa are organically linked with, and have provided the fundamental basis for, the 
development of a capitalist economy” (100). In essence, racism was the basis for imperialism, but 
materialism was the dagger behind the cloak of civilizing the natives. Therefore, Western industrial 
revolution had tremendous consequences for the conquered territories of the world. Consequently, 
“the various complex and intersecting class struggles through which capitalist forms of production 
and relations of production were developed and consolidated under colonialism in South Africa, 
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themselves generated racist ideologies and a racially structured hierarchy of economic and political 
power” (Davies et al, 100). This material colonialism that is existent in South Africa is equally 
made manifest in the US. Civil rights movements in the US can be described as being germane to 
the anti-apartheid movement in ways that were quite stark.   
The most important feature of the South African apartheid laws is the deliberate attempt to 
deceive the entire world that the government had the interest of the people of colour at heart. 
Therefore, the lexicon with which the laws were crafted was deliberately misleading. The language 
of apartheid laws does not only deflect attention from the racist reality of their laws or direct 
attention away from the intention, the language actually aims to create internal division among the 
oppressed groups. Consequently, Mandela’s strategically employs various rhetorical devices to 
illuminate and expose the smoke screens behind which apartheid laws gradually and eventually 
stripped Africans of their rights to land, free speech, freedom of movement/association, and 
freedom to earn a decent wage.    
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Chapter 5 
 Peace on a More Solid Ground 
This final chapter examines how Mandela’s rhetoric transforms as he transitions from 
activist to statesman.  As Mandela’s roles in the political milieu of South Africa shift, so do his 
rhetorical practices. His braided rhetoric that employs a lot of communal tropes and imbongi style 
narratives of African rhetorical tradition as well as different Western rhetorical tropes is still 
discernible. Furthermore, his rhetorical identification strategically moves from that of a freedom 
fighter on the margins of apartheid South Africa, through acting as a midwife who helps to birth 
the nation, to that of the parent of the nation when he occupies the presidential position in the 
center. Mandela’s rhetorical transformation is made manifest in his speeches, Nelson Mandela: 
Conversations with Myself, and Long Walk to Freedom as well as his inaugural speech in 1994. 
Mandela’s rhetorical moves when he takes on the role of parenting the nation upon 
becoming president indicated that he had been shaped by the anti-apartheid struggle in a profound 
way without being defined by it. The point being made here is that Mandela’s inclusive rhetoric 
that is exemplified through identification with both whites and Blacks is evidence of his kairotic 
ontology and political sagacity. His rhetorical shifts depict how significant it was to keep the past 
in sight, while kairotically seizing the moment and taking the future into consideration. Mandela 
survives the fierce racism of apartheid through his dynamic leadership skills and, in particular, his 
abilities as a rhetor that proved so critical to the success of the anti-apartheid struggle. Having 
survived, the fact that he continues to serve the cause – and still emerges as a president who calls 
for reconciliation between the oppressed and oppressor makes him a fascinating rhetor.  
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Mandela’s rhetoric of peace and healing makes valid the argument that the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission may have been constituted to produce a catharsis necessary for 
overcoming the long years of apartheid violence. The importance of Mandela’s rhetoric of peace 
and reconciliation is described by McPhail in The Rhetoric of Racism Revisited: Reparations or 
Separation as “provocative and profound” because “while a rhetoric of retribution might have been 
expected with Black majority rule in South Africa, instead we have heard a rhetoric of 
reconciliation” (ix). Mandela’s rhetoric of peace, reconciliation, and of “healing the wounds” in 
his inaugural speech reinforces the ethos that characterized his rhetoric all through the struggle. 
Mandela’s leadership of dynamism, diplomacy, and kairotic ontology is made manifest through a 
balance of conciliation and directness. Therefore, his radical shift proves quite challenging but 
successful as the entire people of South Africa (whether white, Black, Indians, Asians, or 
Coloured) become his constituency.  
Drawing upon Burke’s notion of dramatistic pentad as well as his concepts of merger and 
division, this chapter examines how Mandela enacts a merger with the entire South African 
populace when he becomes president. Burke articulates the concept of merger and division as unity 
and plurality as well as a progressive development from homogeneity to heterogeneity (A 
Grammar of Motives, 404). The concept deploys the birth metaphor to describe the offspring who 
is “substantially one with the parent” in a merger undergoing a division at the point of birth. Burke 
argues that dialectical merger and division play key roles in persuasion because they are 
complementary to identification. Mandela’s anti-apartheid rhetoric makes him substantially one 
with Black South Africans; however, he enacts both a merger and division from these same Blacks 
at the birth of the nation. 
210 
 
The birth metaphor is realized when the apartheid system is dismantled in order to give 
birth to a united nation, instead of a divided country. The end of apartheid necessitates Mandela’s 
metamorphosis from being consubstantial with the oppressed to being one with the nation. 
According to Salazar, Mandela’s first parliamentary speech “was attempting the nation’s 
“delivery” …as labor or travail of the South African nation and of the orator himself” (21). 
Mandela’s presidential role as parent to the nation embraces all South Africans (the oppressors, 
the oppressed, and those in-between). This embrace helps to midwife the birth of South Africa and 
usher in the peace and reconciliation process. The effect of Mandela’s rhetoric in bringing about 
nationhood, peace, and reconciliation will be investigated under the following subheadings: (1) 
Deconstruction of Contextual Discourse Deploying Education as a Privileging Tool, (3) The 
Thorny Path to Peace Negotiation, (4) Mandela’s Dynamism and Diplomacy in the Peace Process, 
(5) Rhetorical Merger and Division in Birthing the Nation, (6) Mandela’s Transformation from 
Activist to Nation Builder, and (7) The Catharsis of Truth and Reconciliation. 
 
Deconstruction of Contextual Discourse 
After apartheid had been dismantled and Mandela had been elected the first Black 
president, he was confronted by a complex situation that was triangulated. The threefold problems 
Mandela had to deal with were economic, political, and rhetorical in nature. These problems 
threatened to tear the fragile fabric of the new nation apart. The problems were such that Blacks 
who now had political power were left without any economic power. The whites who had the 
economic power firmly in their hands felt threatened by their lack of political and numerical power. 
Mandela had the onerous task of crafting the rhetoric needed to bring all the groups who were 
suspicious of each other into that space where they could learn to take and yield. It was also 
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important to create a new economic system where Blacks could be given the platform required to 
climb out of their impoverished state without giving the impression that their white counterparts 
were being deprived of their economic power. Blacks were impatient because they had been 
oppressed for too long, and the anti-apartheid struggle had taken a toll on them in many different 
ways.  
 It was imperative for Mandela to strive for the equilibrium that would forestall a counter 
white insurgency. The racist rhetoric that helped to create the imbalance in the first place was 
firmly etched in the minds of some South Africans, and the racial ideology behind that rhetoric 
needed to be deconstructed. White hegemony was established and perpetuated in discourse; 
therefore, it would require discourse to dismantle it. Fairclough examines such discourse through 
sociolinguistic, psycholinguistic, and pragmatic lenses in order to account for the “what?” as well 
as the ‘why?’ and ‘how?’ questions used to describe the social relationships of power. A 
combination of these theoretical approaches to language use helps to explain the relationships 
between language and power and ideology.  
This relationship helps to throw light on how existing sociolinguistic orders are created, 
how they are sustained, and how they might be changed to the advantage of those who are 
dominated by them (Fairclough, 8). According to Fairclough, a critical linguist, “[i]deologies are 
closely linked to power, because the nature of the ideological assumptions embedded in particular 
conventions, and so the nature of those conventions themselves, depend on the power relations 
which underlie the conventions; and because they are a means of legitimizing existing social 
relations and differences of power, simply through the recurrence of ordinary, familiar ways of 
behaving which take these relations and power differences for granted” (Language, 2). Therefore, 
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it can be argued that racism is an ideology that constructs power when it is embedded within the 
conventions that shape social relations.  
The power constructed by racist discourse makes it important to examine the questions 
raised by Chilton, a cognitive linguist, such as: “why this kind of category formation is so persistent 
a factor in social behavior, and why the language forms associated with it are so potent” (Chilton, 
24).  Finding answers to such questions will be fruitful for interrogating how the human mind 
constructs as well as responds to social and political discourse. These constructs are connected to 
ideologies that “are closely linked to language because using language is the commonest form of 
social behavior, and the form of social behavior where we rely on ‘common-sense’ assumptions” 
(Fairclough, Language, 2).  Chilton argues that the manner in which discourse constructs social 
reality implies that some sort of causal relationship exists between language use and social action.  
This causal relationship makes CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis) productive as a tool for 
explaining racism and xenophobia. CDA accounts for how “particular language users establish 
exclusionary attitudes and maybe practices by recurrently and selectively asserting certain 
attributes (i.e. social roles, behavioral characteristics, physical appearance, etc.) of social and 
ethnic groups” (Chilton, 24). CDA is effective for establishing the connection of context as 
existing in “a causal relationship to social action (by which we might understand social 
relationships, group membership, the formations of social and political institutions and the like)” 
(Chilton, 23). This connection paves the way for showing that discourse as social action is 
transforming and transformative. The transformation caused by contextual discourse is 
exemplified by Mandela when political changes cause him to deploy language differently from 
how he had in the past. As he moves towards the political center, Mandela faces new challenges 
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and possibilities that force him to make strategic rhetorical changes. For example, when he 
addressed South African business executives just before he was elected president, he says to them:  
We are very conscious of the critical importance of such matters as the confidence in 
the future of both the national and international business communities and investors. 
We accept that both these sectors are very important to the process of the further 
development of our economy. We can, therefore, have no desire to go out of our way 
to bash them and to undermine or weaken their confidence in the safety of their 
property and the assurance of a fair return on their investment. But we believe that they 
must be sensitive to the fact that any democratic government will have to respond to 
the justified popular concern about the grossly unequal distribution of economic power 
(“We Must End the Old Social Order and Bring in a New One,” 63).  
 It is interesting to observe what Mandela does in the above speech. When he uses the 
pronouns “we,” “our,” and “us,” he is identifying with these group of people who hold all the 
economic power as his equals. Although Blacks do not have the desired political power yet, 
Mandela is communicating with the assurance that the political power will eventually be attained. 
Therefore, he is projecting towards the future based on the present reality and having in mind the 
past injustices of apartheid. In essence, the assurance of power is reflected in Mandela’s speech. 
The way power shapes human behaviour is captured by Fairclough, who argues that “[p]ower 
exists in various modalities, including the concrete and unmistakable modality of physical force. 
It is a fact, if a sad fact, that power is often enough exercised through depriving people of their 
jobs, their homes, and their lives, as recent events in for example South Africa have reminded us” 
(3-4). For Fairclough, power is not just a matter of language; power assumes various forces. 
Identifying the various modalities of power helps to produce a wide variance between the exercise 
of power through coercion of many different forms such as physical violence, and the exercise of 
power through consent or acquiescence. Mandela attempts to gain consent among white South 
Africans even before he becomes president by pointing out the unequal power relations between 
Blacks and whites.  
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Achievement of assent in apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa was quite a 
complicated issue because the interests were as diverse as the groups. Mandela captures the 
complexity of the South African socio-economic and political milieu in the following words: “We 
hope that the fact that we are meeting here signifies that there is a common acceptance among us 
that we necessarily must cooperate to ensure that the people do indeed enjoy a decent standard of 
living in conditions of freedom. To establish a system of cooperation requires that we have to 
overcome the mutual mistrust that, to some degree, undoubtedly exists between us. And we do not 
have to elaborate the reasons for that distrust” (We Must End the Old Social Order and Bring in a 
New One,” 58). Mandela’s rhetorical shifts is evident in how the pronoun “us” is sometimes 
inclusive of the Business Executives who are all whites and who are in control of the national 
economy; while at other times, the use excludes them.  
To overcome the unequal economic power between whites and Blacks, the need for consent 
is particularly important. To buttress the point, Mandela argues that the most important clauses of 
the Freedom Charter have to do with job creation and the provision of food, housing, and education 
for all. The reason that these clauses are so important is because “on one side of the street are the 
haves, and on the other, the have-nots; on one side, the whites, and on the other, the Blacks” (“We 
Must End the Old Social Order and Bring in a New One,” 57-58).  Mandela deploys rhetoric in a 
way that can be described as covert in the sense that both he and his white audience can recognize 
that the freedom struggle was heading in only one direction, and that direction was victory for 
Blacks. Whites would have to yield political power as well as some economic power in order to 
ensure that there is a decent standard of living for Blacks. However, he does not merely use facts 
to make his rhetorical appeal. In his usual manner, he resorts to narratives, poetry, and rhetorical 
questions to disturb the conscience of his audience. 
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He employs a rhetorical strategy of drawing upon the Western rhetorical tradition by 
appropriating the English nursery rhyme “Baa, baa, black sheep” and Shakespeare’s Merchant of 
Venice to connect with his white audience. He says, for example, “you will, I am certain, remember 
the rhyme: Baa, baa, black sheep” (“We Must End the Old Social Order and Bring in a New One,” 
58). After reciting the rhyme, he says to them “could it be that when the children composed this 
simple verse, they could understand that it was only the figurative Black sheep that would – 
because it was itself excluded – have a sufficient sense of justice to remember the little boy down 
the lane! Was it because they had seen in practice that the white sheep apportioned only a tenth of 
its wool, or none at all, to the little boy down the lane?” (“We Must End the Old Social Order and 
Bring in a New One,”58). Mandela uses the idea of “a tenth” or “none at all” to allude to the 
desperate economic situation of Blacks – “the have-nots” – to make an appeal to these Business 
Executives who are the “haves.” It can be argued that Mandela deployed the metaphor of numbers 
and percentages to evoke pathos in the minds of these business men who could appreciate the 
effect that such numerical strength or a lack of could have in economic terms. Therefore, this 
rhetorical strategy is effective for setting up the stage for deconstructing racism and the impact of 
racist policies in the lives of South African Blacks.  To further depict the power of racism to blind 
people to the pain of the “other,” Mandela draws upon Shylock’s character in the following words:  
Many a time the martingales and deprived people whom we represent have posed the 
same bitter questions that Shylock posed in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice: “Hath 
not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, 
passions? Questions such as these, whether about black sheep or the universal nature 
of human pain and suffering, can only be posed by people by people who are 
discriminated against, in a society that condemns them to persistent deprivation of the 
material artifacts and the dignity that are due to them as human beings. We pose them 
for the same reasons (“We Must End the Old Social Order and Bring in a New 
One,”58-59). 
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Mandela’s analogies in the above quotation are particularly provocative because this 
audience would rather not have to answer such questions. This rhetorical strategy is especially 
nuanced because the “other” is placed on the same level as the racist that Shylock evokes in the 
play. However, in drawing upon the Western canon and rhetorical tradition, he connects with this 
audience on many levels. He connects with them on the level of equals when he used the pronoun 
“we” in “the people we represent.” He shifts away from them by using the “us” versus “them” 
polarity that can be accusatory. He identifies with oppressors on the level of equal power and shifts 
ground to stand with the oppressed when he says that “We pose them [questions] for the same 
reasons [unequal power relations].” This continuous shifting of rhetorical grounds characterizes 
Mandela’s discourse during the negotiation process and after he becomes the president.  
Mandela’s shifts are rhetorically appealing because he continuously exposes the unequal 
power relations in South African as one of the contexts for producing assent and cooperation in 
the peace process. Mandela’s rhetorical moves validates Fairclough’s argument that power 
relations depend on both coercion and consent in varying proportions to portray the fact that 
ideology is the primary means of manufacturing consent (Fairclough, 3-4). Mandela’s arguments 
connect to Fairclough’s idea that unequal power relations have huge implications. According to 
Mandela, “[t]he issue we are addressing is one of power and the uses and abuses of power. Those 
among us who are white come from that section of our population that has power, and in a sense, 
total power over the lives of the Black people. Nothing within the sphere human endeavor is 
excepted – be it political, economic, military, educational, or any other. Indeed, this even extends 
to the right to decide who shall live and who shall die” (“We Must End the Old Social Order and 
Bring in a New One,” 59). In essence, discourse in context is a significant factor for producing 
economic and political domination of the “other.” Such domination is described by Derrida as a 
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cause and effect phenomenon emanating from language use. According to Derrida, “the properly 
performative act must produce (proclaim) what in the form of a constative [all emphasis in the 
original] act it merely claims, declares, assures it is describing” (18). In essence, there is a sequence 
to the various acts, and in the case of racial violence, the constative precedes the performative act.  
The extent to which racial violence, as a performative act, can deform a society is often 
overlooked; however, “not all performatives, a theoretician [J. L. Austin] of speech acts would 
say, are “happy.” That depends on a great number of conditions and conventions that form the 
context of such events. In the case of South Africa, certain “conventions” were not respected, the 
violence was too great, visibly too great, at a moment when this visibility extended to a new 
international scene, and so on” (Derrida, 18). This violence derives its magnitude from the fact 
that the white community was too much in the minority, and the disproportion of wealth was too 
flagrant and too skewed in favour of whites.  Consequently, the harm caused by this disproportion 
to South African people of color was excessive. The excessive effect of Black impoverishment by 
the apartheid regime was manifesting in the bitterness and impatience of the Black population.  
 
Deploying Education as a Privileging Tool 
The domination of Black South Africans was executed through several methods such as “a 
parody of education, the hasty manufacture of a few thousand subordinate functionaries’ “boys,” 
artisans, office clerks, and interpreters necessary for the smooth operation of business” (Desai 
Gaurav and Nair Supriya, 62). Based on Gaurav and Supriya’s evaluations, the South African 
situation was typical of colonial oppression that aims to ensure the colonized remain below the 
poverty level.  Mandela captures this tactic of impoverishing South African Blacks in the following 
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words: “before the Nationalists came to power, the disparities in funding tell a story of racist 
education. The government spent about six times as much per white student as per African student. 
Education was not compulsory for Africans and was free only in the primary grades. Less than 
half of all African children of school age attended any school at all, and only a tiny number of 
Africans were graduated from high school. Even this amount of education proved distasteful to 
the Nationalists” (Long Walk, 166). The main reason that education for Africans would be 
distasteful to the Nationalist is because education was the gateway to intellectual and economic 
empowerment.   
According to Mandela, “[t]he Afrikaner has always been unenthusiastic about education 
for Africans. To him, it was simply a waste, for the African was inherently ignorant and lazy and 
no amount of education could remedy that. The Afrikaner was traditionally hostile to Africans 
learning English, for English was a foreign tongue to the Afrikaner and the language of 
emancipation to us” (Long Walk, 166). The adjectives – distasteful, unenthusiastic, and hostile – 
used by Mandela to describe the Afrikaner’s attitude towards education for Africans depict the 
gravity of the emotions that gave rise to such destructive policies. Both the policies and the inherent 
contradictions in the policy that depict such a warped view of Africans magnify the psychology of 
racist apartheid. If Africans were ignorant and lazy as claimed by the Afrikaners, it would be 
assumed that education would be proposed as the antidote and not the other way around.  
Therefore, the branding of Africans as ignorant and lazy was just an excuse to deny them 
the much-needed education. Africans were being denied education because an educated Black 
population had the potential to rise above their current social, political, and economic conditions 
to be on an equal level with their white counterparts. In essence, education of Blacks implied a 
destabilization of the hierarchy/hegemony of white supremacy. Mandela’s take on the sub-
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standard education indicate that Afrikaners did not want the potential risk of an enlightened so-
called inferior race. That is because it would be much easier to suppress an ignorant group than to 
dominate an educated one. The idea of denying Blacks education and resources for improvement 
connects strongly to Fairclough’s concept of the various modalities of power.  
Theorizing the modalities of power helps to put in perspective how denying standard 
education to Blacks was an attempt to colonize their minds. Mandela links the substandard 
education designed for Blacks to the strategy of permanently subjecting them to an inferior 
position. For example, Mandela argues that Dr. Hendrick Verwoerd, the minister of Bantu 
education, reasoned that the education offered to Black must be to train and teach the people in 
accordance with their opportunities in life. Verwoerd could not imagine an African population 
with intellectual potentials; therefore, it was useless to educate them. Quoting Verwoerd, Mandela 
says that “[t]here is no place for the Bantu in the European community above the level of certain 
levels of labor,” he said. In short, Africans should be trained to be menial workers, to be in a 
position of perpetual subordination to the white man” (Long Walk, 167).  Mandela’s argument is 
proof that the constative act of labelling Blacks inferior set the stage for the performative act of 
their perpetual inferiorization through the apartheid education policy.  
Mandela depicts how the economic, social, and political subjugation of Blacks was 
designed, using the educational system as the foundational framework. This framework placed a 
ceiling on their chances for opportunities by putting a cap on how much education a Black person 
could attain. Consequently, the social, political, and economic growth of Blacks was 
predetermined by an educational policy designed to inferiorize them. To concretize their 
inferiorization, Blacks could neither vote nor hold public offices; and this exclusion from power 
erased their potential for self-determination. The tenacity with which the apartheid government 
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pursued the subjugation of Blacks was evident in the various levels of physical, economic, and 
psychological injustice meted out to the Black population. These injustices caused great anger and 
pain in Mandela as well as other Black leaders, and the resentment made them all the more 
determined to dismantle apartheid.  
 
The Thorny Path to Peace Negotiation  
Mandela’s long incarceration did not end the anti-apartheid struggle; instead, there was an 
escalation of violence with the country tethering on the verge of economic, social, and political 
collapse. The South African socio-political and economic landscape was greatly racialized, 
polarized, and fragmented. Crapanzano describes the situation prior to the release of Mandela as a 
time when South Africa “is caught in a deadened time of waiting. For most whites, waiting is 
compounded by fear; for most Blacks, however great their poverty or despair, waiting is 
illuminated by hope, by a belief that time is on their side. For the Coloureds and Asians, there is 
both fear and hope in waiting” (xxii). This deadened time of waiting and the immense suffering 
experienced by South Africans generally and Blacks particularly caused Mandela to step into the 
vacuum created by the stalemate between the government and the leaders of the anti-apartheid 
struggle. 
The reasons for the impasse were quite glaring, and the root causes of the conflicts that 
gave birth to the impasse were often submerged in identification, moralization, and the subjective 
ways that terminologies were interpreted among the conflicting parties. The impasse required 
transcendence, which readily undercuts racial and philosophical affiliations in order to mitigate 
and resolve the lingering conflicts. Transcendence accounts for Mandela’s shift in mindset that 
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resulted in a transitional rhetoric, while remaining faithful to the tenets of the anti-apartheid 
struggle. The first inkling of transcendence on Mandela’s part can be glimpsed from the 
correspondences he initiated from prison in the following words: “THE DEEPENING [capitals in 
the original] political crisis in our country has been a matter of grave concern to me for quite some 
time, and I consider it necessary in the national interest for the African National Congress and the 
government to meet urgently to negotiate an effective settlement” (Mandela, “The ANC and the 
Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political Settlement,” 9). Mandela’s rhetorical 
shifts can be seen in the way he deploys the English lexical structure to convey a meaning potential 
that is dynamic. 
The usage of the pronoun ‘I’ by Mandela on several occasions in the letter to the apartheid 
government indicate an individuality that may be viewed as overshadowing his collective intent. 
Rather than view the individualized pronoun “I” as a deliberate attempt to separate himself from 
the collective frame of the struggle, it should be examined as a depiction of Mandela’s 
transcendence. When analyzed vis a vis his initiative of brokering peace, Mandela’s language 
symbolizes a practice of rising above the complex chaos that the nation had degenerated into. The 
incessant violence, the rising death rate, especially the death of Black South Africans, coupled 
with the ostracization of South Africa in the comity of nations all converged to galvanize Mandela 
into making the peace moves. Mandela’s letter to the government from prison and his employment 
of the pronouns “I” and “We” served to symbolize his singularity on the one hand and the 
collectivity symbolized by the ANC as the arrowhead of the anti-apartheid struggle on the other 
hand. Mandela’s deployment of the individual and collective pronouns for resolving the apartheid 
conflict exemplifies Burke’s ideas in the five key terms of dramatism. The five key terms – Act, 
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Scene, Agent, Agency, and Purpose – help to determine the motives behind certain discourses, 
especially that employed in conflict. According to Burke,  
Men may violently disagree about the purposes behind a given act, or about the 
character of the person who did it, or how he did it, or in what kind of situation he 
acted; or they may even insist upon totally different words to name the act itself. But 
be that as it may, any complete statement about motives will offer some kind [emphasis 
in the original] of answers to these five questions: what was done (act), when or where 
it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he did it (agency), and why (purpose) (A 
Grammar, xv).  
The internal relationship between these five terms, their possibilities for transformation, 
and their range of permutations and combinations have bearings on human motives. The internal 
relationship enables the appreciation of Mandela’s role in dealing with the apartheid complexities 
and their implications for defining the context of the political impasse. Mandela’s individualistic 
actions and language require rigorous examination in light of Burke’s argument that “[r]andom or 
unsystematic statements about motives could be considered as fragments of a philosophy” (A 
Grammar, xvi). In essence, Mandela’s philosophy of communal harmony that is in tandem with 
his African identity provides the framework for understanding the motives behind his rhetoric. The 
social, racial, and political cleavages in South Africa (while Mandela languished in prison) affected 
him personally in a way that makes the nation of South Africa a personification of Mandela’s own 
physical body. Mandela’s principle of looking beyond himself informs the trope of equating the 
nation with his being. To extend the idea that grammatical resources represent principles of 
identification, Mandela’s linguistic deployments require investigating in the context of his 
rhetorical evolution over the course of the struggle.  
Burke argues that various philosophies are casuistries through which these principles apply 
to temporal situations. Therefore, the term ‘Scene’ simply acts as a blanket term for the concept of 
background or setting in general, which is also a name for any context in which acts or agents 
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perform (Burke, A Grammar, xvi). The scene in question here (a fragmented South Africa) 
necessitated the act (of initiating correspondences with the government) on the part of Mandela, 
the agent. This act was considered unwise because Mandela’s philosophy of rising above the 
contextual complications of the conflict and its consequent political deadlock was not apparent to 
everyone. However, the motive and the act were transcendental because Mandela sacrificed his 
personal interest for the general good.  
Mandela captures that transcendence in the idea of “national interest. This principle 
resonates with Mandela’s desire for peace, equality, and unity that makes up the why (purpose) of 
his act. In addition, the role of “act”, “agent”, “agency”, and “purpose” in the central place of 
“scene” (Burke, A Grammar, xvii) operate as the ultimate ground for human action. According to 
Burke, a person may employ “God,” another uses “nature,” a third uses “environment,” or 
“history,” or “means of production” as a philosophical motivation for action. And, “since each 
philosophical idiom will characterize this background differently, there will remain the question 
of which characterization is “right” or “more nearly right” (Burke, A Grammar, xvii). In order to 
examine whose motivation is more right in the case of the South African stalemate, Mandela’s 
actions make the question of rightness quite interesting.  
The point being made here is that not only did Mandela risk his reputation and position 
with the ANC, he also risked failure in the peace process. Despites these risks, he was undeterred 
from initiating the peace moves because his concern for the national state of affairs transcended 
all other concerns. The suffering endured by the leaders of the anti-apartheid struggle paled into 
insignificance when compared to the deplorable living conditions of Black South Africans as a 
result of the protracted conflict. The reality of how bad things had become in South Africa is 
captured by Mandela in the following words:  
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I am disturbed, as many other South Africans no doubt are, by the specter of a South 
Africa split into two hostile camps – blacks (the term blacks is used in a broad sense 
to include all those who are not whites) on the one side and whites on the other – 
slaughtering one another, by acute tensions which are building dangerously in 
practically every sphere of our lives – a situations which, in turn, preshadows more 
violent clashes in the days ahead. This is the crisis that has forced me to act (“The 
ANC and the Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political 
Settlement,”10). 
 Mandela’s rhetoric in the peace process requires serious scrutiny. That is because his 
rhetoric undercuts the manoeuvrings usually employed in conflict situations. Such manoeuvring is 
described by Burke as a move “to formulate the basic stratagems which people employ, in endless 
variations, and consciously or unconsciously, for the outwitting or cajoling of one another. Since 
all these devices have a “you and me” quality about them, being “addressed” to some person or to 
some advantage, we classed them broadly under the heading of a Rhetoric” (Burke, A Grammar, 
xvii). Mandela does not seek to either outwit or cajole; rather, his tone is matter-of-fact, 
informative, conciliatory, and sometimes antagonistic. When he employs the “I/we” versus “you” 
pronoun, it is with the intention of collapsing the walls that these oppositions normally erect in a 
conflict situation.  
Mandela’s rhetoric explicitly illustrates Burke’s key terms of dramatism as a way of 
showing how he takes charge of the situation. It can be argued that Burke’s concepts of “act,” 
“agent,” “scene,” “agency,” and “purpose” work together to depict the shifts in Mandela’s rhetoric. 
In essence, the shifts are enacted when he uses language that portrays conciliation in one instance 
and in another instance, his language is accusatory when addressing the apartheid government. It 
can be argued that this shift was not an effort to exploit the situation to gain any advantage; instead, 
Mandela deploys this rhetorical shift to expose the level to which Blacks have been totally stripped 
of power. In fact, Mandela’s words reveal how the people had been suppressed and how Black 
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leaders have been targets of apartheid repression through scapegoating. The leaders of the anti-
apartheid struggle were framed as terrorists and communists to justify their scapegoating.  
By implication, Black leaders and white supporters of the movement were depicted as 
troublemakers who were being blamed for the instability in apartheid South Africa. By labeling 
these leaders communists and terrorists, the apartheid government was acting out a script. The 
script was based on the knowledge that “[t]errorism inevitably reflected poorly on those who used 
it, undermining any public support it might otherwise garner” (Mandela, Long Walk, 282). This 
labelling created huge problems for Mandela and other ANC leaders because this labelling 
provided an excuse for their brutalization. Such labelling ensured the leaders got the worst 
treatment in prison because “if a man worked for the prison service, he was probably brainwashed 
by the government’s propaganda. He would have believed that we were terrorists and communists 
who wanted to drive the white man into the sea” (Mandela, Long Walk, 419). Despite being 
scapegoated and severely punished for his beliefs, Mandela always hoped for and worked towards 
cooperation, which accounts for his peace moves and ultimate call for reconciliation.  
 
Mandela’s Dynamism and Diplomacy in the Peace Process  
The idea of preserving lives and cohesion in the community was a part of his African 
communal trope, and it played a key role in Mandela’s response to conflict. Consequently, even 
when Mandela shifted from nonviolence to armed struggle, he and the ANC chose sabotage 
particularly “[b]ecause it did not involve loss of life [and] it offered the best hope for reconciliation 
among the races afterward. We did not want to start a blood feud between white and Black. 
Animosity between Afrikaner and Englishman was still sharp fifty years after the Anglo-Boer 
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War; what would race relations be like between white and Black if we provoked a civil war? 
Sabotage had the added virtue of requiring the least manpower” (Mandela, Long Walk, 282 -283). 
Parenthood and transcendence, whereby every form of partisanship is submerged for the interest 
of the South African state, describe Mandela’s choices and peace efforts. Mandela’s transcendence 
enabled his transformation because he changes from the agent that is acted upon by the scene 
(racist apartheid system) and the co-agents (the implementers of apartheid policies) into the 
reversal role of a counter-agent. He becomes the counter-agent, who is acted upon and in turn acts 
upon the scene and the agent.  
Mandela employed an interesting strategy in his peace efforts that was constantly 
morphing. In essence, he would stand firm when he needed to and yield at other times. Mandela 
stood firm when he argued in support of the ANC by pointing out that some of the preconditions 
for negotiation stated by the government, “namely that the ANC must first renounce violence, 
break with the SACP, and abandon its demand for majority rule” (“The ANC and the Government 
Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political Settlement,” 11), were implausible. Bearing in mind 
that the same conditions produced the stalemate in the first place, Mandela put forward the 
argument that showed how the government was more responsible for the stalemate than the ANC 
leaders. Therefore, it can be argued that Mandela’s rhetoric in the letter to the government bears 
the hallmark of diplomacy. For example, Mandela argues against the government in the following 
words:  
No dedicated ANC member will ever heed a call to break with the SACP. We regard 
such as a purely divisive government strategy. It is in fact a call on us to commit 
suicide. Which man of honor will ever desert a lifelong friend at the instance of a 
common opponent and still retain a measure of credibility among his people? Which 
opponent will ever trust such a treacherous freedom fighter? Yet this is what the 
government is, in effect, asking us to do – to desert our faithful allies. We will not fall 
into that trap (“The ANC and the Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective 
Political Settlement,” 15).    
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Mandela simulates a courtroom in his letter by accusing the government of duplicity and 
producing an irrefutable argument that is logical and profound. He strategically turns the accuser 
into the accused as he had done on previous occasions. The strategy of turning the tables on the 
apartheid government is achieved through forensic logic that lays out proofs of deception and 
double standard on the part of the government. Mandela captures this double standard by pointing 
out that “the government also accuses us of being agents of the Soviet Union. The truth is that the 
ANC is nonaligned, and we welcome support from the East and West, from the socialist and 
capitalist countries. The only difference, as we have explained on countless occasions before, is 
that the socialist countries supply us with weapons, which the West refuses to give us” (“The ANC 
and the Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political Settlement,” 15). This 
directness was a part and parcel of his leadership and rhetorical style. Mandela stated that the ANC 
had no intention of changing their stand on the question of choosing whom to be loyal to.  
He argues that “the government’s exaggerated hostility to the SACP and its refusal to have 
any dealings with that party have a hollow ring. Such an attitude is not only out of step with the 
growing cooperation between the capitalist and socialist countries in different parts of the world, 
but it is also inconsistent with the policy of the government itself, when dealing with our 
neighboring states” (“The ANC and the Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political 
Settlement,” 15).   The point Mandela makes here is that the apartheid regime was being 
hypocritical in their hostility toward the ANC alliances. The hypocrisy is evident in the fact that 
“not only has South Africa concluded treaties with the Marxist states of Angola and Mozambique 
– quite rightly in our opinion – but she also wants to strengthen ties with Marxist Zimbabwe. The 
government will certainly find it difficult, if not altogether impossible, to reconcile its readiness to 
work with foreign Marxists for the peaceful resolution of mutual problems, with its 
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uncompromising refusal to talk to South African Marxists” (Mandela, “The ANC and the 
Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political Settlement,” 15). The double standard 
enacted by the apartheid regime exemplifies the moral absence that racism breeds.  
According to Mandela, “[t]he reason for this inconsistency is obvious. As I have already 
said, the government is still too deeply committed to the principle of white domination and, despite 
lip service to reform, it is deadly opposed to the sharing of political power with Blacks. And the 
SACP is merely being used as a smoke screen to retain the monopoly of political power” (“The 
ANC and the Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political Settlement,” 15). Hafriza 
Burhanudeen describes five features that diplomatic language should possess. These features 
include (1) that language use be inoffensive, sensitive, and non-aggressive to avoid conflict in a 
shared linguistic space, (2) to identify what should be said constructively, as well as accentuate 
what must not be said, (3) to regard language as a tool for building, making and promoting peace, 
(4) that communication must be tactful and tactical, and (5) that attitudes, beliefs and emotions be 
articulated in a positive manner by using adjectives, verbs and nouns that do not degrade other 
persons in spoken and written texts. An examination of Mandela’s letter to the government may 
give the impression that he violates the principles of diplomatic language.  
The strong language employed by Mandela gives an interesting twist to his directness as a 
diplomatic strategy for negotiating peace. Diplomatic language often employs wordiness, modal 
auxiliaries such as ‘must,’ ‘shall,’ and ‘will’ as well as repetition in order to adequately convey the 
intended message. It must be born in mind that the goal of diplomatic language is the promotion 
of mutual cooperation for resolving conflicts. According to Levinson, “context is understood to 
cover the identities of participants, the temporal and spatial parameters of the speech event, and 
… the beliefs, knowledge, and intentions of the participants in that speech event, and no doubt 
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much besides” (5). The fact is that Mandela’s language demonstrated that context played a key 
role in arriving at the meaning potential needed for breaking deadlocks in a conflict. The context 
of the apartheid reality and the anti-apartheid struggle makes the pragmatic nature of Mandela’s 
rhetoric quite exigent. It is significant to note that Mandela’s letter meets the required elements of 
Grice’s co-operative principles. The co-operative principle recommends that you “make your 
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction 
of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Levinson, 101). This co-operative principle 
operates under the four maxims of quality, quantity, relevance, and manner.  
The maxims recommend how interlocutors make contributions in a speech event in order 
not to violate the co-operative principles. For example, (1) “the maxim of quality” requires that a 
speaker does not say what they believe to be false or that for which they lack evidence, (2) “the 
maxim of quantity” recommends that a speaker makes their contribution as informative as is 
required for the current purposes of exchange, does not make their information more informative 
than is required, (3) “the maxim of relevance” indicates that speakers make their contributions 
relevant, and (4) “the maxim of manner” requires that speakers be perspicuous, and avoid 
obscurity, avoid ambiguity, be brief, and be orderly (Levinson, 101 – 102). All of these maxims 
appear to be the blueprint for diplomatic language. Considering that Mandela’s language 
incorporates these elements, it can be argued that he employed diplomatic language despite 
presenting certain hard truths. 
 The language of diplomacy is embedded in etiquette, yet it has not succeeded in 
eliminating conflicts thus making diplomacy an evolving process. Diplomacy can be described as 
a process whereby conflicts are prevented and resolved through mediation, conciliation, and 
negotiation. Therefore, diplomacy involves reconciling different values and historical experiences 
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as well as shaking up conditions that hinder communication and peace. The contextual 
complexities of apartheid South Africa makes Mandela’s diplomatic language relevant to the 
discourse context. The South Africa scene at the time Mandela wrote his letter in 1989 to the 
government enables a greater appreciation of the reason behind Mandela’s intervention and his 
dynamic rhetoric.  
Regardless of how Mandela’s intervention is viewed, the most important consideration 
should revolve around the fact that he made a significant move when no one else was willing to 
take the risk. The risks entailed losing in the peace talk or/and being denounced by his followers 
and co-leaders because “both sides regarded discussions as a sign of weakness and betrayal” (Read, 
318). Mandela depicted Read’s point of view in his letter to the government in the following words: 
“it is in this spirit [of an open mind] that I have undertaken this mission, and I sincerely hope that 
nothing will be done or said here that will force me to revise my views on this aspect” (“The ANC 
and the Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political Settlement,” 11). The risk of 
appearing weak once again or of being accused of betrayal by his fellow Blacks makes Read’s idea 
of transformational leadership highly instructive.  
According to Read, “[s]uccessful transformational leadership depends upon leaders [who 
produce] qualitative changes in a community’s attitudes, belief, and values, as opposed to mere 
‘transactional leadership’ that bargains with human beings instead of changing them” (319). This 
idea of changing the mindset of the people is evident in Mandela’s conversation with Walter 
Sisulu, one of the ANC top leaders. When he informed Walter that he had commenced talks with 
the government, Sisulu was suspicious. According to Mandela,  
I told him about my letter to the commissioner of prisons and my meeting with 
Coetsee. I said that I had discussed with Coetsee the idea of beginning talks with the 
government and that the government seemed interested. What were his views on the 
matter? I have been through thick and thin with Walter. He was a man of reason and 
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wisdom, and no man knew me better than he did. There was no one whose opinion I 
trusted or valued more. Walter considered what I told him. I could see he was 
uncomfortable, and at best, lukewarm. “In principle,” he said, “I am not against 
negotiations. But I would have wished that the government initiated talks with us rather 
than us initiating talks with them.” I replied that if he was not against negotiations in 
principle, what did it matter who initiated them? What mattered was what they 
achieved, not how they started. I told Walter that I thought we should move forward 
with negotiations and not worry about who knocked on the door first. Walter saw that 
my mind was made up and he said he would not stop me, but that he hoped I knew 
what I was doing (Long Walk, 534 – 535).  
Mandela’s logical reasoning and his ability to persuade his fellow ANC leaders stem from 
his dynamic and transformative leadership. These leadership qualities are captured by Read as a 
variable-sum rather than zero-sum game. The concept of the variable-sum is described as the 
incorporation of various perspectives into producing assent among conflicting views. This concept 
of variable-sum shaped Mandela’s leadership in essential ways because he consistently sought to 
persuade others (on all sides). The variable-sum style is traceable to the South African idea of 
Ubuntu, whereby there is no loser in a conflict. Mandela’s style enabled him to perceive common 
interests under circumstances in which a different person might easily make a different choice 
(Read, 318). In addition to Mandela’s leadership qualities, his rhetorical appeal tended to rely 
heavily on rhetorical questions, which the Western and African rhetorical traditions have in 
common.  
This rhetorical strategy pervades most of his speeches and writings as a means of probing 
deep into the motives of his adversaries and audience. It can be argued that his deployment of 
rhetorical questions connects strongly to his training as a lawyer – a profession that depends greatly 
on argumentation, logic, and dialectics in general. Mandela’s employment of layered tropes to 
great effect contributed to his rhetorical appeal. For example, the idea of not worrying about “who 
knocked on the door first” depicts the metaphor of a locked door, which is semiotically realized to 
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represent the political impasse. The locked door needed to be cracked open or possibly broken 
down in order move the country forward. 
 Mandela succeeded in persuading both sides of the need to negotiate for a peaceful 
resolution because he enacted the variable-sum game strategy, which proves that “[t]here is a 
common interest in reaching outcomes that are mutually advantageous” (Read, 320), rather than a 
zero-sum game in which more for one party means less for the other. The decision to reach out to 
the ‘enemy’ when he did was a rhetorical move that portrayed Mandela’s appreciation of kairos. 
It is important to examine Mandela’s employment of kairos in order to show how his foresight as 
a leader contributed greatly to his success.  For example, in his dialogue with his fellow leaders 
who were afraid that he might have sold out, he enacted a division. He refused to allow his agency 
to be regarded with undue suspicion.  
In a letter to Oliver Tambo, who had expressed fears that Mandela may have sold out to 
the enemy, Mandela says: “I replied to Oliver in a very terse letter saying that I was talking to the 
government about one thing and one thing only: a meeting between the National Executive 
Committee of the ANC and the South Africa government. I would not spell out the details, for I 
could not trust the confidentiality of the communication. I simply said the time had come for such 
talks and that would not compromise the organization in any way” (Long Walk, 536). Mandela’s 
words that “the time had come” connect to Bruce Barry and Robert J. Robinson’s concept of 
“ripeness.”  
To Barry and Robinson, “ripeness” “holds that a dispute is ready for constructive 
negotiation when there exists both a mutually detrimental stalemate that pushes the parties to come 
to the bargaining table and a shared opportunity for a mutually beneficial settlement that holds out 
the promise of an attractive outcome” (138). Mandela’s foresight exemplified such ripeness or 
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kairos, which he seizes upon after his release from prison. This ripeness is captured in the 
following words: “Our struggle has reached a decisive moment. We call on our people to seize this 
moment so that the process towards democracy is rapid and uninterrupted. We have waited too 
long for our freedom. We can no longer wait. Now is the time to intensify the struggle on all fronts” 
(Mandela, “Now is the Time to Intensify the Struggle,” 22). Mandela gave this rousing speech to 
his followers while negotiating with the government. This rhetorical strategy that appears like a 
doubleness depicts his appreciation of kairos. Although some people accused him of having sold 
out, Mandela’s singular act rescued South Africa from the brink of total collapse. Mandela’s 
effective rhetoric was largely dependent upon his dynamism, which he enacted during the period 
of negotiation. The effectiveness of his strategies is made manifest through the merger and division 
he exemplified in his independent actions while remaining faithful to the policies and aims of the 
ANC. 
 
Rhetorical Merger and Division in Birthing the Nation 
The concept of merger and division is exemplified more potently in dialectics. Burke 
examines dialectics as “reasoning from opinion; the discovery of truth by the give and take of 
converse and redefinition; the art of disputation; the processes of “interaction” between the verbal 
and the non-verbal; the competition of cooperation or the cooperation of competition; the spinning 
of terms out of terms, as the dialectician proceeds to make explicit the conclusion implicit in key 
terms or propositions used as generating principle” (A Grammar of Motives, 403). What is aimed 
for in dialectics is some form of agreement that is arrived at through the interplay of various factors. 
These factors modify one another and may appear as voices in a dialogue. Each voice contributes 
in partiality “to the development of the whole; or the placement of one thought or thing in terms 
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of its opposite; or the progressive or successive development and reconciliation of opposite; or so 
putting questions to nature that nature can give unequivocal answer” (Burke, A Grammar, 403). 
The idea of reconciling opposites plays a significant role in Mandela’s effort to bring peace to 
South Africa. Mandela’s rhetoric exhibits the metaphor of parenthood whereby a parent calls 
conflicting child to the table of negotiation and reconciliation. Mandela’s parenthood and 
transcendence are evident in his role of bridging the communication gap between the government 
and the people. For example, he says:  
I must add that the purpose of this discussion is not only to urge the government to talk 
to the ANC, but it is also to acquaint you with the views current among blacks, 
especially those in the Mass Democratic Movement. If I am unable to express these 
views frankly and freely, you will never know how the majority of South Africans 
think on the policy and actions of the government, you will never know how to deal 
with their grievances and demands. It is perhaps proper to remind you that the media 
here and abroad has given certain public figures in this country a rather negative image, 
not only in regards to human rights questions, but also in respect to their prescriptive 
stance when dealing with black leaders generally. The impression is shared not only 
by the vast majority of blacks but also by a substantial section of the whites. If I had 
allowed myself to be influenced by this impression. I would not even have thought of 
making this move. Nevertheless, I have come here with an open mind, and the 
impression I will carry away from this meeting will be determined almost exclusively 
by the manner in which you respond to my proposal (Mandela, “The ANC and the 
Government Must Meet to Negotiate an Effective Political Settlement,”10). 
The importance of a nation state at a time when the focus is shifting from nationalism to 
the concept of transnationalism and global citizenship requires serious examination. The degree 
of disenfranchisements suffered by Blacks in South Africa undermines the concept of global 
citizenship “where human rights connect with human responsibilities, as individuals and groups 
seek to mediate the terms of global integration and interdependence” (Chris Armstrong, 352). 
Blacks could not afford the luxury of thinking global under apartheid because they had no basic 
human rights like freedom of movement and engagement enjoyed by their counterpart across the 
globe. Citizenship, with its rights and privileges, is conferred on people through the processes of 
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birth or immigration; and though born in South Africa, Blacks could not enjoy those rights and 
privileges. Consequently, it was extremely necessary for the people to have a nation where they 
could experience the belongingness that had eluded them through the cruel system of apartheid. 
Mandela’s strategy of merger and division exemplifies the birth metaphor. He midwifes 
the birth of the nation through his ability to see things from various perspectives in the spirit of 
communal brotherhood. This communal brotherhood is an essential part of his braided rhetoric 
whereby the imbongi, who is an integral part of the African rhetorical tradition, plays the role of 
reconciling warring sides. This role of the imbongi is an element of his pragmatism, and it was 
certainly a contributory factor towards the birthing of the South African nation. Before Mandela 
intervened to break the deadlock, South Africa was not a nation. It was a country at war with itself. 
Mandela’s division from his fellow anti-apartheid leaders enabled him step into the role of the 
midwife and parent. This transformation results in a merger with the government in order to bring 
about a greater good. Ironically, he also enacts a division from the government when the need 
arises.  
The merger and division produced by Mandela’s actions connects to Burke’s argument that 
many kinds of transformations represent “[d]istinctions…[which] arise out of a great central 
moltenness, where all is merged” (A Grammar, xix). Mandela’s division from the scene while still 
merged with it in his incarceration is exemplified in the various actions and distinctions he 
ultimately enacts. These actions and distinctions produce a fluidity that is “thrown from a liquid 
center to the surface, where they have congealed” (Burke, A Grammar, xix). Mandela shows how 
these distinctions that serve as a return to their sources in an alchemic center were instrumental to 
the peace process. From this center, they may be remade and can again become molten liquid that 
may enter into new combination, which may be thrown forth as a new crust or a different 
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distinction (A Grammar, xix). To bring about reconciliation, Mandela takes on the risk of enacting 
a division from the ANC leaders when it was paramount to break the deadlock, while being merged 
with these same leaders in order to fulfil the ANC objectives.  
The move to negotiate with the government was a risk because he had not consulted with 
the executive committee of the ANC. He was risking the distrust of the ANC leaders because as 
Read points out, “[t]he ANC’s policy all along had been to seek negotiations with the South 
African government, but none of the ANC’s preconditions for talks – unbanning the ANC, 
releasing all political prisoners, allowing free and open political opposition- had been met. Under 
the circumstances, for Mandela to agree to talks could easily be seen as capitulation” (317). 
Mandela went ahead to make the overture to the government in order to forestall further loss of 
lives despite this obvious risk of appearing to have compromised his ethos and that of the ANC. 
His aptitude for initiating and helping to conclude the peace process can be described as being 
located in his African culture of communal brotherhood. This African sense of honour when 
combined with his acquired Western culture of justice makes Mandela a unique rhetor. This sense 
of honour made him to seek not to dishonour another human being. According to Mandela,  
I learned my lesson one day from an unruly donkey. We had been taking turns 
climbing up and down its back and when my chance came, I jumped on and the 
donkey bolted into a nearby thornbush. It bent its head, trying to unseat me, which 
it did, but not before the thorns had pricked and scratched my face, embarrassing 
me in front of my friends. Like the people of the East, Africans have a highly 
developed sense of dignity, or what the Chinese call “face.” I had lost face among 
my friends. Even though it was a donkey that unseated me, I learned that to 
humiliate another person is to make him suffer an unnecessarily cruel fate. Even as 
a boy, I defeated my opponents without dishonoring them (Long Walk, 10).  
The idea of honour, which guided Mandela during the negotiations for peace, was 
significant in bringing about a smooth transition.  In enacting a division with his fellow anti-
apartheid leaders, Mandela did not merely merge with any particular group; instead, he enacts a 
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merger with the entire people of South Africa regardless of race or ideology.  The dialectical 
opposition between individuality of division and the collectivity of a merger is not fully embodied 
in the prevailing context of peace negotiation. What is observed is that Mandela’s individuality is 
really a consubstantial merger in the sense he is now for all in general and for no one in particular. 
Mandela’s strategy of merger and division occurred within a lot of contextual manoeuvrings. The 
manoeuvring was exigent because of the fragmented state of the country. The dexterity with which 
he negotiated with integrity exemplified his sense of honour. His exemplary role resulted in his 
election as the first Black President of South African. Thus, a nation was born. 
 
Mandela’s Transformation from Activist to Nation Builder  
Mandela’s individuality was instrumental in his transformation from an activist to the 
father of the nation. This transformation is evident in the merger that he enacts with people of all 
races such as the business community (made up mostly of whites) and people of all ideological 
affiliations. The merger and division as a rhetorical strategy is most evident in his address to the 
South African Business Executives: “We Must End the Old Social Order and Bring in a New One.” 
The pronoun “we” and “us” pervades the entire speech as a way of symbolizing the collapsing 
wall of division. The existence of the wall is captured in the following words:  
Recently, I had the occasion to read an advertisement inserted in the British press 
by the Anglos American Corporation. It begins by quoting various clauses of the 
Freedom Charter, which have to do job creation and the provision of food, housing, 
and education. It then poses the very important and correct question: “If the South 
African economy doesn’t deliver, how can any politician hope to?” That in a sense 
encapsulates the significance of this conference. Both of us – you representing the 
business world and we a political movement – must deliver. The critical questions 
are whether we can in fact act together and whether it is possible for either one of 
us to deliver if we cannot or will not cooperate (Mandela, “We Must End the Old 
Social Order and Bring in a New One,” 57 – 58). 
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The lexical structure deployed, which has the inclusive pronouns “we” and “us,” dominates 
Mandela’s rhetoric as an example of rhetorical identification. Despite exploiting identification, 
Mandela’s rhetorical tactics are significant because the identification embodied is transformative 
in the sense that he aims to transform the ‘scene’ (South Africa) through the ‘agency’ of 
rhetoric/’us’ (South Africans), and the ultimate “purpose” is the chance for racial integration and 
equity. Mandela’s transformative rhetoric is itself transformed as he gradually moves from the 
divisive and exclusive pronouns of “we”/”us” versus “you” lexico-semantic discourse of his anti-
apartheid rhetoric to that of merger and inclusive pronouns of “us” and “we” as he moves towards 
the political center of power.  
For example, in describing the context of the exclusion of Blacks from power, Mandela 
serves to remind the powers that be of their role in producing political instability in South Africa. 
Mandela says that “[t]he cause of our discontent is, in part, our exclusion from the exercise of 
political power and our consequent condemnation to a situation of being the victims of the abuse 
of power. The inclusion of all people of South Africa within a genuinely democratic system will 
therefore remove this particular cause of our discontent” (Mandela, “We Must End the Old Social 
Order and Bring in a New One,” 59-60). Mandela’s words imply that the strategy of merger and 
division is deployed in dynamic ways. That is because he moves further away from the “I/we/us” 
versus “you/them/they” position towards the all-inclusive “we/us” and “you” upon his election as 
the president. Upon becoming President, Mandela combines the inclusive pronouns with the birth 
metaphor to depict that every South African is involved in bringing to birth this new nation from 
its old, wounded, and fragmented form. This birth metaphor is captured in Mandela’s inaugural 
speech in the following words:  
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Today, all of us do, by our presence here, and by our celebrations in other parts of our 
country and the world, confer glory and hope to newborn liberty. Out of the experience 
of an extraordinary human disaster that lasted too long, must be born a society of which 
all humanity will be proud. Our daily deeds as ordinary South Africans must produce 
an actual South African reality that will reinforce humanity's belief in justice, 
strengthen its confidence in the nobility of the human soul and sustain all our hopes 
for a glorious life for all. All this we owe both to ourselves and to the peoples of the 
world who are so well represented here today. To my compatriots, I have no hesitation 
in saying that each one of us is as intimately attached to the soil of this beautiful 
country as are the famous jacaranda trees of Pretoria and the mimosa trees of the 
bushveld. Each time one of us touches the soil of this land, we feel a sense of personal 
renewal. The national mood changes as the seasons change. We are moved by a sense 
of joy and exhilaration when the grass turns green and the flowers bloom (Mandela, 
“Inaugural Speech, Pretoria”).  
Mandela’s braided rhetoric is made manifest in the employment of the birth, land/soil, 
season, and the flora/fauna metaphors that serve to delineate a spring time when nature is reborn 
or renewed in life and beauty. The connection to the soil is an African rhetorical topos that serves 
to show how the African identity is embedded within the soil, and the soil acts as a symbol of 
wholesomeness, communal co-existence, and ancestral regeneration. Mandela’s inaugural speech 
is a rhetorical transformation that shows he has moved from a position on the margin as an anti-
apartheid fighter to the movement towards the political center. Mandela portrays this rhetorical 
transition in a manner that can be described as the ultimate identification. The identification, which 
is signified by the pronoun “we”/us,” coalesces with the metaphors of springtime to show that all 
South Africans are being reborn. The effusive manner with which Mandela deploys these 
metaphors serves to produce an image that is semiotically realized as a beautiful garden where 
everyone and everything work together in perfect harmony.  
Mandela’s deployment of the metaphor of a new and beautiful South Africa connects to 
the image of the Garden of Eden before the fall as an invocation of a Judeo-Christian concept and 
the Western rhetorical tradition.  This image is produced in the following words: “We are moved 
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by a sense of joy and exhilaration when the grass turns green and the flowers bloom” (Mandela, 
“Inaugural Speech, Pretoria”) to symbolize a luxurious springtime. Beautiful as the springtime 
may be, it does not last. The summer time brings with it a scorching heat as Mandela is faced with 
the challenges of governing a fractured nation. This challenge proved to be a test that threatened 
to destroy Mandela’s ethos as a leader yet again. When Mandela became the president in May 
1994, the people had waited too long for this dream to come true, and they were impatient for 
quick development. The inability to produce social and economic development at the pace desired 
by the people caused them to accuse Mandela of selling them out once again. One of those who 
criticized Mandela in the most vociferous manner was Winnie Mandela, his ex-wife. According to 
a newspaper interview Winnie is alleged to have given, she says: 
Mandela let us down. He agreed to bad deal for the Blacks. Economically, we are still 
on the outside. The economy is very much ‘white’. It has a few token blacks, but so 
many who gave their life in the struggle have died unrewarded…I cannot forgive him 
for going to receive the Nobel (Peace Prize in 1993) with his jailer [FW] de klerk. 
Hand in hand they went. Do you think de Klerk released him from the goodness of his 
heart? He had to. The times dictated it, the world had changed, and our struggle was 
not a flash in the pan, it was bloody to say the least and we had given rivers of blood. 
I had kept it alive with every means at my disposal…look at the Truth and 
Reconciliation charade. He should never have agreed to it…What good does the truth 
do? How does it help anyone to know where and how their loved ones were killed and 
buried? That Bishop Tutu who turned it all into a religious circus came here…He had 
the cheek to tell me to appear. I told him a few home truths. I told him that he and his 
other like-minded cretins were only sitting here because of our struggle and ME 
[capitals in the origin]. Because of the things I and people like me had done to get 
freedom (Mandira Naipaul, “How Mandela betrayed us, says ex-wife Winnie”).  
Winnie’s criticisms represent a rupture in the ANC body. As Mandela’s ex-wife, a key 
member of the ANC, and a member of parliament from 1994 – 2003, Winnie’s accusations carried 
a lot of weight. There was an obvious division stemming from disagreements among Blacks and 
their leaders. These divisions were most evident during the negotiation phase of the movement 
where the divide and rule tactics of the governments were at their highest. After the elections were 
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concluded and power was in the hands of the black majority, the bitterness among Blacks became 
palpable. Mandela’s capacity to see things from different perspectives came to the rescue once 
again. Through the performance of a pentadic ratio, Mandela points the searchlight upon his own 
Black people. Thus, Mandela validates Burke’s argument that the pentadic ratios are principles of 
determination (A Grammar, 15). In an address on Mashakane Focus Week in Bothaville, South 
Africa on October 4, 1998, Mandela enacts a merger with his fellow Blacks in a manner that is 
actually a division from them.  
In his address, Mandela explains how actual developments take time and efforts in the 
following words: “[a]fter apartheid ended, we faced the difficult task of reconstructing our 
shattered society and providing the most basic of services for our people. We had to build schools 
and hospitals, to provide housing and jobs, to boost our economy, to protect our people’s rights 
through our constitution and our courts, to help South Africa deal with the division of its past and 
start the healing process, to deal with abuse and damage, which engulfed most of our communities” 
(United Nations. “Nelson Mandela: In his Own Words.”). It is interesting to see how Mandela’s 
rhetoric transformed from that of a freedom fighter to that of “the father of the Nation.” Mandela’s 
employment of identification, merger, and division is quite strategic and appealing.  
Mandela goes on to add that “government cannot meet challenges by itself. It requires of 
us all to pull together, into a partnership, in order to bring about the necessary changes,” Mandela 
changes from the collective pronoun – “we/us,” to the individual/singular pronoun “I” to make the 
point that the individuals are all “I” within the collective – “we’ in conjunction with the 
government as “agents.” All these agents must “act” together for the “purpose” of bringing about 
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the required change in South Africa. Mandela throws the challenge back to the people in the 
following words: 
When we say that the best solutions to these challenges can only be found when we 
work with each other, it requires a commitment of each and every one of us. Today we 
should all ask ourselves: What have I done to improve the surroundings in which I 
live? Do I litter or do I protect my surroundings? Do I spread racial hatred or do I 
promote peace and reconciliation? Do I buy stolen goods or do I help to reduce crime? 
Do I pay my dues or do I cheat on my taxes, service fees and licenses? Do I expect 
everything to be delivered to me or do I work with my councilors to create a better life 
for myself and my community? (Mandela, “Address by President Nelson Mandela at 
a Municipal Infrastructure Programme in the Free State.”).  
In his characteristic manner, Mandela deploys rhetorical questions coupled with various 
pentadic ratios to probe the consciences of his audience. The pentadic ratio is operating upon the 
merger and division embodied by the pronoun “I” and the possessive pronoun “my.” The use of 
“I/my” is a merger with the people to mean “we/ours” and a division to mean “you” as individuals 
and “your” individual efforts. 
Those who accused Mandela of “selling out” because he was willing to share power with 
their former oppressors failed to realize that the political compromise reached by Mandela was 
“expressive of the spirit of ubuntu and of long-established African traditions wherein society 
frowned on extremism of any kind” (Sisifo Ndlovu, 188). Despite the fact that there were attempts 
to make him appear weak once again by his followers and fellow ANC leaders, Mandela 
demonstrates that his actual strength lies in the so-called weakness because his Africanness put a 
burden on his heart such that “[i]n a conflict situation…not even the victor could lay claim to the 
entire fruits of victory; nor could the defeated enemy be completely excluded” (Ndlovu, 188). The 
point is that even when there is no obvious employment of African rhetorical mode in his speech, 
the concept of ubuntu always guided his words and actions.  Consequently, having arrived in the 
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political center, Mandela’s rhetorical strategies tended to depict McPhail’s rhetoric of coherence, 
which transcends complicit rhetoric. The rhetoric of coherence is more significant in South Africa 
where racial conflict had inflicted deep wounds. The racial polarities that brought South Africa to 
its knees produced several ghosts that needed to be laid to rest for the new nation to move forward. 
The Government of National Unity and Truth and Reconciliation Commission were the measures 
through which the nation could begin the process of healing.   
 
Catharsis of Truth and Reconciliation 
Mandela always sought ways to produce catharsis, so that the bitterness in the heart of the 
oppressed will not result in revenge or in the victimization of the scapegoat. For example, in the 
Vaal township of Boipatong on June 17, 1992, a heavily armed force of Inkatha members (a rival 
group of the ANC) secretly raided and murdered forty-six ANC members, most of whom were 
women and children. Mandela wrote that “[p]eople across the country were horrified by the 
violence and charged the government with complicity. The police did nothing to stop the criminals 
and nothing to find them; no arrests were made, no investigation begun. Mr. de Klerk said nothing. 
I found this to be the last straw, and my patience snapped. The government was blocking the 
negotiations and at the same time waging a covert war against our people” (Long Walk, 602-603). 
Rather than resort to violence, as the people were demanding, Mandela sought ways to diffuse the 
tension in order to calm things down. According to Mandela,  
I addressed a crowd of twenty thousand angry ANC supporters and told them I had 
instructed ANC secretary-general Cyril Ramaphosa to suspend direct dealings with the 
government…At the rally, is saw signs that read, “MANDELA, GIVE US GUNS” and 
“VICTORY THROUGH BATTLE NOT TALK” [capitals in original]. I understood 
such sentiments; people were frustrated…I was initially sympathetic to this group of 
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hardliners, but gradually realized that there was no alternative to the process. It was 
what I had been urging for so many years, and I would not turn my back on 
negotiations. But it was time to cool things down. Mass action in this case was a middle 
course between armed struggle and negotiations. The people must have an outlet for 
their anger and frustration, and a mass action campaign was the best way to channel 
those emotions (Mandela, Long Walk, 604).  
Mandela deploys repetition for appealing to the people in order to calm them down in the 
face of obvious provocation. Mandela’s readiness to rise above the moment without losing sight 
of the exigency or reality of the moment caused him to seek a “middle course” of releasing tension 
rather than risk an implosion. After his election, he carried on this philosophy of seeking the middle 
course by setting up the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC aimed to produce 
catharsis by revisiting past injustices in a spirit of communal brotherhood through disclosure and, 
possibly, closure. It was a middle course between the demands of a beleaguered apartheid 
government that was demanding “that in exchange for loss of power there should be blanket 
amnesty for all the agents of apartheid, particularly the police and the armed forces” (Njabulo 
Ndebele, “South Africa: quandaries of compromise”) and the call for justice and punishment of 
perpetrators by the victims of apartheid.  
Mandela recognized the need for healing through forgiveness and reconciliation in a way 
that can be transformative. Mandela’s words “I was chained as you were chained. I was freed, and 
you have been freed. So, if I can pardon my oppressors, you can too,” captures his leadership style 
of leading by example. It is instructive to note that though Mandela has enacted a separation from 
Dr. King in adopting the armed struggle, it can be argued that he merges his ideas with those of 
Dr. King in his call for peace and reconciliation. Mandela’s motive for the peace and reconciliation 
commission echoes Dr. King’s following words:  
We Negroes have long dreamed of freedom, but still we are confined in an oppressive 
prison of segregation and discrimination. Must we respond with bitterness and 
cynicism? Certainly not, for this will destroy and poison our personalities…To guard 
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ourselves from bitterness, we need the vision to see in this generation’s ordeals the 
opportunity to transfigure both ourselves and American society. Our present suffering 
and our nonviolent struggle to be free may well offer to Western civilization the kind 
of spiritual dynamic so desperately needed for survival (A Gift of love, 98).  
The danger of bitterness rests in its possible outlets, which can only be catastrophic. What 
confronted Mandela on assumption of office as the president was a problem that “was analogous 
to two powerful steam engines careening towards each other on the same track. Mandela had to 
slow them both down, stop them, and then reverse each one to a position where they could link up 
and travel in a completely new direction” (Willie Pieterson, “What Mandela taught the World 
about Leadership”). The new direction was akin to Dr. King’s philosophy of love in the face of 
hatred. Robin Kelley argues that Dr. King’s vision of love as the antidote to hatred should be 
seriously examined because most ideologies have often fallen short of their ideals. However, the 
kind of ideals King held was the kind of “transcendence upward” Burke describes, which is done 
“for the greater glory of God” (Burke, Attitude, 337). Mandela needed to hold on to such an ideal 
that will help South Africans overcome their difficult past.   
In his wisdom, Mandela identified that some of the black leaders, particularly his ex-wife, 
had been accused of human right abuses in the cause of the struggle. If human rights abuses 
occurred on both sides of the divide, unjust acts were not exclusive to any particular race. In 
essence, the fallacy of essentialism is made manifest because the realities and abuses of apartheid 
and the fight against apartheid indicates that human predilection to abuse of power transcends race. 
Mandela’s call for reconciliation and amnesty rather than a call for retribution “challenges the idea 
that racism as a social practice of domination can be reduced to a relationship between oppressors 
and the oppressed, between victimizers and victims, between white people with power and Black 
people without it. Such a reduction only reaffirms racism’s most basic assumption: that we are in 
essence separate and distinct from one another and only indirectly implicated in each other’s lives” 
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(McPhail, viii). The call for amnesty had seeds that implied that both Blacks and whites needed to 
heal in the process because everyone comes to the table of reconciliation as human beings not as 
racially differentiated beings.  
 However, a blanket amnesty under the circumstances would have made most Blacks feel 
cheated as victims of apartheid and, consequently, lose confidence in their leaders. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was instituted as a conditional amnesty because it offered the victims 
of apartheid “the opportunity to tell what happened to them, and for their sufferings to be publicly 
acknowledged…[and] the perpetrators of political crimes should account for their deeds by making 
full and truthful disclosures of their actions” (Njabulo Ndebele, “South Africa: quandaries of 
compromise”). The act of ‘telling’ is the procedure that produces catharsis for the release of all the 
pent-up emotions. 
The criticism that haunted the TRC was “that it frustrates justice and the desire for 
punishment” (Ndebele, “South Africa: quandaries of compromise”). It can be argued that 
punishment assumes varying forms. The singular mode of punishment envisaged by those calling 
for it entailed lawsuits and, possibly, imprisonment. As Ndebele argued, such criticisms failed to 
“take into account the fact that many recipients of amnesty experience a kind of punishment they 
never anticipated: the shame of being publicly exposed. The exposure of their participation in 
despicable acts of cruelty has in some cases resulted in broken families, disorientation, and loss of 
self-esteem – a form of punishment that can arguably be far more devastating than that exacted by 
an ordinary jail sentence” (“South Africa: quandaries of compromise”). All the emotions that the 
TRC would help to release would partly lead to the catharsis and healing that Mandela hoped for 
in his negotiations and which was also articulated in his inaugural speech.  
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It is significant to discuss the way that the healing aimed for by Mandela is re-inscribed 
through the rhetoric of reconciliation. The inaugural speech shows that “Mandela was attempting 
the nation’s “delivery” in his speech – “delivery” as labour or travail of the South African nation 
and of the orator himself…Mandela indeed delivers the eulogy of South Africa at the very moment 
that consensus, national reconciliation – the new nation as conciliation of difference – is born” 
(Salazar, 21). The rhetoric of reconciliation, which is Mandela’s course, can be described as an 
embodiment of McPhail’s concept of the ‘rhetoric of coherence’ because “[b]oth attempt to 
achieve the same ends: the conscious understanding and integration of difference in order to 
transform division” (ix). The TRC may have achieved, among other things, a recognition that all 
human beings are essentially interconnected.  
Mandela’s dreams of unity for South Africa can only be realized when people believe that 
they are “materially, ideologically, and spiritually implicated in each other’s lives. What affects 
one, as Dr. King so astutely observed, affects all” (McPhail, ix). Did the TRC achieve the aim 
Mandela hoped for? It can be argued that Mandela did achieve his aim despite the complications 
that trailed the TRC. For one, there were no inter-racial wars or counter-insurgencies. And the 
peaceful transition that produced a stable polity hitherto absent in South Africa became a symbol 
of Mandela’s dynamic leadership. Through the TRC, Mandela attempted to produce unity in 
plurality, and the consensus he aimed for was achieved through a quotation from the poem of an 
Afrikaans poet Ingrid Jonker, who he describes as “an Afrikaner woman who transcended a 
particular experience and became a South African, an African and a citizen of the world” (Salazar, 
23). More significantly, the TRC offered an opportunity for examining the psychodynamics that 
necessitated catharsis and healing in a racially fractured space like South Africa.  
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The TRC opened up the space for national healing in a unique way particularly because 
“the contrition leading to a plea for forgiveness, as part of a quest for reacceptance in, can be far 
more restorative than the hoped-for rehabilitative effects of an ordinary prison term. The cure in 
the method of the TRC is located within social practice rather than in the artificiality of punitive 
isolation” (Ndebele, “South Africa: Quandaries of Compromise”). But the healing continues. The 
peaceful transition through Government of National Unity and the TRC has become a reference 
point globally. According to Eric Doxtader, “the South African “miracle” has granted considerable 
presumption to the idea that reconciliation is a crucial if not necessary element of democratization. 
In a number of countries, including Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda, Indonesia, and Angola, there 
are now standing calls to define and implement reconciliation processes that deal with the past and 
promote healing of deep division” (268). Despite the contextual differences between these nations 
and that of South Africa, the healing that proceeds from reconciliation has proved to be a universal 
concept. Mandela’s role in the South African context made him a role model for leadership in 
conflict resolution. According to Pietersen,  
Mandela faced the kinds of strategic challenges any national leader might face. His 
overriding vision of freedom and harmony implicitly embraced three sub goals: a 
political goal (democracy), a social goal (better living conditions), and an economic 
goal (shared prosperity). All three, of course, were interrelated. On the political front, 
the results have been stunning: a peaceful transition to democracy and black majority 
rule. Mandela was truly the trumpet that sounded the clear sound. He served as a 
majestic role model of inclusiveness (“What Nelson Mandela Taught the World about 
Leadership”). 
 The social, economic, and political fracturing caused by racism is not peculiar to South 
Africa.  Racial inequality has existed in Canada and the US much longer than in South Africa. The 
TRC in South Africa served as a reference point for its counterpart in Canada where Justice Murray 
Sinclair compared the Residential School experiences of the Aboriginals to that of Blacks in South 
Africa. Sinclair claims that the Canadian TRC learned a lot from Mandela and South Africa 
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because it enabled many victims of the Residential School System have the catharsis and closure 
that was experienced in South Africa. According to Sinclair, Mandela “was certainly an elder…a 
wise and kind man who brought with his presence an understanding of what it was that aboriginal 
people were experiencing and had experienced in the past” (Canada’s Truth…”). It is important to 
ask if the TRC has succeeded in resolving the problem of inequality in South Africa and Canada. 
The answer is in the negative. That is because equality must pervade all the strata of the society in 
order to have a stabilizing effect in the society. The lack of economic power on the parts of Blacks 
proved to be a sore point.  
The TRC in South Africa produced a lot of ambivalent feelings among Blacks and whites, 
leaders and commoners. That is because “there is a decades-long debate over the precise nature of 
reconciliation and its contribution to the struggle and “negotiated revolution” that ended apartheid” 
(Doxtader, 268). Reconciliation entails the telling of the past within the present because as 
Doxtader claims “[r]econciliation beckons story-telling” (280) as a way of getting people to 
reconcile themselves with their painful past experiences. Therefore, the TRC hoped for a 
reconciliation that aimed to help reconstruct victim identity, especially within the context of 
racism. Apartheid framed Black identity in derogatory terms, which reduced their dignity and 
humanity. In providing the space for the people to tell their stories without any fear of retribution, 
it can be argued that the TRC succeeded in helping Black South Africans reclaim their identity. 
 The opportunity for individuals to tell previously censored or lost personal stories that 
arise from their experiences in relation to others implies that “reconciliation appears in a Kairos, 
the time of opportunity that remains before the end of time” (Doxtader, 271). The experience of 
reconciliation appears to mean more for the oppressed than the oppressor, not only because the 
oppressor loses power in the case of South Africa, but particularly because “[i]ts promise of dignity 
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in the wake of denigration depends on the remembrance of experience that confirms the self’s 
standing for itself and in the face of the other” (Doxtader, 274). The significance of reconciliation 
for forging ahead cannot be overemphasized.  
The significance lies partly in the potential of the TRC to employ narratives as a means of 
documenting history and to constitute the form of “[a] movement between the recovery of dignity 
and the catharsis of acknowledgement” (Doxtader, 280). Presuming that the aim of reconciliation 
makes more meaning for the oppressed particularly Black South Africans, it is easy to understand 
why white South Africans remain committed to the ideology of innocence. Despite the 
“willingness of Black leaders and citizens to forgive and even forget the racial injustices of 
apartheid” (McPhail, “A Question of Character…” 395), the reason a lot of white South Africans 
refused to apologize is because the rhetoric of reconciliation closes the old racial contract and 
requires re-signing the racial contract.   
The resistance of whites to the concept of constructing a new racial contract can best be 
appreciated through the concept of collective memory and historical memory. The current racial 
contract was based on differences “that emerge from a national history of the idea of race and the 
practices of racism. They are also differences that emerge from the very divergent ways in which 
we have experienced or been subjects to that history. They are differences shaped on the one hand 
by collective memory and on the other by a collective practice of selective memory or, perhaps 
more accurately, a collective amnesia” (Condon, 10-11). This idea connects strongly to Chilton’s 
argument that the information stored in the long-term memory is often retrieved and processed 
through the short-term and episodic memory for immediate action. Consequently, the role of 
narratives in producing these memories cannot be overstated. As McPhail points out, “it is the 
structure of our collective memory and public discourse that makes racism a persistent problem” 
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(“A Question of Character…” 392). The public discourse, whereby everything is categorized in 
essential terms and the racial difference that is constructed in separate and unequal terms, gave 
rise to apartheid. Therefore, the reconciliation aimed for by the TRC calls into question the ethos 
of the racial contract in South Africa and elsewhere.  
Despite the TRC, racism in South Africa mirrors racism in the US where “the projection 
and protection of white racial privilege and power continue to be exercised and embraced, and in 
both cases have become much more subtle and insidious” (McPhail, “A Question of Character…” 
396).  The stronghold of racism among whites is located within psychology, which has been 
produced over time through the scapegoating of the “other” who represents some threat, whether 
real or perceived, within the community. The threat is made to appear more potent especially when 
this racial, ethnic, or religious “other” has been rhetorically constructed to possess an image, which 
has been demonized over time. The communal identity is strengthened when all the resources and 
community’s cooperative efforts are directed towards fighting this common enemy. The insidious 
nature of racism, when the monster has been fought head on, begs the question – what are the 
potentials for rhetoric to transform a mindset that has taken centuries to calcify?   
The reason that reconciliation was embraced by Blacks and resisted by whites proceeds 
from the fact that “freedom, equality, and responsibility have been conceptualized and actualized 
in radically different ways by peoples of African and European descent” (McPhail, “A Question 
of Character…” 392). This difference in conceptualization does not dissipate like a mist. That is 
because Africans and Europeans make up the group whereby “the former see [equality, freedom, 
and responsibility] in terms of the consequences and material conditions of the Racial Contract, 
while the latter define these in terms of abstractions and intentions of the social contract. Closing 
the gap between the two is a prerequisite for coherent reconciliation, and this can only be 
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accomplished by a collective act of white atonement: a resigning of the Racial Contract” (McPhail, 
“A Question of Character…” 392). It can be argued that Blacks in South Africa needed the healing 
that comes from forgiveness and reconciliation far more since they were the most wounded by 
apartheid, and it is the wounded that needs to heal and move on.  
It is also important to reiterate that racism and the injustices that result from racial 
oppression are founded on the normativity of whiteness as a system of unearned privilege. 
Therefore, “South Africa’s rhetoric of reconciliation was largely a Black rhetoric: it was the 
spiritually inspired militancy of a Tutu and the integrative Afrocentricity of a Mandela that formed 
the substance of a reconstitutive Black rhetoric, a coherent rhetoric of reconciliation” (McPhail, 
“A Question of Character…” 394). Mandela’s call for reconciliation is the ultimate transition from 
the rhetoric of complicity as a racial ‘other’ to the rhetoric of coherence as a statesman.  
Will whites ever produce the rhetoric of coherence? To answer this question, it is important 
to retrace the evolution of the rhetoric of racism. The rhetoric of racism is a psychological and 
social construct, which enables the appreciation of how matters related to race are among the most 
pervasive mental phenomena of the past few hundred years. In essence, the self-deception of 
whites and misrepresentation of other races form a part of the cognitive and moral economy 
physically required for conquest, colonization, and enslavement. This mindset, which Fanon refers 
to as narcissism is what defines white supremacy; and for whites to apologize or embrace 
reconciliation, is to redefine the white versus black equation. 
Several people – Blacks and whites – refused to apologize during the TRC sitting and the 
attitude of such people requires serious evaluation. For some of the black leaders, the TRC seemed 
like a betrayal because they believed they were the wounded party and, thus, their past acts of 
human rights violations were justified as far as they were concerned. Asking them to apologize 
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seemed like the ultimate injury from one of their own. Though surprised and grateful by the lack 
of bitterness and acts of vengeance towards them by Blacks, South African whites remained aloof.  
The aloofness of these white South African negates the spirit of reconciliation that the TRC aimed 
for. Despite the negative attitude of some participants and the mixed reactions that greeted the 
TRC report, the exercise can be described as a success because of its latent potential for the 
transcendental rhetoric of coherence.  
Mandela’s concept of reconciliation encapsulates Dr. King’s idea of overcoming hatred 
through love. The reconciliation that brought peace in South Africa was conceptualized and 
performed in the spirit of Ubuntu, while Dr. King’s rhetoric of love is based on the Biblical concept 
of forgiveness (the golden rule – do unto others as you would have them do unto you). As Doxtader 
argues, reconciliation is laden with “significant religious and dialectical baggage” (268) and, thus, 
the term is troubled and distrusted. Therefore, it can be argued that “between a deep mystery (of 
grace) and naïve simplicity (of synthesis), we are wary of reconciliation because it seems to lack 
or overdetermine reason” (Doxtader, 268). Doxtader links reconciliation to the salvific sacrifice of 
Christ, which produced a reconciliation between God and the human race; and to the Greek concept 
of amnesty. Mandela and Dr. King’s strategies for overcoming strife spring from similar 
ideologies, arising from the African and Western rhetorical and religious traditions.  
This similarity proves that the African and Western rhetorical traditions have a lot in 
common as has been argued in the first chapter. It also proves that both rhetoric and religion are 
neutral in nature and, therefore, their manipulation or abuse is what has created their potential for 
harm. Mandela’s embodiment as the agent of reconciliation is an indication that his Africanness 
and his love for Western rhetorical tradition and culture have not only produced his braided 
rhetoric, it also implies that there is an intermingling of the two rhetorical traditions with which he 
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makes his rhetorical appeal. This braiding of the two rhetorical traditions is the ultimate transition 
to the rhetoric of coherence.  
The rhetoric of coherence embodied by Mandela, which was enacted through identification 
and kairotic ontology, can be described as a success despite the discontent among his Black 
compatriots. It can be argued that the rhetoric of coherence made his commitment to the TRC non-
negotiable because his non-racialism was transmitted through identification with the entire nation. 
Apart from the catharsis that the TRC served to produce, it was an opportunity to interrogate the 
discourse and context that the catastrophe of apartheid in South Africa produced as well as chart a 
new course for the reconstituted nation.  
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